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Abstract 
 
International Relations scholarship suggests that meanings embedded in the idea of self-
determination have shifted over time. This scholarship also recognises that throughout the 
twentieth century self-determination has played a key role in the demise of empire and the 
ensuing formation of new states. This was the case with the conclusion of World War I, 
with the wave of post-World War II decolonisation, and following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. However, whereas scholarship depicts self-determination as central to 
the legitimacy of new states and international society, it does not tell us much about what 
happens after statehood is recognised. The assumption that self-determination ends where 
sovereignty starts, the author argues, obscures the ambiguous role that self-determination has 
played before, and crucially after statehood is recognised. Invoked to universalise the model 
of the nation-state and sovereign equality, self-determination has concurrently involved 
exclusions and hierarchies, both domestically and systemically. The present thesis is 
concerned with this fundamental and yet largely neglected part of the story of the expansion 
of international society. More precisely, the author argues that twentieth century 
understandings and usages of the idea of self-determination point to the existence of a 
recurrent tension. This is a tension between the egalitarian aspirations of self-determination 
on one hand, and practices of hierarchy associated with self-determination on the other. For 
each of the 20th century waves of expansion of international society, this tension has been 
evident at three different levels of world politics. First, it has been embodied in the 
disciplinary role of international society, when self-determination was redefined, during each 
wave of state formation, as the standard of legitimate membership and statehood. Second, the 
tension has manifested itself at the domestic level of the newly “self-determined” states as 
boundaries of national political communities were delineated. Third, and as an implication of 
all this, the tension is found in the ordering of states within international society. 
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Introduction 
 
When in June 1991 Franjo Tudjman came to proclaim the creation of the Croatian state, he 
did so in the name of what he regarded as the “inalienable, indivisible, non-transferable and 
perpetual right of the Croatian nation to self-determination and state sovereignty.”1 That same 
phrase, uttered to define the contours of the new, independent state of Croatia, was, however, 
simultaneously used to justify the moral, legal and physical exclusion of individuals that did 
not fall within the boundaries of the Croatian nation, now marked, infamously, by ethnic 
criteria. Just one year earlier, in Paris, member states of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, of which Yugoslavia was also part, had each formally agreed upon a 
“steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms,” 
undertaking “to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of 
government for [our] nations.”2 Could self-determination be invoked, and its invocation be 
tolerated internationally, to justify boundaries of inclusion and exclusion along ethnic lines?  
 
As the European Community (EC) Commission on the dissolution of Yugoslavia reiterated in 
January 1992, when violence and exclusion had by then spread throughout the whole of the 
Balkans, “Article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants on human rights established that 
the principle of the right to self-determination serves to safeguard human rights.”3 And yet, 
the opposite was occurring, right after the endorsement of the Paris Charter, and at the heart 
of Europe, in the very region where, in 1919, the Paris peacemakers had applied self-
determination to guarantee the transition from empires to nation-states. Robust international 
condemnations followed, leading eventually, after years of violence and upheaval, to the 
establishment of international supervisory regimes, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
 
Tensions between international ideas and expectations attached to self-determination, on the 
one side, and domestic ideas and practices of self-determination, on the other, are not a new 
matter. If we examine the history of the twentieth century, similar dynamics emerge. With the 
conclusion of World War I, new states were formed in the name of self-determination on 
territories formerly under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman and Russian 
empires. Recognition of new states as equal members of the “family of nations” was made 
                                            
1 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Part I: Historical Foundations, adopted on December, 22nd, 1990.  
2 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, unanimously endorsed in Paris in 1990 by the members of the CSCE. 
3 Quoted and discussed in Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee.” 
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conditional upon the ratification of the so-called Minority Treaties. These treaties delineated 
internationally, despite obvious flaws, the contours of self-determination after the war, and 
how national authorities should define and treat internal societies. The way in which the new 
states were formed, though, did not conform to international standards.  
 
International Relations (IR) scholarship recognises that throughout the twentieth century the 
principle of self-determination has played a key role in the demise of imperial orders and the 
ensuing formation of new states. This was the case with the conclusion of World War I, with 
the wave of post-World War II decolonisation, and following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. However, whereas it depicts self-determination as central to the 
legitimacy of new states and international society, this scholarship does not tell us much about 
what happens after statehood is recognised. This thesis argues that the assumption that self-
determination ends where sovereignty starts underestimates the ambivalent role of self-
determination before and, crucially, after statehood is recognised. Not only does this 
assumption restrict the story of the expansion of international society to the establishment of 
new states, overlooking subsequent implications for international membership and order, it 
neglects fundamental aspects, often dismissed from the study of IR as “merely” belonging to 
the domestic realm. This thesis is concerned with this fundamental and yet largely neglected 
part of the story of the expansion of international society. 
 
We are told that over the past century, the progressive unfolding of self-determination led to 
the expansion of the model of the nation-state, replacing vertical logics of membership and 
identity with horizontal ones. New states were formed, they became members of international 
society, and this is where the story of its expansion ends. In this thesis, however, I show that 
this progressivist tale of equality sits uncomfortably with logics of hierarchy that 
accompanied the history of self-determination throughout the twentieth century, 
internationally but also domestically. The thesis thus addresses the following research 
question:  
 
What is the relationship between evolving conceptions of self-determination internationally 
and domestic practices of self-determination in the wake of empire, and what does this 
relationship tell us about the constitution of hierarchy in 20th century international society?  
 
 
2
The existing literature 
 
As Chapter 1 will show, the nature of imperial systems has been traced in IR since Michael 
Doyle’s foundational work Empires, and more recently scholars have focused on processes of 
imperial demise. Authors engaged with ends of empires have stressed how invocations of 
self-determination have been used to delegitimise these forms of political authority, focusing 
in particular on the period between the end of World War I and the post-World War II wave 
of decolonisation.4 This process, it has been recently stressed, was importantly the result of 
subject peoples’ demands for greater equality of rights, which, due to their nature, empires 
could not accommodate.5 Self-determination thus came to be firmly associated with such 
demands over the 1950s and 1960s, through its framing in the language of human rights.6 
Used to justify the dismantling of imperial systems and their unequal regimes of rights’ 
allocation, self-determination became attached to ideas of equal rights and non-
discrimination, and in turn, came to delineate the model of the nation-state globally.7  
 
These are aspects crucial to the story of the expansion of the modern sovereign order during 
the twentieth century, yet they represent just one portion of it. The question as to what 
happened both domestically and internationally during moments of expansion, once self-
determination was proclaimed remains unanswered. Compared to the first part of the 
historical account, little attention has been given in IR to the relationship between self-
determination and state formation after imperial demise. These observations lead to the 
suggestion that within the discipline the model of the nation-state, along with its defining 
values of equality and, increasingly, inclusion, has “come to be construed as the inevitable 
endpoint of self-determination.”8 Engaging with only one side of the story bears at least one 
major, teleological risk. It leaves the reader with the sense that indeed the nation-state was 
achieved globally, against political hierarchies and discrimination. James Mayall, one of the 
“fathers” of the study of self-determination in IR, wrote in 1990 that over the twentieth 
                                            
4 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, 2007; Simpson, “Brad Simpson, ‘The Many Meanings of National Self-
Determination,’ Current History, 113.” 
5 Reus-Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System, 2013. 
6 The argument has been firstly acknowledged in Reus-Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction of 
Sovereignty,” 2001. It has then been the object of a book in International History: Burke, Decolonization and the 
Evolution of International Human Rights, 2010. 
7 Reus-Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System, 2013, Chapter 5. 
8 Scott, “The Image of the State and the Expansion of the International System,” 27. 
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century “the naturalness of hierarchy was replaced by the naturalness of equality.”9 This 
thesis calls into question this widely shared assumption. In scholarly practice in particular, we 
tend to work with restrictive analogies between hierarchy and empire, on the one hand, and 
equality and nation-state, on the other. However, the historical picture of the expansion of 
international society in the twentieth century is less clear-cut. This thesis thus seeks to 
problematise - to borrow Mayall’s expression - the “naturalness” with which transitions from 
empires to nation-states have been portrayed, and locate them within the broader realm of 
twentieth century world politics.  
 
Within the existing IR literature, the bodies of scholarship that have engaged most directly 
with the questions posed in this research are the English School and constructivism. Crucially, 
both bodies of scholarship acknowledge that self-determination lies, today, at the heart of 
states’ legitimacy, international society and world order. However, both schools are 
problematic in key respects. First, with one exception (James Mayall’s 1990 work) neither 
body of work has fully problematised self-determination. Instead, self-determination has been 
regularly studied in association with, and subordination to, other core principles of 
international order such as sovereignty, human rights and non-interference.10 Second, whereas 
both literatures recognise that self-determination has been constitutive of new states, neither 
has engaged with the implications of the relationship between self-determination and 
(legitimate) statehood after empire. The implications of this relationship upon 
reconfigurations of order and upon questions of international legitimacy remain largely 
overlooked.11  
 
What is present in the extant literature, instead, is a general appreciation that, beyond its 
centrality, the meaning associated with self-determination has changed over the twentieth 
century. For a long time, emphasis was put on the inter-war period.12 More recently, IR 
scholars have directed their attention to the post-World War II wave of decolonisation, joining 
a similar growing interest in the discipline of history. Tracing changes in meaning is 
insufficient, however, for a comprehensive understanding of the place of self-determination in 
                                            
9 Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, 1990, 33. 
10 Respectively, see as cases in point: Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect, 2014; Reus-Smit, 
Individual Rights and the Making of the International System, 2013; Respectively, see as cases in point: Welsh, 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. 
11 As an exception see Hurrell, On Global Order, 2007, Chapter 5. 
12 As a case in point see Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-States System. 
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world politics. Conceptions of self-determination have both normative and historical 
implications for statehood. These, I argue, are implications that should be investigated, as 
they relate both to the internal organisation of states and their acceptance as legitimate 
members of international society. This thesis seeks to correct this tendency by building upon 
the constructivist and English School literatures, the recent resurgence of interest in self-
determination in international history, and, to a lesser extent, relevant writings in legal 
history.  
 
The argument 
 
Pursuing this line of analysis in Chapter 2, I argue that despite their variations twentieth 
century understandings and usages of the idea of self-determination point to a recurrent 
tension. This is a tension between the egalitarian aspirations of self-determination, on one 
hand, and the practices of hierarchy associated with self-determination, on the other. As we 
shall see, for each of the 20th century waves of expansion of international society,13 this 
tension is evident at three different levels of world politics.  
 
First, the tension has been embodied in international redefinitions of self-determination. 
Throughout the 20th century, IR scholarship tells us, self-determination became the accepted 
standard for post-imperial statehood and membership in international society. Yet just like 
any standard, I argue that self-determination has inevitably entailed correlative disciplining 
expectations. These have been international expectations as to what “good” domestic order 
ought to be within post-imperial states. These expectations have been marked by a discourse 
about political equality of individuals and equality of rights as constitutive of the nation-state. 
However, they have also been at times more, or less, explicit and coherent, encouraging, in 
contradictory ways, the recognition of certain claims over others. Moreover, whereas self-
determination is largely imagined as the principle associated to non-interference and leading 
to sovereign equality after breakdowns of imperial orders, by the very delineation of 
international expectations, the dominant narrative about equality within and among states 
appears to be compromised.  
  
                                            
13 The phrase “waves of expansion of international society” was first used by Reus-Smit, in “Struggles for 
Individual Rights and the Expansion of the International System,” 207. 
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Second, the tension has manifested itself at the domestic level of the newly “self-determined” 
states as political élites delineated the boundaries of national political communities. It has 
long been acknowledged that there needs to be a demarcation as to who can be part of a 
political community and who cannot. The unexpected feature of exclusions in new, post-
imperial states formed in the name of self-determination lay in the systematic way in which 
these took place. ‘Hierarchical membership’ has been the norm, I shall argue. Old social 
distinctions, or hierarchies inherited from past imperial modes of recognition, have structured 
post-imperial societies, often at odds with the egalitarian aspirations of self-determination. 
  
The deeper significance of all this, that constitutes the third level of my argument, is that 
international expectations about equality within new, “self-determined” states have rarely (if 
ever) been met. This discrepancy, I suggest, has resulted in the moral and political 
categorising of states along lines of democratic/liberal zones of practice and identity. In a way 
not dissimilar to old civilisational ideas, self-determination has been used to justify 
hierarchies of status, within international society. Self-determination has not only established 
who could be part of international society and who could not. Expectations attached to self-
determination (and whether these were respected or not) have also delineated, at given times, 
who could be a more legitimate – and thus equal - member within it.  
 
Historical cases 
 
The empirical body of the thesis is organised into three main parts, composed of two chapters 
each, and each concerned with a different wave of state formation after hierarchical systems 
of authority collapsed: following World War I (chapters 3 and 4), with the decolonisation 
movements after World War II (chapters 5 and 6) and with the end of the Cold War (chapters 
7 and 8). Each part has a similar structure: the first chapters in each pair are concerned with 
international redefinitions of self-determination, the second chapters all deal with the role of 
self-determination, both domestically and internationally, after statehood is recognised.  
 
 
Part One  
 
The historical investigation commences with the end of World War I and the Paris Peace 
Conference, when self-determination became a shared principle of international order. 
6
Chapter 3 explains that self-determination was granted to those people who had mobilised 
nationalist sentiment during the nineteenth century, under the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
empires. It was also explicitly tied, I argue, to international expectations about what “good” 
domestic order should be, after statehood was recognised. Representatives of Great Powers at 
the Paris Peace Conference principally defined these expectations. Recognition of new states 
as equal members of the “family of nations” was thus made conditional upon the ratification 
of the so-called Minority Treaties. With their inconsistencies, these treaties each delineated 
internationally how national authorities should define and treat internal societies and groups.  
 
However, as Chapter 4 shows, the way domestic societies came to be delineated and treated 
within many newly formed states did not follow international expectations. Post-imperial 
hierarchical membership was in contrast with the international conceptions of equality that, 
despite obvious flaws that I will highlight, were embedded in the idea of self-determination 
upheld in Paris. To illustrate my claims, I direct my attention to the formation of the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia. I contend that the Kingdom was inaugurated in 1919 on explicitly 
contradictory grounds and later exemplified a form of hierarchical membership. Throughout 
the 1920s the League of Nations would constantly remind Yugoslavia and other post-imperial 
states that their status as sovereign equals was dependent upon meeting international 
expectations about appropriate state behaviour defined in the treaties.  
 
Part Two 
 
Chapter 5 locates the idea of self-determination in the realm of the wider transformations that 
characterised the international normative environment in the post-World War II 
decolonisation period, until the passing of the two International Covenants on Human Rights 
in 1966. In the immediate post-war years important changes were in motion but the United 
Nations remained an empire-oriented organisation.14 The principle of self-determination was 
stated in the UN Charter in 1945, but was more an aspirational principle than as an 
immediately and universally applicable right. Major transformations took place in the 
following years, when post-colonial delegates used the UN as an arena to uphold the cause of 
self-determination for all against the will of colonial powers. Thanks to their efforts, self-
                                            
14 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. 
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determination came to be embedded in human rights language and a nexus was established 
between human rights and political rights within bounded polities.  
 
General Assembly Resolution 1514 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial People, 
passed in 1960, constituted a watershed, licensing, in the name of self-determination and 
human rights, the constitution of new states in those areas still under colonial rule. As Chapter 
6 shows for post-colonial Africa, despite the ideals of equality and inclusion upon which new 
states were proclaimed, conceptions of hierarchical membership often prevailed internally. 
States formerly under British and French authority are of particular interest to this chapter. 
First, they represent an important axis of variation as to the type of membership policies 
inherited from colonialism, British authorities stressing diversity, French ones, instead, 
propounding assimilation. According to the type of membership regime inherited, more or 
less formalised practices of hierarchical membership were inaugurated after independence. 
With decolonisation, international supervisory regimes retreated, due to norms of sovereign 
equality and non-interference. While in many post-colonial states, in particular those formerly 
under British rule, hierarchical membership endured in line with older imperial membership 
policies, the standard formula at the UN was a “liberal pluralist” one.  
 
Part Three 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 are both concerned with the break-up of Yugoslavia and the formation of its 
successor states. Chapter 7 investigates the re-emergence in international debates of ethnicity 
and self-determination, right in the area where the Paris Peacemakers had thought the matter 
to be solved. The temptation to constitute ethnically defined nation-states was perceived as 
deviant from the liberal ideals to which self-determination had come to be attached as a norm 
after 1960. The promptness with which the European Conference on Yugoslavia (and EC 
Committee) was organised in September 1991, indicates international society’s willingness to 
delineate, again, the boundaries of self-determination and criteria of entry into international 
society. However, as in 1919 this was undertaken on contradictory grounds. Whereas equality 
and human rights were promoted, the EC Committee and Conference on Yugoslavia 
recognised only certain groups and thus, only some claims over others.  
 
Taking stock of these events, Chapter 8 considers three distinct attempts to delineate political 
communities in the name of self-determination. Starting in 1991 with Croatia’s secessionist 
8
declaration, it continues with the Bosnian events of 1995, and terminates in 2008, with 
Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence. The chapter also examines how and why 
international responses to self-determination claims and state formation have changed. 
Starting from the initial disinterest in Croatia’s strongly institutionalised practices of 
hierarchical membership, questioned only later and the object of a delayed EU accession 
process, it then turns to the turbulent international involvements (with a focus on the UN and 
OSCE) in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
 
Approach and Method 
 
Interestingly, during two of the three key moments studied in this thesis, the Balkan area was 
one of, if not the principal object of international discussion. These moments were after 1919, 
and the end of the Cold War, the first when self-determination was acquired for the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, the second when it was acquired for the Successor States to Former 
Yugoslavia (SSFY). In both cases practices of hierarchical membership were inaugurated. It 
appears that hierarchies were also fostered through international supervisory regimes. “More 
mature” states were called to guarantee self-determination after World War I, with the 
Minority Treaties, and then in the 1990s and 2000s, in particular through the role of the 
OSCE and EU. I will also show that concurrently, these international supervisory regimes 
fostered a certain ambiguity, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, they 
cultivated hierarchies of rights, both in 1919 and after the Cold War. Internationally, they 
made sovereign equality (and in the case of Kosovo, sovereignty) conditional upon respect for 
the expectations attached by international actors to self-determination. 
 
In both cases, clearly defined groups of actors delineated such expectations and 
understandings of self-determination. In the case of the Paris Peace Conference, the Minority 
Treaties were negotiated by a very limited number of actors. Delegates representing national 
groups in post-imperial territories were invited to speak, to give their view on the creation of 
new states. Teams of geographers, anthropologists and historians worked on the matter. 
However, it was within the limited space of the Committee on New States, formed on the 
decision of the Council of Four composed of Georges Clémenceau, David Lloyd George, 
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando and Woodrow Wilson, that the content of the treaties was 
discussed. Many contested at the time the views that the representatives of these Great Powers 
upheld. In the years preceding the Paris Peace Conference, the Bolsheviks had articulated the 
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idea of self-determination as the vehicle for social revolution – a view that was to influence 
decisively and globally later struggles for self-determination. In Paris, post-imperial states, 
including Japan’s representatives, called into question the institutional boundaries of self-
determination, demanding the recognition of the equality of nations and races in international 
law. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, self-determination as defined at the Peace Conference 
was to be contested by numerous members of the League of Nations, from Latvia’s and 
Finland’s proposition to universalise minority protection in 1922, to later Ethiopian claims for 
self-determination against Italy. These challenges attest to the fact that, although the Great 
Powers sought to define self-determination in order to regulate the entry of new members into 
international society, such institutional understanding was constantly contested. 
 
Similarly, in the post-Cold War period, despite the formal shift towards structural equality 
internationally, a group of mostly western actors (with the exception of the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference) became actively involved in monitoring the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. The European Community (EC), the Conference for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE, future OSCE), the UN, the USA, and various individual European states, in 
particular Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK, identified with and 
acted in the name of what they termed the “international community.” Although the term is 
highly contested in academia, it does appear in UN texts and resolutions and, taken as such, 
represents the self-perception of certain actors, a perception defined by shared beliefs and 
values, following an undoubtedly blinkered liberal vision. Unlike works that, even though 
critically, like Dominik Zaum’s, 15  endorse the term when discussing international 
involvement in the area, I prefer not to, and refer instead specifically to individual actors: 
from the EC’s prompt involvement by its organisation of a peace conference, to other western 
states’ contradictory reactions; from the successive peace conferences in which the US played 
a key role, such as Dayton and Rambouillet, to the role of the UN and OSCE missions in loco. 
This should allow me to stress the absence of homogeneity in international response, while 
these very same actors have redefined self-determination in the name of so-called universal 
values. International response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and to the further formation of 
new states, though, was very much contested. First, local actors contested it - Belgrade on the 
one hand argued (and acted) against the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Pristina, on the other, in 
the face of initial international disinterest, called for Kosovo’s self-determination. Moreover, 
                                            
15 Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox, 2007, 9. 
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international public opinion criticised the contradictory involvement of the EC, then US, UN 
and OSCE in the area. An analysis of their role should thus help reflect upon logics of power 
structurally, but also how ideas settle and come to constitute a certain form of power, too.16 
 
Although very different, post-colonial African states in the 1960s represent interesting cases 
for this thesis. International disciplining continued in the form of expectations attached to the 
application of uti possidetis, and other UN resolutions on decolonisation. These had been 
negotiated by post-colonial states, and thus purported a global character, while supervisory 
regimes withdrew. In many post-colonial states, in particular those formerly under British 
rule, hierarchical membership endured in line with older imperial membership policies. Their 
perpetuation in post-colonial Africa led to international criticism, such as in Nigeria, 
following the international endorsement of self-determination as a prerequisite for human 
rights and the further institutionalisation of the human rights regime. However, due to norms 
of sovereign equality and non-interference, and perhaps also because this was occurring 
beyond the sphere of influence of the two ideological blocs and was therefore of less strategic 
concern, the stratification of status of these new states took ambiguous forms. For example, 
international disciplining towards newly independent states took the form of requirements 
from international financial institutions to adapt (and “develop”) towards a capitalist 
economy. A strong reaction came in the 1960s and 1970s from post-colonial Asian and 
African states, calling for economic self-sufficiency, through, for example, the inauguration 
of a New International Economic Order.  
 
Hence, whereas the story that I tell in this thesis has a strong institutional focus, this does not 
signify that such understandings were not regularly contested or challenged. Numerous other 
actors and their claims have shaped and challenged the formation of domestic and 
international hierarchies. It is important to emphasise, then, the histories of resistance and 
radical critiques of these dominant redefinitions and formulations of self-determination. As I 
demonstrate at various points in the thesis, it may be, indeed, that such histories and critiques 
complement rather than contradict my overall argument. Nevertheless, it is one of the 
(necessary) limitations of this thesis that it does not engage in comprehensive detail with such 
acts of resistance and many important radical or contesting visions of self-determination.  
 
                                            
16 I refer here to two out of the four categories of power (structural and producive) developed in Barnett and 
Duvall, “Power in International Politics.”, 43 
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In each case, I have directed my attention towards areas that were the main focus of 
international discussion on the application of self-determination (rather than those excluded 
from it). To make sense of 20th century world politics, most scholars interested in the 
principle have in fact directed their attention to justifications used to avoid the recognition of 
self-determination’s claims. I propose to complete extant arguments by focusing on the 
implications as to legitimate statehood and membership for new states formed on the basis of 
the principle. I am not indifferent towards other extant claims and practices, but I hope that 
my focus might tell us something about the constant negotiation between equality and 
hierarchy within international society, in particular after self-determination is recognised and 
statehood acquired.  
 
Thus, in this thesis, I undertake a macro-historical research, by looking at the emblematic 
moments in which self-determination was redefined, renegotiated and used as the standard of 
entry for groups of states into international society. I have used a broad, inclusive 
understanding of such historical moments, extending my historical research over several years 
(Part One) and decades (Part Two, Part Three). Each historical moment that I investigate in 
this thesis uncovers logics of both continuity and change. Each uncovers different 
understandings, contingent upon specific material and normative contexts, but also reveals 
logics of continuity, through the repetition of certain practices and the persistence of given 
conceptions over time.  
 
To identify such discourses, practices and conceptions, both domestically and internationally I 
have relied on primary and secondary sources in French, English and Serbo-Croatian. For my 
analysis of the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations I have undertaken research 
at the archives of the League of Nations in Geneva (LNA). I have also undertaken archival 
research for my study of the post-1945 United Nations, both at the United Nations Office in 
Geneva (UNOG) and at the United Nations Archives in New York (UNA). For both historical 
cases, I have used available verbatim records from meetings within relevant bodies, 
correspondence among national delegates and the League’s or UN representatives, relevant 
petitions, pamphlets, newspapers’ articles, and official documents. For the post-Cold War 
period, I have used official statements, annual reports, recommendations and legal texts by the 
various international organisations and actors involved in the Balkans. Whereas I have spent 
time in the area, these documents were mostly available online. I have undertaken several 
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interviews with international stakeholders in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, though these were 
rather complementary to the primary work of analysing texts and statements.  
 
With regards to the various domestic contexts that I study, I have largely relied upon official 
statements and speeches, as well as on legal documents. Where possible, I have sought to 
combine my investigation with materials less often used in IR research, such as films and 
novels. I have also tried to maintain a certain balance in each chapter in the sources used, 
though this was not always possible, given that in certain cases, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, 
numerous documents are not yet available.  
 
A final word before beginning 
 
In fine, The concluding chapter of the thesis reflects on the implications of these arguments. 
This thesis undertakes a re-reading of the idea and practice of self-determination over the 
twentieth century expansion of international society. This re-reading rejects the conventional 
IR treatments, which tend to depict the expansion of international society, at the end of 
empire, as a linear and progressive globalisation of sovereignty and diffusion of liberal norms. 
Instead, this thesis presents a more complex history, in which the application of self-
determination has been both a local and international matter involving a persistent negotiation 
between the claims and practices of hierarchy and equality. Accordingly, this thesis offers 
three contributions. First, it speaks to the growing literature concerned with the constitution of 
hierarchy in world order, by offering a holistic approach that sees the domestic and the 
international as two mutually constitutive spheres. Second, this thesis speaks to the 
bourgeoning literature on the “standard of civilisation,” as it underscores the civilisational 
role that self-determination has played in shaping legitimate statehood and membership over 
the 20th century. Third, and as an implication growing from my research, this thesis makes a 
valuable contribution to the emerging constructivist agenda to recover meaning in the 
historical study of international relations.  
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1  
Whatever Happened to Self-Determination? 
 
International Relations (IR) scholars recognise that the idea of self-determination has been 
central to the legitimacy of new states and the expansion of international society. However, 
very little attention has been given to what happens after statehood is recognised. This lack of 
attention is problematic for it overlooks the tension at the centre of this thesis. This chapter 
demonstrates this gap and suggests how it will be filled by the thesis. As the first section will 
explain, because of reasons peculiar to the intellectual history of the discipline, for a long time 
self-determination did not attract much attention. Unlike legal theory and political theory, 
which, with their limits, have made regular interventions on the question, issues of self-
determination have only attracted attention from a limited number of IR scholars. These are 
authors, associated largely with constructivism and with the English School, that have been 
interested in overlapping questions of political legitimacy, order, sovereignty and what they 
see as the global expansion (and construction) of the sovereign system. The second section 
will underline the limits of the existing literature. It will show that although these authors 
regularly refer to the idea of self-determination they have not adequately problematised it. To 
investigate adequately the role of the idea of self-determination historically, and its inherent 
tensions, I suggest we need to both build on the aforementioned literature and borrow from 
related interpretivist works that deal with questions of order and membership in international 
society. 
 
Who is Interested in Self-Determination? 
 
In this section I propose to locate the gap in IR, by delving into one traditional feature of its 
post-war intellectual history. I then contrast the discipline’s lack of engagement with self-
determination with the position of legal theory and political theory, for which it has been a 
major topic of concern over time. 
 
International Relations and self-determination: explaining the gap  
 
It seems that for several decades, in particular following Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 Theory of 
International Politics and until the end of the Cold War, the nation-state came to be viewed in 
IR as an almost unchanging, if not trans-historical model. This can be attributed to the 
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absence of engagement with detailed historical enquiry, which is peculiar to post-World War 
II positivism that saw history as a site of data collection. When the IR positivist project was 
initiated in the decades following World War II, the purpose was to move away from what 
many perceived as the imprecise study of world politics epitomised by classical realists such 
as E.H. Carr, a historian, and Hans Morgenthau, a legal theorist. Both authors, interestingly, 
engaged each in their way, with questions of self-determination. Writing in 1939, E.H. Carr, 
for example, explained how, in 1919, the peacemakers erected self-determination as a core 
principle of the post-war order because nationalism was still perceived by many to promote 
internationalism. The consequences, he argued, resulted, however, in the making of a flawed 
post-war settlement.17 He thus criticised what he claimed was a utopian view, embodied 
principally by Woodrow Wilson, “the most perfect modern example of the intellectual in 
politics.” 18  Morgenthau also considered issues of nationalism and self-determination. 
Advocating for self-determination, in Politics Among Nations, he advanced the argument that 
the principle was highly destabilising for the balance of power, going back to the 19th century, 
with the German and Italian reunifications.19 Post-World War II positivism, however, set 
aside the study of historical details, to prioritise the development of theories.  
 
History was regularly used – and, one could add, occasionally ‘adjusted’- to identify stability 
over time, leading, inter alia, to the view that states were the fixed units of sovereign space. 
Such reification meant that, “the territorial state [was] viewed as existing prior to and as a 
container of society.”20 In turn, this vision also decontextualised processes of state formation. 
It precluded the possibility of thinking about other historical forms of spatial-temporal 
authority such as, for instance, empires, and about transitions from one form to the other.21  
 
The assumption that world politics are constituted by recurrent patterns of identity and 
behaviour and that therefore the study of IR should be about the identification of such 
regularities is nevertheless peculiar to offensive and defensive realist theories, rather than to 
                                            
17 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, 14, 46. 
18 Ibid., 14. 
19 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations the Struggle for Power and Peace, 233, 352. For an account of 
Morgenthau’s views on self-determination in relation to international stability and change see Little, The 
Balance for Power in International Relations, 115-124. Crucially, Little makes the point that Morgenthau did 
not see the international structure as unchanging, as others have instead argued (124). 
20 Agnew, “The Territorial Trap,” 58–59. 
21 An early and emblematic exception to this trend is Doyle, Empires, 1986. Also, It should be noted that the 
assumption that world politics are constituted by recurrent patterns has been peculiar to both offensive and 
defensive realists, though not to all positivists. 
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all positivist approaches. Indeed, while liberals and neoliberals have always thought that it is 
possible to learn from the past, structural realists have considered largely that history was a 
matter of repetition over time.22 With the intent of elaborating scientific approaches, offensive 
and defensive realist scholars have largely had as their ontological focus continuity of 
practices and fixity of identities. From this perspective, transformations over time did not 
become irrelevant, as many critics have perhaps too easily argued, but they did become less 
relevant. Shaping the discipline as a whole, this tendency contributed to the de-historicising of 
the study of the nation-state. 
 
Over the past two and a half decades, and coinciding with the end of the Cold War, such static 
conceptions have been called into question.23 Scholars influenced by what could be termed a 
“delayed linguistic turn” in IR initiated the critique. With regards to statehood and 
sovereignty specifically, R.B.J. Walker suggested that the distinction between political theory 
and International Relations had rested on a modern conception of the international system – a 
conception in which state sovereignty constituted the timeless boundary between the domestic 
and international realms.24 This assumption, he claimed, had dominated and impoverished the 
study of world politics.25 His view contributed to the fostering of discussion within the 
discipline in its entirety as to the theoretical (and linguistic) assumptions that underpin and 
might prejudice how scholars conceive their object of study. This first “linguistic turn” was 
consequently followed by what has been termed the “practice turn.” Authors endorsing this 
latter turn have called for a greater engagement with “phronetic international relations 
theory,” to complement the study of linguistic practices. In other words, they have called for a 
greater engagement with social practices in order to underscore historical contingency and 
avoid the over-theorising of certain paradigms.26 A focus on practice rather than theoretical 
knowledge allows for a more attentive approach to historical detail. Interestingly, as Chris 
Brown points out, this call has come from authors of very different backgrounds and has 
extended to the field as a whole.27   
 
                                            
22 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy.” 
23 See on these various theoretical debates Dunne, Cox, and Booth, The Eighty Years’ Crisis. 
24 Walker, Inside Outside, Chapter 2. 
25 Ibid., 92. 
26 See inter alia: Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn”; Adler and Pouliot, International 
Practices; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, “Power in Practice.” 
27 Brown, “The ‘Practice Turn’, Phronesis and Classical Realism,” 439. 
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Yet, although views that do not take history seriously have been questioned, they still seem to 
be influencing assumptions and topics in the discipline, if only because the nation-state is 
today the sole model of legitimate political authority, globally. This might help explain why, 
despite the resurgence of historical enquiry into world politics, the relationship between self-
determination and the formation of states has not been problematised adequately. To be sure, 
this might not be the unique explanation. This reason, though, can be seen as complementary 
to the more obvious one, that for a long time, IR was concerned largely with systemic 
arguments and not with domestic politics with which self-determination was associated. What 
is curious, however, is that precisely those approaches that have questioned static views 
through historical enquiries and that have called for an engagement with the “domestic” in 
international relations, such as Walker has done, have largely neglected the study of self-
determination. Moreover, it is interesting to note that whereas both Brown and Walker call for 
the need to historicise international relations, in their works they do not undertake substantial 
historical analyses on world politics. 
 
The approaches in IR that systematically refer to self-determination are, in turn, the English 
School (with its grand narratives on the expansion of international society) and constructivism 
(with its interpretive theoretical equipment to analyse international principles and institutions 
over time.) Yet, neither of them has engaged with the implications of self-determination for 
post-imperial states domestically, and their acceptance as legitimate members of international 
society once statehood is recognised. 
 
These two bodies of scholarship often refer to self-determination as the principle at the heart 
of both the legitimacy of states and of international society.28 However, the investigation of 
post-independence experiences of self-determination after breakdowns of imperial orders has 
been neglected. In some sense, Rodney Bruce Hall is one of the rare scholars in IR to consider 
such experiences, though his focus remains directed towards nations and the nationalisation of 
state actors and their identities in the international system.29 What we do find in the majority 
of the English School and constructivist literature concerned with self-determination is the 
acknowledgement that meanings attached to the idea have changed over time. However, 
tracing changes in meaning is insufficient for a comprehensive understanding of the place of 
                                            
28 See, inter alia: Clark, Legitimacy in International Society; Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to 
Protect, 2014. 
29 Hall, National Collective Identity, 6. 
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self-determination in world politics. Conceptions of self-determination have both normative 
and historical implications for statehood. These, I argue, are implications that should be 
investigated, as they relate both to the internal organisation of states and their acceptance as 
legitimate members of international society. Before engaging with English School and 
constructivist literature dealing with self-determination, it should be noted that in the period 
in which self-determination did not form part of scholarly concerns in IR, it was the object of 
attention of studies in political and legal theory. Discussed in the 19th century by political 
thinkers Giuseppe Mazzini, Lord Acton and John Stuart Mill, with its emergence as an 
international principle after World War I, self-determination has been the recurrent object of 
debates.  
 
It should be noted that classical literature on nationalism engages extensively with self-
determination. Authors such as Benedict Anderson, John de Breuilly, Ernest Gellner and Eric 
Hobsbawm have all considered, to different extents, the relationship between nationalism and 
the former. However, it could also be said that they have largely done so in order to locate 
self-determination within historical processes in which nations are formed, identities are 
constituted, nationalisms emerge. Even John de Breuilly, who calls for an interpretive 
approach to the study of nationalism through the use of historical enquiry, does so for the 
purpose of establishing a taxonomy of nationalisms (how they emerge, how they relate to 
each other, how they differ). In other words the questions that scholars on nationalism address 
are largely distinguishable from those dealt with in this thesis.  
 
Less interested with how nationalism and nations emerge and identities are formed, this thesis 
deals primarily with extant ideational universes and practices that I analyse and confront. It is 
my sense that this, then, leads ultimately to different theoretical concerns, but also to the 
narration of a different story. Hence, whereas throughout my study I have engaged to different 
extents with the work of these authors and they have influenced my research (Anderson on 
questioning the possibility of hierarchies within a community of equals; Breuilly in his 
understanding of nationalism as a form of politics; Hobsbawm in his remarks on how to 
comprehend concepts and realities historically), I do not think that my discussion of their 
views would be enriching, theoretically. Conversely, throughout my historical analysis I do 
engage with their works, though more in the form of endorsing or not their arguments, in the 
way I understand the various self-determination claims and nationalisms that I study. 
Ultimately, authors engaged with nationalism have adopted different lenses from those that I 
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adopt in this thesis, leading to different answers and stressing different preoccupations – 
notwithstanding my sympathies with Hobsbawm’s and Breuilly’s positions on historical 
research. Having clarified this point, let us now turn towards a brief overview of legal and 
political theory scholarship on self-determination.  
 
Political and Legal Theory: the tendency to fix meanings? 
 
Whenever self-determination has been invoked in international practice, similar debates have 
reappeared in political and legal theory. It can be said that there are three major areas of 
interest, or three major questions, that have concerned political theorists over time - although 
answers provided have differed. First, disagreement has revolved around the question of what 
self-determination is: whether it is a principle, a right, or a norm. The second broad theme of 
debate has concerned the establishment of who the “people” entitled to self-determination are. 
This has translated into questioning whether self-determination is a collective, individual or a 
state’s right; and whether it is indivisible, or a right that may be compromised on the basis of 
the public good. In the aftermath of WWI, scholars struggled to find the “objective criteria” in 
order to identify the “nation” that would be eligible for self-determination.30 In 1945, Alfred 
Cobban wrote his first version of National Self-determination, which he later revised in 1969, 
acknowledging that much had changed with decolonisation, and that his views no longer 
reflected historical changes.31 He also noted that his definitions of both self-determination and 
the people needed to be revised.32 With the end of Cold War and the upsurge of regional 
conflicts in the name of ethnic allegiances, the question reappeared: could self-determination 
be, after decolonisation and the primacy of the principle of uti possidetis, directed again to 
ethnic groups, or nations?  
 
In fine, the third topic of debate has revolved around the implications of self-determination 
for sovereignty and international stability, especially after the Cold War. Unable to find one 
answer – perhaps because of the lack of clear legal codification – discussions have turned 
instead, in particular in liberal theory, towards what self-determination ought to mean and 
how it ought to be used.33 Among liberal theorists, this has led to speculation as to the 
                                            
30 E.g. Macartney, National States and National Minorities. 
31 Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, Preface. 
32 Preface to the 2nd edition, Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination. 
33 These debates are exposed in Coppieters and Sakwa, Contextualizing Secession. 
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positive benefits and negative effects of self-determination, and the circumstances in which it 
should be used. Broadly, in post-Cold War normative theory there are two general types of 
responses. They both tend to see self-determination as a threat to sovereignty, largely 
equating it to secession (or, for this matter, with irredentist tendencies too.) Some have 
claimed that self-determination is a negative “solution”, to the extent that it im.plies the 
politicisation of group identities, and that this is destructive for a liberal and egalitarian 
understanding of membership.34 Conversely, following Alan Buchanan, a second group of 
liberal authors has called for self-determination as a remedial right, to be used when no other 
solution seems to be applicable.35  
 
Rather than seeking endlessly to associate given meanings to self-determination, as post-Cold 
War liberal political and legal theorists have proposed, several international lawyers have 
instead been driven by the primary concern to historicise it. 36 If, as Martii Koskenniemi put 
it, “the discourse of national self-determination contains little that is self-evident or on which 
everyone can agree,” the principle needs then to be comprehended not in abstraction but 
through historical practice.37 One work in particular has both historicised and studied in depth 
the ambiguous role that self-determination has played across time and space. This is Antonio 
Cassese’s Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal. Written in 1995, his work 
remains the fundamental but most commonly cited reference on the matter. Cassese's analysis 
of self-determination looks at how, over time, ideas about self-determination have become 
international legal norms, and how these legal norms have affected state practice. It sheds 
light on the meanings that self-determination was imbued with over the twentieth century, and 
argues that, overall, self-determination “was advanced in at least five different versions:” as a 
criterion for territorial change (populations should be able to choose via elections or plebiscite 
which state they belong to); as a democratic principle calling for the consent of the governed 
in any sovereign state; as an anti-colonialist principle; as a right for minorities within 
sovereign states; and as a principle of non-intervention. 38  
 
                                            
34 See Barry, Culture and Equality. 
35 Buchanan, Secession; Macedo, Secession and Self-Determination. 
36 These are only a few examples: Emerson, “Self-Determination”; Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-
Determination; Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today”; Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples; 
Simpson, “The diffusion of sovereignty,” 1996; Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line”; Knop, Diversity and Self-
Determination in International Law. 
37 244-245 Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today.” 
38 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, 316. 
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These are broad “versions” that Cassese scrutinises in great depth in his book, highlighting 
the developments, implications and limits of each for international law and practice. Cassese 
also suggests that self-determination’s varied meanings have contributed to its “in-built 
ambivalence,”39 leading him to contend that “the ‘political’ and ‘popular’ (as opposed to 
legally accurate) conception of self-determination is having disruptive effects on the 
traditional setting of the world community and indeed might even act as a sort of 
earthquake.”40 Hence, whereas Cassese’s work influences this thesis, it also remains first and 
foremost a study in public international law, explicitly positivist in its purpose.41 This study 
conceives international law as one defining dimension of self-determination, along with other 
practical and ethical considerations, and thus departs from Cassese’s strictly legalistic 
interpretations.  
 
In IR, the investigation of historical changes in self-determination can be seen more broadly 
as part of the interpretivist practice to call into question the “assumed naturalness that we live 
in a world of nation-states as political communities.”42 Stemming from this concern, and 
being less interested in the direct question of what self-determination “is”, constructivists 
have investigated how it has been used and understood over time. Increasingly sympathetic to 
interpretivist ontologies and long committed to historical enquiry, English School proponents 
have joined them in this effort. However, as we are about to see, despite recurrent reference to 
shifts in meaning associated with self-determination over the twentieth century, only rarely 
have these shifts been studied in depth. 
 
Historicising Self-Determination:  
The Contributions and Limits of English School and Constructivist Scholarship 
 
English School and constructivist scholarship on self-determination concurs in locating the 
roots of self-determination in American and French revolutionary ideals about equality and 
popular sovereignty.43 1776 and 1789 are thus often cited, though possibly romanticised, as 
the birth dates of the concept. However, only seldom are these key moments examined. 
                                            
39 Ibid., 6. 
40 Ibid., 342. 
41 I refer here to positivist in the legal, rather than epistemic sense.  
42 Hurrell, On Global Order, 2007, 121. 
43 As a case in point see: Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics the American and French Revolutions in 
International Political Culture, 2002.; Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination,” 352. 
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Similarly, its nineteenth century invocations and understandings are also overlooked.44 The 
majority of IR works commence with World War I, when self-determination became a widely 
debated principle internationally. Although its application was limited to the areas formerly 
under the rule of old Euro-Asian empires, self-determination came to be a principle of world 
order, foundational to the constitution of new states. Extant scholarship also acknowledges 
that the Nazis and Fascists invoked self-determination as defined after World War I to justify 
the meticulous exclusion of minorities and to rationalise genocide.45 There is a general 
agreement that “existing formulations of the right to self-determination emerged from World 
War II morally and politically bankrupt.”46 However, inquiries into the interwar period are 
often limited to acknowledging that self-determination was interpreted problematically in 
ethnic terms, and was for this reason redefined after World War II. This, the literature 
recognises, coincided with the decolonisation wave. It is indeed on the post-war 
decolonisation era that IR scholarship has mostly focused – possibly influenced by the 
conception that this was when the contemporary world order was most clearly delineated. 
Despite the relative abundance of examination of the decolonisation period, what self-
determination came to mean between the adoption of the UN Charter and the enactment of the 
UN Covenants on Human Rights is a matter of scholarly discord.  
 
In this section, I will show how IR works on self-determination’s history are foundational for 
this thesis, since they allow the identification of dynamics of stability and change over time. 
However, I will also stress what I see are two of their limits. First, by focusing on the 
relationship between self-determination, sovereignty and human rights after World War II, 
they do not adequately investigate the implications of self-determination for the constitution 
of states after imperial demises. Second, they largely associate the study of self-determination 
with other cognate concepts and practices of world politics, detracting from its fundamental 
and yet contradictory role for twentieth century world order. Antonio Cassese’s thorough 
investigation overcomes these limits, though, because of the nature of his work, the author 
does not engage with broader normative structures that have influenced self-determination. 
 
                                            
44 Two important exceptions being Fabry, Recognizing States; Scott, “The Image of the State and the Expansion 
of the International System.” 
45 Jackson Preece, “Minority Rights in Europe,” 10. 
46 Reus-Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System, 2013, 200. 
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In 1990, James Mayall published a comprehensive study on self-determination, starting with 
World War I and with particular emphasis on the post-colonial period. He described the 
“national idea” embodied by self-determination as the legitimating ground of nation-states 
and international society.47 He argued that self-determination had become foundational to 
nationalism over the twentieth century. After 1960, it had come to “fix” the political and 
geographical world map through the formation of new states. This, he argued, had led to the 
universalisation of international society.48 He also devoted several chapters of his book to the 
economic and political implications of post-colonial self-determination for the new states and 
international society. Importantly for this thesis, he underscored a tension (which, however, 
he did not investigate) between the international understanding of self-determination, 
embedded in popular sovereignty and attached, from World War II, to human rights, and 
exclusive practices associated to it domestically. He suggested that whereas “there is no 
conflict between the doctrine of self-determination and that of human rights,” “the principle of 
national self-determination built into the system [has] turned out to be much less permissive, 
or popular, than attention to its philosophical origin and meaning might lead one to expect.”49  
 
IR authors writing on self-determination have all, in some way, taken stock of one or another 
facet of Mayall’s claim on post-war self-determination and its ambiguous relationship with 
human rights and sovereignty. Accordingly, there are two sets of views that can be found in 
the literature. The first sees self-determination as opposed to human rights, and is the 
approach prominently upheld by Robert Jackson.50 Although Jackson published his book the 
same year as Mayall, he had advanced this proposition in previous work.51 The second is the 
more recent view that self-determination and human rights are part of the same normative 
regime. This is the argument is most notably advanced by Christian Reus-Smit, who sees self-
determination and human rights as dependent one upon the other.52 It should be mentioned 
that there is a third approach in the field, which does not directly engage Mayall’s work. It 
considers self-determination as a rhetorical tool in domestic and international politics, in no 
way connected (or opposed) to human rights politics. In different ways, both Daniel Philpott 
and Neta Crawford advance this position, suggesting that self-determination was used to 
                                            
47 Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, 1990, Introduction.  
48 Ibid., 26. 
49 Ibid., 35-41. 
50 Jackson, Quasi-States, 1990; Moyn, The Last Utopia. 
51 Jackson, “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory.” 
52 Reus-Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty,” 2001; Reus-Smit, Individual Rights 
and the Making of the International System, 2013. 
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foster change in colonial ideas and practices.53 These works find a direct equivalent in 
historian Erez Manela’s argument. Manela contends that ideas on self-determination shaped 
thoughts on independence within the colonised world between what the author terms “the 
1919 Wilsonian movement” and the 1950s.54 While this thesis relies on the historical insights 
of these three authors, it also accepts limits to their work, as advanced by Reus-Smit. Namely, 
they ignore the United Nations as the post-World War II forum of discussion, where human 
rights and self-determination came to be joined and justified on universal moral grounds.55  
 
Hence, with regards to post-World War II self-determination and its relation with human 
rights and sovereignty, the first author to have fully elaborated his position was Robert 
Jackson. Jackson argued that through decolonisation, self-determination had become a 
“categorical right” leading to what he termed “negative sovereignty” for post-colonial 
states.56 He made the point that until 1960 “positive sovereignty,” understood as the “capacity 
of a government to provide political goods to its citizens,” 57  defined membership of 
international society along explicit criteria of “civility.” 58However, decolonisation led, via 
the categorical allocation of self-determination, to “a negative sovereignty game” for the 
newly formed states. In other words, because of the categorical imperative for self-
determination, post-colonial states were internationally granted the attributes of “juridical 
statehood” (which he loosely associates to the Montevideo criteria), without being ready for 
what he terms “empirical statehood”59 (which he views as the pre-World War II civilisational 
criterion for sovereignty.) To Jackson, this was the direct cause of serious human rights 
violations within the newly formed states.60 Following from this, he saw the development of 
the international human rights regime as a reaction against categorical self-determination and 
Third World “quasi”-statehood.  
 
                                            
53 Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 2001; Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics Ethics, 
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57 Ibid., 12. 
58 Ibid., 50–51. 
59 Ibid., 21; 25. 
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Over time, numerous IR scholars have more, or less, explicitly endorsed Jackson’s argument. 
Jack Donnelly has indeed suggested that human rights have become, with decolonisation, the 
new standard of civilisation by which to judge the domestic behaviour of illiberal or quasi-
states.61 Luke Glanville has highlighted the predominance of a non-interference norm during 
the Cold War, associated to categorical self-determination. 62 To some extent Jackson’s 
argument also finds support in international history, both in Brad Simpson’s recent work on 
the use of self-determination in US foreign policy and in Samuel Moyn’s work on the 
development of human rights politics during the twentieth century.63 Moyn’s primary concern 
is directed at transnational activist human rights movements in the 1970s, with a particular 
focus on the US. Jackson instead focuses on the institutional politics of human rights, and that 
constitutes a fundamental difference. Still, Moyn’s argument “that human rights entered 
global rhetoric in a kind of hydraulic relationship with self-determination: to the extent the 
one appeared, and progressed, the other declined, or even disappeared” 64  is a direct 
reverberation of Jackson’s claim.  
 
Whereas both Jackson and Moyn rightly stress in their respective works how self-
determination accelerated the process of decolonisation, the argument that self-determination 
and sovereignty are separate from human rights politics is problematic. The first reason has 
already been highlighted by Reus-Smit, who shows how Jackson ignores the discussion about 
human rights that occurred during decolonisation debates at the United Nations (UN).65 
Jackson recognises that self-determination was internationalised before 1960, yet he fails to 
mention that post-colonial states, and to a lesser extent colonial movements, relied on human 
rights to obtain self-determination during the 1950s and 1960s.66 Reus-Smit has also recently 
advanced similar critique of Moyn’s work, arguing that the wrongly ignores the importance of 
human rights in the reconstitution of the right to self-determination.67   
 
Sharing Reus-Smit’s concern, my work addresses specifically one additional limitation to 
Jackson’s view. In Quasi-States Jackson establishes a connection between weak statehood 
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and violent domestic state practices, without any mediating factors. Yet nowhere in that book 
does he investigate what happened within these so-called “quasi-states” once self-
determination was recognised.68 Jackson claims that a shift occurred from a positive to a 
negative sovereignty game, because of the allocation of categorical self-determination to 
political communities unfit for positive, independent statehood. Becoming in 1960 a 
“categorical right” for all, Jackson suggests that self-determination led to the granting of 
statehood to political communities that, however, were not yet ready for what he terms full, 
“positive sovereignty.” Because of the categorical imperative for self-determination, post-
colonial states were internationally granted the attributes of “juridical statehood” without 
being ready for what he terms “empirical statehood.”69 Hence, in his view, if human rights 
violations and discrimination have been the norm in post-colonial states, the reason is to be 
found in the institutional incapacity of these “quasi-states.”   
 
Unlike Jackson, I understand regimes of self-determination as reflecting one conception of a 
certain, broad order, to which specific rights and responsibilities are attached beyond the 
recognition of (one, single) statehood. The realisation of self-determination thus bears direct 
consequences upon the recognition of (legitimate) statehood. Rather than understanding 
international hierarchies in terms of variations in sovereignty, I suggest that after 1960, these 
depended upon liberal expectations such as human rights, attached to self-determination, not 
being satisfied. Accordingly, this thesis is more at home with the second view present in the 
discipline, advanced by Reus-Smit. This view sees self-determination and human rights as 
part of the same post-World War II normative regime. In this work, such regime is understood 
as having defined liberal expectations behind recognitions of self-determination. 
 
According to Reus-Smit, the conceptual and moral foundations of self-determination were 
reconstituted after World War II, during UN negotiations on the two International Covenants 
on Human Rights.70 That the concept of self-determination should be resurrected after the war 
in ethnically blind terms is no novelty.71 Reus-Smit adds, to this traditional account, that 
throughout the 1950s newly independent post-colonial states further rehabilitated it. They did 
so by “grafting the right to self-determination on to emergent human rights norms, arguing 
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that the former was a necessary prerequisite for the latter.”72 Reus-Smit first advanced this 
argument in 2001 and Roland Burke has more recently echoed it in international history.73 
Burke also supports the view that “the right to self-determination [has come to] constitute the 
nexus between decolonisation and human rights.”74  
 
Reus-Smit views self-determination, sovereignty and human rights as three distinct, yet 
interrelated core principles of the post-World War II world order. He argues that human rights 
legitimised the invocation of self-determination claims and grounded the norm on universal 
moral foundations. This, in turn, led to the globalisation of the nation-state.75 He thus suggests 
that “treating these as separate, mutually contradictory regimes, obscures the justificatory role 
that human rights principles have performed in the constitution of the modern sovereign 
order.”76 Indeed, Reus-Smit contends, self-determination through its embedding in human 
rights rhetoric “delegitimis[ed] the institution of empire, universalised the organising 
principle of sovereignty and helped construct one of the principal institutions codifying liberal 
norms of legitimate statehood – the international human rights regime.”77 As mentioned, this 
thesis builds on Reus-Smit’s argument with regards to decolonisation, and engages with the 
relationship between self-determination, sovereignty and (human) rights. It does so beyond 
the decolonisation era. And, it does so in relation to international expectations attached to 
self-determination that, I suggest, exert direct influence on the existence and legitimacy of 
new states formed in the name of self-determination. 
  
It should be noted that despite being conceptually opposed, Jackson and Reus-Smit’s views 
present a shared limitation in their approach to self-determination. They both disregard the 
role of self-determination beyond recognitions of independence and beyond the 
decolonisation era. Crucially, the role of self-determination did not just end once European 
overseas colonies became independent. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE recognised 
that self-determination was applicable beyond the colonial context, and so did the 1990 CSCE 
Paris Charter, followed soon after by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
Whereas since decolonisation the international norm of self-determination might have not 
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changed in its somewhat loose formulation, similarly to the pre- and post-World War I period, 
throughout the 1990s its invocations have come to be associated with ethnic and minority 
claims.  
 
Jennifer Jackson Preece engages with the question of self-determination over the twentieth 
century as a whole. She underscores specifically one cognate dimension to the self-
determination story: minorities and their rights.78 She thus traces the history of minorities 
from Westphalia to the end of the Cold War and, interestingly for this study, she also 
scrutinises the relationship between minority rights and self-determination over the twentieth 
century. Jackson Preece first focuses on post-World War I’s recognition of ethnic diversity 
and the Minority Treaties, which she qualifies as a “failure” of the League of Nations. To her, 
they “discredited minority rights” as “minorities themselves tended to be viewed with 
suspicion.”79 She then continues with World War II, highlighting the “general consensus . . . 
in favour of the view that human rights by themselves, rather than coupled with more specific 
minority provisions, were the preferred response to minority questions.”80 In other words, 
what she calls the “assimilationist view of democracy,” paralleled by the emergence of human 
rights norms, led to the UN approach that self-determination only applied to statehood after 
(colonial) empire, and that diversity should not be recognised domestically.81 With the 
Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents, domestic rights of minorities and self-
determination came to be associated again.82 Two decades later, Jackson Preece argues, this 
association found even greater expression as diversity and democracy became again 
compatible in the history of the breakup of Yugoslavia. 83  
 
Jackson Preece’s focus on minority rights in association with self-determination, her 
consideration of the domestic level in making sense of international changes, and her interest 
in the post-Cold War period are crucial contributions. These are all aspects that this thesis 
acknowledges and will engage in greater detail in the following chapters, in particular with 
respect to the breakup of Yugoslavia. However, her work suffers from an important limitation 
in the detailed story that it tells about the role of self-determination in world politics. It does 
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not adequately articulate the relationship between the two defining dimensions of self-
determination that she highlights: on the one hand, domestic claims and allocation of rights in 
the name of self-determination (with her focus on minorities), and on the other, the 
constitution of (legitimate) states within international society, also in its name. I hope that the 
shift towards a holistic approach systematically including both the domestic and international 
realms will help engage in a more encompassing manner this relationship - a move that 
Jackson Preece is less concerned with, given her primary focus on minority rights.  
 
Jackson Preece’s work is no exception to what seems to be a general tendency in IR to 
subordinate the study of self-determination to a primary focus on other cognate concepts, 
principles or practices. Hence, not only are works on self-determination scarce in IR, but, with 
the exception of Mayall in 1990, the study of self-determination has been used largely to 
elucidate related norms and institutions (such as sovereignty, human rights and minority 
rights), and associated practices (such as nationalism but also military and humanitarian 
intervention.) 84  Yet, “if sovereignty,” as Hurrell contends, “has provided the basic 
institutional framework of the society of states, it was national self-determination that came 
ever more to provide the political power and the moral meaning to the idea of an international 
society.”85 To be sure, the extant literature recognises that self-determination is a core and 
complex principle of the twentieth century world order. However, the study of IR lacks a 
historical account elucidating its role for the internal definition of states, for their acceptance 
as legitimate members of international society, and for the ordering of world politics.  
 
Statehood and Order in the Study of World Politics 
 
As I have argued, IR literature concerned with shifts in meanings associated to self-
determination has tended to overlook its role in processes of state formation. While 
recognising its constitutive role, this literature has not engaged directly with the relationship 
between self-determination and (legitimate) statehood after the breakdown of imperial orders. 
This thesis suggests that the implications of self-determination, once statehood is recognised, 
represent a crucial dimension to the story of the expansion of the nation-state and of its 
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legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. These are most obviously implications for 
the domestic delineations of political communities, since self-determination constitutes the 
transitional principle from empires defined by hierarchy, to nation-sates defined at least in 
theory by equality. A second set of implications relates to the membership of new states 
within international society, in contexts of reconfigurations of world order. This thesis 
considers these two sets of implications as complementary, and reflective of specific 
conceptions of self-determination, at given times. Yet, they are surprisingly excluded from 
historical accounts of self-determination in IR. Two cognate bodies of literature might then be 
helpful in getting a sense of such implications, although they deal only tangentially with self-
determination. The first is a small collection of interpretivist works interested in concepts and 
practices of state formation and recognition. The second is a larger set of works concerned 
with questions of order and membership in international society. In this section I will briefly 
highlight their respective contributions, and in so doing I will show how this thesis is 
fundamentally embedded in these works, but also how it seeks to contribute to some of their 
views.  
 
From empires to nation-states: state formation and legitimacy in IR 
 
Although “trans-historical” visions of the nation-state have long been contested in IR, 
histories of empires have been overlooked until recently - Michael Doyle’s 1986 
comprehensive study on their functioning being a notable exception.86 Over recent years 
however, ends of empires have increasingly attracted the attention of a growing number of 
scholars in the field.87 Attempting to make sense of trajectories of empires as preceding the 
formation of the contemporary sovereign order, these scholars have joined a similar 
burgeoning interest in the field of international history. Indeed, as historians Jane Burbank 
and Frederick Cooper have recently argued, the “exploration of the histories of empires, both 
old and recent, can expand our understanding of how the world came to be what it is, and 
open a wider perspective on the organisation of political power.”88  
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Whereas Burbank and Cooper do not refer to self-determination in the process that they 
highlight, in IR, Reus-Smit specifically associates the investigation of ends of empires in the 
twentieth century with invocations of self-determination.89 As already mentioned, Reus-Smit 
is concerned with self-determination in the period coinciding with the wave of post-World 
War II decolonisation. He shows how invocations of self-determination have played a part in 
delegitimising empire across time and space. He also suggests that over the twentieth century, 
self-determination has legitimised the formation of new states after imperial demises, making 
self-determination the nexus in this process. Certainly, in tracing how empires have come to 
an end, Reus-Smit accomplishes the task posed by Burbank and Cooper.  
 
The same problem previously highlighted, however, persists. Namely, the implications of 
self-determination for statehood, both domestically and internationally, once sovereignty is 
recognised, are disregarded. In IR this seems to be reflective of a broader tendency within the 
field as a whole. Because authors identify fundamental systemic change with a shift in the 
organising principle of the system, they view the external reconfiguration of the system 
according to that principle. They are thus ultimately concerned with the emergence of a 
system based on externally independent states, largely overlooking the internal nature of new 
states and their relationship with the international. This, I argue, is problematic for at least 
two reasons. First, it restricts the story of the expansion of international society to the 
establishment of new states, overlooking subsequent implications for international 
membership and order. Second, it neglects aspects largely dismissed from the study of IR as 
belonging to the domestic realm.  
 
Over the past decade two authors have come close to this problématique, highlighting that 
although self-determination is crucial to the constitution and acceptance of new states, its 
relationship with state recognition is not as simple as is often assumed. In 2006 Amy Scott 
argued in her doctoral thesis that the concept of the nation has become a prevalent way of 
conceptualising populations of states through the idea of self-determination. Hence, Scott 
contends, the state – which she apprehends in terms of political community - has been 
construed in IR theory as the “inevitable endpoint of self-determination.”90 Scott rightly 
claims that the concept of the state lacks historical contextualisation. She seeks to fill this gap 
by thinking about self-determination and people as being prior to the state.  
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 A few years later, in 2010 Mikulas Fabry examined practices used to recognise new states, 
from the eighteenth century to the post-Cold War period. Crucially for this study, the author 
argues that, “for the past two hundred years state recognition has been tied to the idea of self-
determination of peoples.” 91  Taking this statement as a starting point, Fabry analyses 
historically international practices associated with the recognition of new states in the name of 
self-determination. These two theoretical approaches are foundational to the argument of this 
thesis. The acknowledgement of state formation and recognition as complex and long-term 
processes historically and theoretically sheds light on what Scott terms the “monist 
conception of the state.”92 However, their contribution remains limited empirically, to the 
extent that neither work has moved its respective historical analysis of states beyond the act of 
international recognition.  
 
Scott, Fabry, and also Reus-Smit provide this thesis with indispensable intellectual tools by 
which to think about the state as a historical construct that, over the twentieth century, was 
constituted and legitimised in the name of self-determination. In this study, though, I wish to 
move beyond strict acts of recognition, both historically and conceptually, and in so doing 
participate in enriching extant views. First, I show that a linear tale of progressive equality 
attached to the expansion of the nation-state is problematic. Second, I advance as part of the 
overarching argument of the thesis that international ideas of self-determination have political 
and moral implications in regards to statehood. These are implications in terms of 
expectations about domestic behaviour, which have been attached to self-determination, at 
given times and in specific ways. Scholarship acknowledges to some extent that international 
expectations about rightful domestic behaviour have been attached to self-determination 
through other norms and practices, such as humanitarian interventions and international 
administration.93 However, a study taking as a primary focus the idea and practice of self-
determination, uncovering what expectations specifically have been attached to self-
determination, still needs to be written.  
 
Hence, the argument that self-determination involves expectations once statehood is 
recognised is not entirely new. It comes close, for example, to Luke Glanville’s contention 
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that, since it was first articulated in the sixteenth century, sovereign authority has always had 
externally defined responsibilities attached to it.94 These have been international, but also 
domestic responsibilities, towards national societies. Indeed Glanville shows that since the 
American and French Revolutions, state responsibilities have been increasingly understood in 
relation to the respect of popular sovereignty, domestically.95 My argument builds upon 
Glanville’s, but differs from it in two principal ways. First, I argue that, internationally, 
responsibilities come to be attached to the realisation of self-determination whilst the 
principle is negotiated and redefined. Second, whereas Glanville suggests that there are 
domestic responsibilities attached to sovereignty, he does not scrutinise consistently the 
implications on domestic state behaviour. I hope to contribute to his view by bringing insights 
from the domestic realm and by understanding how these affect the story of the expansion of 
international society. 
 
The historical picture that emerges from this research, of both self-determination and 
statehood after empire, is complex. Self-determination appears less as a clear-cut principle 
bringing hierarchy and empire to an end, in favour of equality and the nation-state, and more 
as an ambiguous idea sustaining contradicting views and practices. This is true both for the 
domestic and for the international level. If the domestic picture is blurred, so too is the 
international one, inasmuch as self-determination has been invoked recurrently (though, of 
course, not exclusively) at moments of reconfiguration of world order. Transitions are long, 
domestically and internationally. As the principle of transition from empires (or hierarchical 
forms of authority) to nation-states, self-determination embodies dynamics of both continuity 
and change. 
 
We have seen that the extant literature on self-determination and state recognition does not 
have much to tell us about the role of self-determination, its tensions and implications over 
statehood after imperial retrenchment and after statehood is recognised. A second set of 
literature concerned with world order and membership within international society thus 
provides this study with additional insights.  
 
If self-determination has come to lie at the heart of the legitimacy of new states over the 
twentieth century, it would seem natural to follow the arguments of the English School 
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literature on the expansion of international society, to make sense of its role. Interestingly, 
and possibly for the reasons highlighted in the first section of this chapter, the traditional 
literature on international society and its expansion neglects questions of self-determination. 
Even Ali Mazrui, in his reflections on post-colonial Africa in Bull and Watson’s Expansion of 
International Society, did not refer to self-determination, despite it being the rationale of uti 
possidetis.96 Over the past two and a half decades, however, English School authors have 
increasingly acknowledged self-determination as foundational to contemporary membership 
of international society. James Mayall and Robert Jackson stressed it at the start of the 1990s. 
More recently Ian Clark and Andrew Hurrell have underlined it again, linking self-
determination with international legitimacy.97  
 
Ian Clark has argued that self-determination has become the accepted criterion of membership 
of international society, even if the criterion is not consistently applied.98 While his work 
states its role, it does not tell us much about how this has historically functioned, nor about 
the ideas, values and norms that self-determination, as the standard of membership in 
international society, conveys. Andrew Hurrell has instead associated self-determination with 
the challenges brought to global order, suggesting that self-determination has a twofold 
purpose: it both destabilises and orders world politics.99 This thesis thus takes up the 
challenge to understand how this twofold purpose has translated into historical practice. The 
picture that emerges, I will show, is ambivalent, if not contradictory.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has laid the foundations for the further consideration of the role of self-
determination and its inherent tensions, across time and space. I have shown that in IR, the 
study of self-determination has attracted the interest of a limited number of scholars, all 
principally associated with constructivism and the English School. These authors recognise 
that self-determination is central to the legitimacy of new states and to the idea of an 
international society. Works that deal with the history of self-determination recognise that its 
meaning has changed over time, yet they largely overlook the scrutiny of its role in the 
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constitution of new states, both domestically and internationally, and in ordering world 
politics. Moreover, they tend to subordinate the study of self-determination to other 
international concepts and practices. Scholarship dealing directly with the role of self-
determination, I have argued, is limited to a set of works on state recognition, questions of 
order and membership in international society. However, even these do not tell us much about 
the implications of self-determination after statehood is recognised. In an effort to overcome 
these limitations, the next chapter will propose an alternative argument concerning the history 
and role of self-determination during the twentieth century’s waves of expansion of 
international society.  
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2  
Hierarchy, Equality and the Expansion of International Society 
 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, constructivists and English School scholars 
recognise that throughout the twentieth century the principle of self-determination has been 
pivotal to the end of empires and the ensuing formation of new states. Yet, whereas this 
scholarship depicts the idea of self-determination as central to the legitimacy of new states 
and international society, it does not tell us much about what happens after statehood is 
recognised. Because IR authors identify systemic change with a shift in self-determination, as 
an organising principle of the system, they view the external reconfiguration of the system in 
accordance with that principle. Being ultimately concerned with the emergence of a system 
based on externally independent states, I have shown, they tend to overlook the internal 
natures of these states. This tendency is, I believe, problematic. First, it restricts the story of 
the expansion of international society to the establishment of new states, overlooking 
subsequent implications for international membership and order. Second, it neglects 
fundamental aspects, often dismissed from the study of IR as “merely” belonging to the 
domestic realm. We are then left unable to adequately explain, for example, one of the key 
puzzles of the politics of self-determination in the twentieth century: how, after World War II, 
can self-determination be embedded in the language of human rights, while institutionalised 
hierarchy and legal inequality is the norm both in the arrangements of international society, 
and within many “self-determined” states?  
 
That self-determination has been foundational to the creation of new states throughout the 
twentieth century is an essential aspect of the expansion of international society. This, we 
know. However, it is also just one part of the story. The assumption that self-determination 
ends where sovereignty begins, underestimates the ambiguous role that self-determination has 
had before, but crucially, also, after statehood is recognised, both domestically and 
internationally. I argue in this thesis that twentieth century understandings and usages of the 
idea of self-determination point to the existence of a recurrent tension. This is a tension 
between the egalitarian aspirations of self-determination on one hand, and the practices of 
hierarchy associated with self-determination on the other. It should be said that these are not 
practices that are attached exclusively to self-determination, but they encompass a whole 
range of material and ideational factors that directly relate to it. This tension, as we shall see, 
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covers three different levels of world politics. First, it has been embodied in the disciplining 
of international society, when self-determination was redefined, during each wave of state 
formation, as the standard of legitimate membership and statehood. Second, the tension has 
manifested itself at the domestic level of the newly “self-determined” states as political élites 
delineated the boundaries of national political communities. Third, and as an implication of 
all this, the tension is noticeable in the ordering of states within international society.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to systematise the contentions that I advance in this study and 
to lay its theoretical foundations. In the first section I lay the intellectual ground on which to 
comprehend my claims, both historically and theoretically. I then detail the chief argument of 
the thesis.  
 
Between Hierarchy and Equality: Theory and Practice of Self-Determination 
 
In 1969, Alfred Cobban argued that, “by 1918 nationalism and democracy were generally 
taken as synonymous in the thought of the Western nations.” 100 The nation-state was the 
democratic expression of the consent of the governed, made possible through the idea of self-
determination. After World War I, self-determination conveyed both the acknowledgment of 
equality of citizens in the polity and, though confused, the recognition of diversity of national 
groups. This was no radical departure from the past. Rather, as Cobban suggested, it was the 
result of historical contingency. 101  Historical events since the American and French 
revolutions and the works of numerous political thinkers had contributed to defining – though 
loosely – the content of self-determination. Because its conceptual foundations can be found 
in John Locke’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings on popular sovereignty, the idea of 
self-determination emerged historically alongside political equality and equality of rights. 
However, as we will see, in the 19th century it was also imbued with more exclusivist 
interpretations as to who could be regarded as the moral equal, both domestically and 
internationally.  
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The conceptual foundations of self-determination: popular sovereignty and Empire 
 
In 1690, Locke defined the natural state of man as “perfect freedom” and “equality.” By no 
“manifest declaration of his Will” has God “set one above the other.”102 As a result, as 
indicated by Luke Glanville, for Locke “individuals contract with each other to create a 
society, but they are not contractually obliged to their government. Governors are merely 
trustees who can be removed if they fail their trust.”103 So not only are governors accountable 
to their own people, but, if deemed necessary, the people have the power to dissolve a 
government and constitute a new one. Locke’s conception of popular sovereignty was 
integrated later in the American Declaration of Independence.104 Equality and freedom were 
in the Declaration on the grounds of the “consent of the governed.” Rousseau then recovered 
Locke’s conception, adding that, “every authentic act of the general will obliges or favours all 
citizens equally.”105 More precisely, for Rousseau it is the “laws’ strict impersonality or 
universality” that produces an “equality between the citizens such that they all engage 
themselves under the same conditions and should all benefit from the same rights. ”106 
Glanville has identified an important tension in Rousseau’s thoughts on equality, between 
individual and national rights. In Rousseau’s writings, the rights of man are in fact in 
contradiction with the demands of the general will, insofar as the social contract gives the 
“body politic an absolute power over all its members.”107 The “people” expressing the general 
will thus become for Rousseau a unified body. He explained this tension as a shift from 
natural to civil liberty. In 19th century theory and 20th century practice though, the notion of 
general will was used to justify very different visions of what the unity of the body politic 
meant.  
 
To be sure, neither Locke nor Rousseau wrote expressly about self-determination. Several 
nineteenth century political thinkers on self-government however remodelled their theories of 
consent of the governed and popular sovereignty. In particular, Rousseau’s vision of the 
people as a single unit of interest influenced various authors who made the association 
between self-government and external non-interference. Indeed, in the early nineteenth 
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century Lord Castlereagh hinted at such an equation, suggesting that in the name of national 
equality, “people should be allowed to determine their own internal political 
arrangements.”108 Giuseppe Mazzini and John Stuart Mill further elaborated this idea. In his 
writings in support of a unitary Italian nation, Mazzini alluded to the two dimensions, the will 
of people and non-interference, as two faces of a single concept. For Mazzini, the Italian 
nation would bring alien rule to an end through the exercise of self-determination. In turn, 
national independence in the form of the nation-state would then allow fully-fledged 
individual liberty.109 JS Mill also developed a similar conception of “liberal nationalism.” In 
his Considerations on Representative Government Mill claimed that “a completely popular 
government is the only polity which can make out any claim to this character” namely, “the 
claim of all to participate to sovereign power.”110 Similarly to Mazzini, Mill stressed that this 
would be “next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.”111  
 
This conception of “liberal nationalism” was paralleled in the 19th century by the works of 
German and Central European romantics. Mitteleuropean romantics saw nations as groups 
defined along what Glanville has elegantly termed “the mystique of the Volk.”112 In other 
words, a nation was constituted by a group of equal members linked by shared historical 
traditions and kinship, if not just ethnic ties. Equality of rights for individuals within the 
community was thus equated to kinship allegiances. Over the years, visions on ethnic 
nationality and institutional nationalism were integrated in the discourses of public 
intellectuals and leaders of minority groups, which in Central and Eastern Europe fought for 
the establishment of their “own” nation-states. The unity of these (ethnic) groups was given 
further expression in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference. Despite Wilson’s initial promise to 
recognise self-determination globally, “peoples” entitled to exercise self-determination 
became those ethnic groups that had mobilised national sentiment during the 19th century, 
under the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman and Russian empires. Because of the area to 
which the principle was directed after the war, the understanding of sovereignty became 
rooted in the idea of the nation, and, vice versa, the nation became specifically defined in 
                                            
108 Ibid., 78. 
109 Mazzini, A cosmopolitanism of nations: Giuseppe Mazzini’s writings on democracy, nation building, and 
international relations. In their introduction, Recchia and Urbinati make the point that Mazzini’s works 
constitute the origins of what came to be known later as “liberal wilsonianism.” 
110 Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 57. 
111 Ibid., 284. 
112 Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect, 2014, 86. 
40
ethno-national terms. The contours of political equality within the new nation-states were thus 
delineated along the lines of ethnic affiliation, not just locally, but internationally.  
 
Both “liberal nationalist” and ethnically restrictive conceptions presented here highlight that, 
since the rise of popular sovereignty, notions of political equality and equality of rights have 
lain at the heart of body politics’ formation and legitimacy. The several views discussed also 
reveal what could be called, historically, a perennial issue of contention: if a people has a 
right to fully express its political will and to determine itself, how is the people defined? Who 
is entitled to be part of the body politic and thereby enjoy political equality? Delineations of 
political communities and their membership criteria varied importantly in the views of 19th 
century authors. For German and Central European intellectuals, equality was defined 
exclusively, along kinship ties. Mazzini equated self-government to universal male suffrage. 
Mill, on the other hand, explicitly claimed that, although representative government was 
ideally the best form of political organisation, “the natural tendency of representative 
government as of modern civilisation (wa)s towards collective mediocrity.”113 For this reason, 
he went on, universal suffrage ought to be allocated to “those who can write, read and count 
arithmetically (…) and it would not be society to exclude him but his own laziness.”114 
Moreover, both Mazzini and Mill expounded the then widely held view that not every people 
on the planet was anyway ready, or advanced enough, for self-government. 115  
 
Egalitarian understandings of self-government were reflected, in the thought of these and 
other nineteenth century intellectuals, by exclusive and hierarchical arguments. 
Internationally, hierarchies concerned who, on the planet, was deemed ready for self-
government. In the domestic domain, the tension revolved around the idea of political 
equality in the body politic, and exclusive criteria of access to the body politic for members of 
internal societies. At the start of the twentieth century though, these arguments were disputed 
in a sudden and subversive manner. In 1913, writing his essay on Marxism and the national 
question, Joseph Stalin argued that national self-determination concerned all peoples on the 
planet, with no exceptions.116 If invoked by oppressed populations, self-determination would 
liberate them from the domination of imperial powers and subsequently allow them to join a 
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centralised state. The idea was reformulated and internationalised a year later in what became 
the Leninist doctrine.117 As World War I was progressing, Woodrow Wilson famously 
adopted the phrase, establishing himself as, borrowing the expression from Erez Manela, “the 
champion of self-determination” internationally.118 This is where my thesis starts.  
 
Politics of self-determination in the 20th century 
 
As Arnulf Becker Lorca has recently remarked, whereas discussions on the nature and scope 
of self-determination are complex and provoke constant debate, it seems that the existing 
literature identifies the 20th century history of self-determination in a very linear way.119 After 
World War I, with its contradictions, the principle of national self-determination (though 
occasionally implying multinational unification) was directed to those territories at the 
borderlands of Europe, formerly under the authority of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires. It thus became an organising principle of post-war international order, though for 
many still aspirational. We also know that the brutality with which practices of exclusion 
were undertaken domestically, in the name of self-determination, called into question the 
understanding of peoples in ethnic terms. Hence, the institutional setting within which self-
determination was then transformed from a principle to a norm, and in which it was 
formalised in international law in 1945, bolstered the ideal of the ethnically blind polity. 
Several years later, self-determination became formally associated with human rights (art.1 
ICCPR, ICESCR), as the institution of empire was delegitimised through decolonisation.120 In 
turn, from 1960 the idea of self-determination came to be grounded on universal moral 
foundations in the name of equality and of its association with human rights. 
 
While this is an important part of the story of self-determination and of the transformations in 
the international, numerous scholars have increasingly shown that hierarchical and imperial 
structures continue to bear relevance for the understanding of the contemporary liberal order. 
More precisely, whereas this is something that American IR scholarship had been 
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highlighting for several years, 121 there seems to be a resurgence of interest on the matter in 
interpretivist literature. For example, in investigating the nineteenth century, the English 
School, constructivism and intellectual history assess influences of hierarchical conceptions 
and practices on 20th century international relations.122 In sum, contemporary IR scholarship 
increasingly recognises that overall, “the world in which we live is largely the product of rise, 
competition, and fall of empires.”123 Hence, if we are to fully comprehend the contemporary 
order, as Edward Keene suggests, we may “need to relate the new twentieth-century forms of 
international political and legal order to the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century forms 
that immediately preceded them.”124  
 
As to the tension that I reveal in this thesis, my argument is thus marked as one that is at 
home with this literature. Invoked to expand globally the model of the nation-state, self-
determination, I contend, has concurrently involved exclusions and hierarchies, both 
domestically and internationally. This, once more, underlines that the making of the modern 
system of states has not been just a story of greater equality and inclusion. We are told that 
the global application of self-determination, along with decolonisation, led to the expansion 
of the model of the nation-state, replacing vertical logics of membership and identity with 
horizontal ones. New states were formed, they became members of international society, and 
this is where the story of its expansion ends. In this thesis, however, I want to show that this 
progressivist tale of equality sits uncomfortably with logics of hierarchy, that seem to 
accompany the history of self-determination throughout the twentieth century internationally 
but also domestically.  
 
Certainly, self-determination has been recurrently invoked over the 19th and 20th century 
beyond imperial transitions as the cases of the Scots, Catalans, or Uighurs attest. However, in 
this thesis I want to investigate the idea of self-determination as the institutionalised principle 
of transition from empires (or hierarchical forms of authority) to nation-states. This, 
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interestingly, is a principle that embodies dynamics of both continuity and change. While this 
might be very occasionally acknowledged, a historical engagement with these processes still 
needs to be written.  
 
Before moving to the core of the thesis’ argument, it seems relevant in a discussion on 20th 
century understandings and usages of self-determination to reflect upon what seems to have 
been a historical distinction between national self-determination and self-determination tout 
court. This distinction has been sometimes accompanied, in particular within scholarly work, 
by the propensity to view the former in collective, and the latter in individual terms. I would 
say, though, and this is the view that I endorse in this thesis, that this is a historically and 
politically contingent distinction. At the end of World War I, because self-determination was 
largely directed towards specific national groups, it was with the nation itself that the term 
came to be associated. Yet, national self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference also 
implied, in some cases, multi-national reunification. In the 1990s, debates on self-
determination and its association with ethnic or national forms of self-identity emerged again. 
Several legal cases preceding the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia seemed to 
indicate the predominance of an understanding of self-determination in territorial rather than 
national terms.125 On the other hand, when the Bolsheviks used “national self-determination” 
in the 1910s, later borrowed by numerous struggles for liberation, the term referred explicitly 
to a tool for collective anti-imperial empowerment. Again, however, how the “nation” was 
defined remained a matter open for discussion. The endorsement of national self-
determination, then, seems to be in this case more a matter of ideological tradition. 
Meanwhile, scholars in legal and political theory have recurrently employed the distinction to 
categorise self-determination into collective or individual terms. It seems to me that these 
categorisations can distract us from looking at how actors have deployed these claims, for 
what projects, and at what times.  
 
The Argument Outlined  
 
I argue in this thesis that twentieth century understandings and usages of the idea of self-
determination point to the existence of a recurrent tension. This is a historical tension between 
the egalitarian aspirations of self-determination, on one hand, and the practices of hierarchy 
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associated with self-determination, on the other, that covers three different dimensions of 
world politics. Each level uncovers specific logics of power, both among and within states, 
but also in the way ideas settle and come to constitute certain forms of power.126 Accordingly, 
in what follows, I detail each dimension, or level, of my argument. Before starting, I should 
note however that whereas for a matter of clarity I separate my claim into three levels, in 
historical practice these boundaries have not been as clear-cut as I present them.  
 
Level 1: Self-determination as the standard of post-imperial membership in 
international society 
 
Throughout the 20th century, IR scholarship tells us, self-determination has become the 
accepted standard for post-imperial statehood and membership in international society. 
Though this aspect has been overlooked in the study of IR, I suggest that just like any 
standard, self-determination has inevitably entailed correlative disciplining expectations. 
These, I suggest, have been international expectations as to what “good” domestic order ought 
to be within post-imperial states. They have been marked by a discourse about political 
equality of individuals and equality of rights as constitutive of the nations-state. However, 
they have also been at times more, at other times less, explicit and coherent, periodically 
fostering the recognition of certain claims over others. Moreover, whereas self-determination 
is largely imagined as the principle leading to sovereign equality within international society 
after breakdowns of imperial orders, by the very delineation of international expectations, the 
dominant narrative about equality within and among states appears to be compromised.  
 
Saying that self-determination has been accompanied by expectations, however, needs further 
unpacking. More than just leading to the expansion of the model of the nation-state, self-
determination has thereby also carried with it a bundle of ideas, values and norms. These have 
settled in specific ways, constituting forms of power by fixing meanings and delineating 
appropriate forms of identity and behaviour. This “normative package,” I suggest, has played 
a part in redefining, differently for each wave of 20th century state formation, legitimate 
statehood and membership within international society. In other words, rather than seeing 
self-determination as a “categorical right” –borrowing the phrase from Robert Jackson – that 
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then leads inevitably to a “categorical sovereignty” defined, inter alia, by non-interference, I 
suggest that specific conceptions have been internationally attached to it, beyond recognition 
of statehood. The content of these expectations has varied at given times, reflective of broader 
shifts in the international environment and has occasionally carried explicit contradictions in 
the recognition of certain claims over others. Hence, first, in the international monitoring of 
self-determination, certain conditions have been imposed upon new, apparently equal, 
members of international society. Second, at times these expectations have fostered 
contradictory views.  
 
To make sense of, and give more detailed form, to such expectations, I propose to break the 
idea of self-determination into three normative components. These are, to begin with, the 
identification of the “people” entitled to self-determination - perhaps the most obvious of the 
three, given its prominence within international discussions. Second, there are the “rights” 
associated with self-determination. I refer here more to the entitlements associated with self-
determination internationally than to specific claims made by peoples - even if they might be 
mutually constitutive. Third, there are the “responsibilities” correlative to such rights that, if 
self-determination is realised, have direct implications for the nature of statehood. The 
identification of these three immanent ingredients stems from my observation that for each 
wave of state formation that I study, debates over self-determination by both practitioners and 
theorists have revolved – albeit not exclusively - around three recurrent themes: Who can 
enjoy self-determination? What does it signify? What will be the consequences of realising it?  
 
For each wave of expansion of international society answers have varied and have taken 
different forms. However, I see people, rights, and responsibilities as self-determination’s 
three immanent ingredients for each wave of expansion of international society, highlighting 
the various levels at which international expectations attached to self-determination have 
operated. Following from my historical enquiry, the following table charts the various criteria 
that I have found to delineate international expectations attached to self-determination for 
each case I study:  
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Waves of state 
formation 
-- 
self-determination’s 
“components” 
Post-World War I Post-World War II 
Decolonisation 
Post-Cold War and 
Break-up of 
Yugoslavia 
PEOPLE Ethnic / Racial  Ethnically and 
racially blind 
Ambiguous: 
Norm: ethnically and 
racially blind 
International 
Practice: ethnic 
RIGHTS Self-government/ 
recognition of ethnic 
diversity  
Self-government 
(independence) 
/equal treatment 
Self-government 
through referendum 
(secession) / 
recognition / equal 
treatment 
RESPONSIBILITIES Political equality and 
equality of rights / 
democratic rule/ 
recognition of 
diversity / protection 
of minorities 
Equality (political, of 
rights)/ inclusion/ 
democratic rule/ 
protection of human 
rights 
Equality / inclusion/ 
Protection of human 
rights / democratic 
“governance”/ 
recognition of 
diversity 
Coherence in content 
of “components” 
No: both equality 
and hierarchy 
upheld 
Ambiguous:  
Yes: in components 
No: tension with 
other norms and 
practices 
No: both equality 
and hierarchy 
upheld 
 
For each wave of state formation that I investigate in my historical chapters, these 
expectations and categories will help in systematising international responses. It is important 
to note, though, that in international practice these have not always been as clearly outlined as 
I indicate in the table.  
 
Moreover, as the last category of the table highlights, self-determination’s components have 
also been in conflict with each other, or with other norms. For example, as we will see, after 
World War I self-determination was formally associated with political equality and equality 
of rights, while permitting hierarchies in recognition of minorities and national groups. A 
similar contradiction has characterised the context of the 1990s Balkans. In turn, whereas the 
decolonisation period seems to represent a historical parenthesis because of the 
universalisation of self-determination, we will see that international expectations were also 
attached to the allegedly neutral principle of uti possidetis. In 1919, 1960 and over the 1990s, 
self-determination was, each time, redefined as new members of international society 
acquired (equal) membership within it. However, since expectations touched upon the 
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redefinition of domestic orders, variation from these expectations in domestic politics of self-
determination, I shall argue, has often been perceived as a (mis)interpretation of the concept.  
 
It should be noted that I arrived inductively at the identification of the three components of 
self-determination for each international debate surrounding 20th century waves of state 
formation. Following my research on international discussions for each 20th century wave, I 
have distinguished the existence of commonalities. These were commonalities between how 
international actors at the Paris Peace Conference, at the United Nations, and during the 
break-up of Yugoslavia (in particular in the opinions of the EC Committee) understood and 
delineated self-determination as the standard of membership within international society. 
Each time, the “qualitative” substance of self-determination was redefined, to satisfy quite 
different political projects. However, debates on self-determination as the principle of 
transition from empires (or multinational federations) to nation-states repeatedly converged 
around similar matters, or “signifiers.” I was thus able to identify the components of self-
determination, their substance, and to uncover logics of continuity and change over the 
twentieth century.  
 
The analytical separation of self-determination into its three components is thus the result of 
an inductive process, completed by empirical research. It has allowed me to better 
comprehend institutional debates on the principle over time. This “design” is 
methodologically fruitful, inasmuch as it has helped me to develop both analytical clarity and 
conceptual inclusiveness, to make sense of international debates surrounding 20th century 
waves of state formation. I therefore do not seek to generalise over other claims or cases, at 
least in this thesis, beyond 20th century moments of international expansion. However, I 
should add that it might not be beyond the bounds of possibility that these or similar 
dimensions can be related to discussions on the entry of states into the 19th century family of 
nations.127 Hence, while post-imperial states were allegedly formed in the name of an 
egalitarian principle, specific international actors, at given times, concurrently used the same 
principle to delineate, in a hierarchical fashion, the standard of legitimate statehood and 
membership in international society. 
 
 
                                            
127 Unfortunately,  because of time constraints,  I was not able to investigate in detail this hypothesis but I hope 
to do so in further research.   
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Level 2: Domestic politics of self-determination and state formation 
 
The tension between egalitarian aspirations and practices of hierarchy has manifested itself at 
the domestic level of the newly “self-determined” states, as political élites delineated the 
boundaries of national political communities. There always needs to be a demarcation as to 
who can be part of a political community and who cannot. The unexpected feature of 
exclusions associated with 20th century waves of state formation that I study, however, lay in 
the institutionalised and systematic way in which these took place - often as I will argue, 
though not always, along older lines of imperial politics of recognition. Casting doubt on the 
assumption that, with transitions from empires to nation-states, hierarchy was simply replaced 
by equality, I suggest that within many post-imperial states, what has endured instead was an 
uneven distribution of political rights. What I term “hierarchical membership” - that is either 
old categories, or hierarchies inherited from previous imperial politics of recognition on 
which the new states were formed - has sat uncomfortably with egalitarian aspirations of self-
determination (be they to a greater or lesser degree exclusively defined.)  
 
In other words, post-independence/liberation experiences of self-determination throughout the 
twentieth century do not conform to a linear tale of equality and inclusion. Instead, it seems 
that institutionalised hierarchy has been the norm during the politics of state formation of 
many post-imperial states. After World War I, hierarchical membership continued in the 
Balkans after empire, with the Minority Treaties further fostering unequal recognitions of 
certain groups over others. With post-war decolonisation, self-determination came to be 
associated to human rights. However, “hierarchical membership” persisted in many post-
colonial states, in particular former British colonies, along, I suggest, the lines of former 
imperial politics of recognition. Then, in 1990, international society discovered with surprise 
the persistence of “pockets of empire” in Yugoslavia, in the area where, in 1919, the Paris 
peacemakers had directed self-determination to guarantee the transition from empires to 
nation-states. Just when the OSCE and the European Community (EC) were upholding 
explicitly liberal ideals for Europe, hierarchies and ethnicity in the name of self-determination 
re-emerged internationally. 
 
The idea of hierarchical membership implies a prioritisation of individuals considered “more 
similar” to an idea of the corporate identity of a newly formed state. Such identity often 
mirrors previous imperial politics of recognition in which certain groups had greater 
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recognition or rights than others. In turn, I suggest, the insufficient allocation of certain rights 
allows for the gradual exclusion of other groups (individuals that self-identify or are publicly 
identified with other groups). These exclusions are represented by the loss of political rights 
or by the loss of other rights that impede the full exercise of political rights.  
 
Throughout my research I was able to identify the persistence of hierarchical membership, 
focusing on both behavioural and discursive practices of political actors within the new states. 
I have coined the term “hierarchical membership” to capture a set of various practices and 
conceptions, the expression of which is different in each case. The rights that I take into 
account though, are similar in each context. These are political and other cognate rights that 
allow individual access to membership within the body politic. Hence, whereas these are 
rights exercised individually, in post-imperial politics of self-determination and state 
formation they are largely allocated (or not) on collective grounds.128 
 
Writing specifically about the Russian Empire, Jane Burbank coins the term “imperial rights 
regime” to define the “regime of differentiated, alienable, but nonetheless legal and 
meaningful rights”, defining its notion of citizenship.129 Burbank, explains that, “‘difference’ 
was a foundation of empire’s existence, essential to the process of defining, allocating, and 
manipulating rights.”130 Importantly for my argument, she also hints at the idea that such 
imperial practices were directly transposed into the Soviet rights regime, though she only 
briefly investigates such legacies. 131 So, although the Bolshevik Revolution took place in the 
name of self-determination, hierarchical differentiation, she suggests, persisted.  
 
In some sense then my argument echoes her proposition, although I focus specifically on 
post-imperial waves of state formation disciplined internationally in the name of self-
determination. The internationally held view that it is through the will of the “people” 
(externally defined) that independence can be achieved, or a government constituted, 
obscures, perhaps not unintentionally, the recognition that the way the political community is 
delineated matters for how rights are allocated. Hence, old membership categories inherited 
from empire used to justify domestic hierarchies within new, “self-determined” states, have 
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been in contrast with international expectations attached to international redefinitions of self-
determination, increasingly defined by quite exclusive liberal values and norms. 
 
              Level 3: illegitimate practices and international hierarchies 
 
The deeper implication of all this, which constitutes the third level of my argument, is that no 
matter how flawed, international expectations about equality within new, self-determined 
states have rarely (if ever) been met. Whereas post-imperial states were allegedly formed in 
the name of an egalitarian, liberationist principle, the same principle was concurrently used to 
delineate the standard of legitimate statehood and membership in international society. As this 
standard was not met by newly “self-determined people,” actors within international society 
have used self-determination to justify more, or less, overt hierarchies of status (hierarchies 
that resemble older, apparently discredited, divisions) within international society. These have 
been hierarchies between old and new post-imperial states in international society; between 
more civilised or less civilised states; between states that allegedly are defined by equality and 
inclusion and those that witness hierarchical membership in the politics of self-determination. 
Hence, whereas internationally norms have become delineated increasingly in liberal terms, 
the old practice of creating hierarchies of status has not disappeared.  
 
More than that, though, I suggest that through the expectations attached to it, the idea of self-
determination has operated as an elusive token of legitimate behaviour and identity 
throughout the twentieth century as a whole. The idea of self-determination has worked as a 
constant reminder from more “mature” states to newly formed ones that their status as 
sovereign equals is dependent upon meeting international expectations about appropriate state 
behaviour. The degree of compliance with or deviance from expectations attached to self-
determination has thus left open, in some sense, a “barbarian option.”132 The demarcation line 
between civilised and barbarian has, however, been replaced by designations of 
democratic/liberal, less democratic/liberal and undemocratic/illiberal behaviours.  
 
Although as from decolonisation formal hierarchies have been dismissed, the concept of 
stratification as proposed by Edward Keene might be a useful tool to comprehend the role that 
self-determination has had in 20th century international society. Writing on nineteenth century 
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international relations, Keene suggests that, “we should replace the idea of expansion with 
stratification as our master concept, and so change the central question from ‘who was a 
member of international society’ to ‘who was where within international society’?”133 I 
believe that a similar move can be undertaken to comprehend in a more encompassing way 
the role that self-determination has had in world politics. Self-determination in fact has not 
only established who could be part of international society and who could not. As I will show 
in the next chapters, expectations attached to it - and whether these were respected or not - 
have also delineated, at given times, who could be a more legitimate – and thus equal - 
member within it. 
 
It is here that the role played by the notion of international disciplining in this thesis takes full 
meaning. My understanding of international disciplining, or disciplining, is not distant from a 
dictionary definition. The Oxford Dictionary in fact defines “discipline,” as a noun, as 
“behaviour in accord with rules of conduct; behaviour and order maintained by training and 
control,” “a system of rules of conduct.” As a verb, “to discipline” is said to signify “to bring 
to a state of order and obedience,” but also to “train (someone) to obey rules or a code of 
behaviour, using punishment to correct disobedience”134 Both as a verb and as a noun, 
“discipline” implies a two-sided process. On the one hand, it concerns agents who exercise a 
certain type of control by setting up rules and norms of appropriate behaviour and identity; on 
the other hand, it relates to agents who are subjected to this type of control and who, to a 
greater or lesser degree, comply with it. In other words, it touches upon given agents setting 
up rules, upon them penalising those who do not conform to such norms. Sometimes rigid 
standards are applied, sometimes flexible standards operate. Conversely, it also concerns 
other agents conforming, or not, to a certain idea of what order ought to be. Of course, in 
practice there exist different degrees of compliance to values, norms or rules and, therefore, I 
would add, of ensuing reward or stigmatisation.  
 
Hence, when I use the term ‘international disciplining’, I refer to the explicit, coherent and 
defined international expectations (attached to self-determination) that more powerful actors 
within international society use to delineate rightful state conduct and identity. In turn, on the 
side of those subjected to such values and norms, disciplining implies a greater or lesser 
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Space,” 652. 
134 “Discipline,” Oxford Dictionary of English, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ (18/02/2015.) 
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degree of conformity to such expectations. If these expectations intended to guarantee order 
are not, or not sufficiently, respected, then the notion of disciplining implies a degree of 
penalisation, or stigmatisation, in order to either correct or control. Put differently, over the 
20th century new, “self-determined states” that have not conformed, or at least not entirely, to 
international expectations (level 1 and 2 of the argument) have been deemed less equal than, 
for instance, older, and “better behaved” members of international society (level 3). For each 
wave of state formation, the degree of coherence and explicitness of expectations that 
international actors have attached to the “standard” of self-determination has varied, as much 
as the implications of these expectations, beyond the realisation of statehood.  
 
With the end of World War I, the Minority Treaties came to substantiate international 
disciplining. Whereas the Peace Makers did not conceive any mechanism of enforcement 
attached to the treaties, I shall argue that these were used as loose standards upon which 
judgements as to the state of advancement of the new states would be articulated. In the 
decolonisation phase, UN resolutions on self-determination and human rights were instead 
used as standards against which the behaviour of new states would be confronted. In the Cold 
War years, on the other hand, UN practice was largely characterised by what Gerry Simpson 
has qualified as an “agnosticism about moral truth.”135 This is reflected, for example, in 
interpretations of international law that did not make judgements about the internal politics of 
states, favouring instead formal sovereign equality. However, whereas supervisory regimes 
retreated, international disciplining towards newly independent states took different forms, 
such as requirements from international financial institutions to adapt (and “develop”) 
towards a capitalist economy, or arguments about the (lack of) respect of human rights. In 
fine, with the end of the Cold War, a group of mostly western actors became actively involved 
in monitoring the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This happened through the formulation of 
explicit international expectations by the EC Committee, which were then enforced via strong 
supervisory regimes, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, but also through the long process of 
Europeanisation that affected Croatia.  
 
The proposition that the role of supervisory regimes in the post-Cold War Balkans can be 
equated with hierarchical or civilisational practices is not new. Both William Bain and 
                                            
135 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 2004, 77–78. 
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Dominik Zaum have made the argument before.136 However, for the types of arguments 
made, both perspectives lack an engagement with the domestic level, looking instead at 
Kosovo and Bosnia primarily through the prism of the supervisory regimes.  
 
Moreover, the argument that I advance, in particular with regards to the former Yugoslavia, 
disputes that advanced by Jennifer Jackson Preece. In 1999, Jackson Preece made the point 
that, although the condition of domestic minorities is an international concern, “any 
suggestion that recent minority rights initiatives disclose a new found willingness on the part 
of international organisations to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states so as to promote 
domestic peace, order and good government is simply not substantiated by the evidence.” 137 
Jackson Preece grounds her position on the claim that “in the terminology of international law 
and practice, the terms "failure" and "failed states" are nowhere to be found.” 138 Disputing 
this statement, I will show instead that in particular after 1999 in Kosovo, and to some extent 
before that in Bosnia, international supervisory regimes inaugurated policies, for instance, on 
minority treatment as part of a legitimate statehood “package.” The self-determination of 
Bosnia and Kosovo would be fully recognised and statehood deemed legitimate if such 
policies were respected (though it remains unclear how the degree of domestic compliance to 
international expectations would be measured). Judgements have thus been recurrently 
articulated and used as leverage tools by international authorities. These have not necessarily 
been explicit judgements about “failed states” according to international law. Instead, they 
have taken the form of evasive statements on the advancement of political communities and 
on what “good domestic order” should be within new states. Put simply, there is a difference 
between the qualifying of a state or of its practices as illegitimate (or worse, failed – a term 
that, unsurprisingly many lawyers are keen to avoid). Mine is thus not an argument about 
legal hierarchies, but rather one about moral and political categories, which may or may not 
have an impact on the former.  
 
  
                                            
136 Bain, Between Anarchy and Society, 2003; Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox, 2007. 
137 Jackson Preece, “Self-Determination, Minority Rights and Failed States” This is a  conference paper that does 
not bear page references. 
138 Ibid. 
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For matters of clarity, the historical premises of this claim are illustrated below:  
 	   Post-World War I	   Post- World War II 
decolonisation	  
Post-Cold War	  
Tools of international 
disciplining 
Paris Peace 
Conference Minority 
Treaties	  
Res. 1514 and 1541 	   EC Committee 
opinions, UN/ OSCE 
/ EU tools	  
International 
Disciplining	  
International 
Supervisory Regime	  
Strong rule: uti 
possidetis / No 
Supervisory Regime	  
Strong International 
Supervisory Regime	  
 
Before concluding, I would like to restate that over recent years logics of hierarchy and 
equality have increasingly attracted the attention of IR scholars. The contribution of my work 
to this body of scholarship is twofold. In shedding light on the ambiguous character of self-
determination in twentieth century world politics, my argument joins “domestic and 
international structures and processes as two faces of a single, global social order.”139 In turn, 
the ontological shift towards a holistic approach helps engagement, I believe, in a more 
encompassing discussion of legitimate statehood after empire, and of membership within 
international society. It does so by exposing neglected elements of the story of the expansion, 
largely dismissed from the study of IR as belonging to the domestic realm. Invoked to 
universalise the model of the nation-state, the idea of self-determination, as this thesis 
underlines, has concurrently involved exclusions and hierarchies, domestically and 
internationally. I follow Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper in their claim that, “if we can 
avoid thinking of history as an inexorable transition from empire to nation-state, then perhaps 
we can think about the future more expansively.”140 The challenge, then, is to use historical 
enquiry accordingly.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The idea of self-determination, I have argued, embodies a historical tension. This is a tension 
between the egalitarian aspirations of self-determination and the practices of hierarchy 
attached to it. I have shown that though old, this tension has been most evident during 
twentieth century waves of expansion of international society, and has manifested itself at 
three different levels. First, it has been embodied in the disciplining of international society, 
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when self-determination was redefined, for each wave of state formation, as the standard of 
legitimate membership and statehood. More precisely, I have argued that behind each 
international acknowledgement of self-determination have lain specific expectations as to 
what “good” domestic order ought to be. To make sense of and give content to such 
expectations, I have proposed to break the idea of self-determination into what I see are its 
three normative components: people, rights and responsibilities. Second, I have argued, the 
tension has manifested itself at the domestic level of the newly “self-determined” states, as 
political élites delineated the boundaries of national political communities. I have suggested 
that in numerous post-imperial states the uneven distribution of rights reflecting former 
imperial politics of recognition, or categories, has endured. Third, and as an implication of all 
this, I have suggested that self-determination has been used internationally to justify, in a 
manner not unlike old civilisational ideas, moral and political stratifications of status. 
Through an examination of archival research and secondary material, the next chapters set out 
to explore these dimensions. 
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3  
 
Self-Determination, Minority Treaties and the Constitution of New States 
at the Paris Peace Conference 
 
 
International Relations scholarship tends to agree that with the Paris Peace Conference self-
determination became the accepted standard for membership in international society. This 
scholarship also agrees that, despite President Wilson’s earlier promise to grant self-
determination to colonial peoples through the “benevolent” help of colonial powers, it soon 
became obvious that victorious colonial powers would not renounce their overseas territories. 
In turn, in the name of the “sacred trust of civilisation,” territories formerly under the rule of 
defeated powers were put under the tutelage of the League of Nations, through the Mandate 
System.141 Self-determination was thus directed to those territories at the borderlands of 
Europe, formerly under the authority of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Because 
of the area to which the principle was directed, self-determination took on an explicit ethnic 
connotation already attached to it both by the Bolsheviks and Wilson. Its ethnic tone, we are 
told, led to the perpetration of discriminatory practices in the new, “self-determined” states. 
However, since these practices are largely understood as being the result of domestic politics 
of state construction after World War I, IR scholarship often tends to dismiss them from its 
study.142 After all, what would domestic behaviour have to tell us about the expansion of 
international society after World War I? 
 
In this chapter and the next, I want to suggest that what happened within the newly formed 
states, after statehood was recognised, constitutes a fundamental and yet overlooked part of 
the story of the expansion of international society. To make sense of the expansion, IR 
scholars have largely directed their attention to the arguments used by the Allied and 
Associated Powers, to maintain overseas colonies and bypass the principle of self-
determination. Whereas these are fundamental aspects of the story, they also represent just 
one portion of it. In Paris, self-determination was granted to those people who had mobilised 
nationalist sentiment during the nineteenth century, under the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
empires. It was also explicitly tied to international expectations about what “good” domestic 
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order should be, after statehood was recognised. These expectations were framed in terms of 
rights and responsibilities. Recognition of new states as equal members of the “family of 
nations” was made conditional upon the ratification of the so-called Minority Treaties. 
Though diverse in some respects, these treaties each delineated internationally how national 
authorities should define and treat internal societies and groups. For this very reason, the 
widely shared assumption in IR (except of course for liberal theories), that the internal nature 
of new states is not relevant to an understanding of the emergence of a system based on 
externally independent states, is, I believe, problematic. At least in principle, through the 
development and application of self-determination, the treatment of domestic societies 
became a matter of wide international concern. Although it was not the first time that the 
treatment of domestic populations had been internationally debated, the end of World War I 
was instrumental in redefining explicitly legitimate statehood and membership in 
international society in these terms. For this reason in particular, this period needs to be 
seriously taken into account.  
 
Authors increasingly suggest that the differentiated allocation of self-determination and the 
establishment of Mandates indicate that the Peacemakers, and Wilson in particular, might 
have been more closely aligned to Lorimer’s 19th century hierarchies of civilisation than to 
what many have long described as the US president’s Kantian idealism. 143  Similarly, 
understanding the meaning of self-determination as delineated by experts of more “mature” 
states in the Minority Treaties helps to reveal the contradictions that characterised the post-
World War I social and political order. While the treaties upheld political equality and 
equality of rights within the polity, they promoted hierarchical recognition of national and 
ethnic groups, while recognising a norm of non-interference: by their very role they shaped 
“domestic jurisdiction.”144 As we will see, with their manifold inconsistencies, the Minority 
Treaties came to outline the contours of appropriate state conduct, giving form to self-
determination’s defining components: peoples, rights and responsibilities. The way domestic 
societies came to be delineated and treated within many newly formed states, however, did 
not follow international expectations. Post-imperial hierarchical membership was in contrast 
                                            
143 This unorthodox view is supported, inter alia by Coogan, “Wilsonian Diplomacy in War and Peace,” 74–75; 
Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, 2002, 124–126. 
144 Both equality and “domestic jurisdiction” are terms present in the templates of all the Minority Treaties. As 
Glanville has noted, the latter emerges as a shared term during the conference. Glanville, Sovereignty and the 
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with the international conceptions of equality that, despite their obvious flaws, were 
embedded in the idea of self-determination upheld in Paris. 
 
The case of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is emblematic. Formed on the eve of 
the Paris Peace Conference on the basis of citizens’ equality, the Kingdom was soon after 
recognised by the Allied and Associated Powers. 145 This newly formed state was the object 
of lengthy discussions by the Peace Conference Committee on New States and the Protection 
of National Minorities, which was in charge of drafting Minority Treaties. Because of its 
ethnic mosaic of allegiances, handling the relationship between majorities and minorities in 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a delicate task for the International Committee. 146 Only 
some months after the Kingdom’s creation, the Committee realised that national authorities 
had inaugurated practices of hierarchical membership favouring specific population groups at 
the expense of others. Although, as I will stress, these were justified in the name of 
international principles, hierarchical membership showed that international expectations 
attached to self-determination had not been met.  
 
Throughout the 1920s, the League of Nations would constantly remind Yugoslavia and other 
post-imperial states that their status as sovereign equals was dependent upon meeting 
international expectations about appropriate state behaviour. As we will see, such reminders 
took the form of ambiguous statements as to the possibility of relegating the status of the new 
states from equal, to somehow less equal. In a very limited number of circumstances, the 
League even cautioned post-imperial states that it might take direct measures to redress 
domestic conduct. That more “mature” states could interfere in the domestic jurisdiction of 
states viewed as less experienced indicates, I believe, that hierarchies of status between new 
and old states were a leitmotiv at the League. I suggest that these were along the lines of what 
in many respects were old, hierarchical, assumptions about international social order. In a way 
not dissimilar to civilisational ideas, self-determination and the Minority Treaties can be seen 
as moral high grounds, used to justify informal hierarchies of status, this time within 
international society. An understanding of the role of self-determination before but also after 
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statehood was recognised allows us to shift from the perennial question of “who could be 
granted self-determination, and thus become a member of international society?” to the less 
obvious one, “who was where within international society of the time?”147 This might give us 
a richer understanding of the post-World War I expansion of international society.  
 
This first part of the chapter is concerned with the period spanning the years 1918 to 1923. It 
starts with Wilson's Fourteen Points and the formation of the first Yugoslavia, and ends in 
1923, with the ratification of the last Minority Treaty. A move beyond the strict period of the 
Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) is helpful for two reasons. First, it allows us to refine our 
understanding of the international supervisory system on minority treatment, established at 
the conference and later executed by the League of Nations. Second, it offers an opportunity 
to explore the Yugoslavian rights regime and reflect upon its implications domestically and 
internationally. To illustrate my claims, this first part is divided into two chapters. This first 
chapter is concerned specifically with discussions and decisions taken in Paris. It is divided 
into two main sections. It begins with a critical account of how, from being an idea with 
multiple meanings attached to it, self-determination became in Paris the foundational 
principle for legitimate statehood after empire. The discussion then turns to its ad hoc 
application and to how the codification of the Minority Treaties delineated post-war standards 
of civilised statehood and membership in international society. The next chapter looks at the 
implications that these standards had for new states’ existence and acceptance as rightful 
members of international society, once statehood was recognised.  
 
The Rise of International Politics of Self-Determination: Change or Continuity?   
 
As the war progressed, Wilson increasingly upheld self-determination as the “moral principle 
essential to the achievement of justice and world order”.148 What became the US president’s 
leitmotiv, however, was neither a completely new idea nor a self-referential value about the 
organisation of international relations. As we have seen in the previous chapter, throughout 
the nineteenth century political thinkers evoked self-determination and national leaders used it 
to justify, albeit occasionally, claims to independence. That the intellectual origins of self-
determination were deep-rooted gave legitimacy both to the idea and to the man who was 
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pronouncing it. To this, we should add that until the end of the war, no attempt was made by 
either Wilson or any representative of the Allied and Associated Powers to delimit the 
meaning and scope of self-determination. Until the start of the Paris Peace Conference its 
great international appeal was attached, I contend, to the vagueness of its formulation. 
 
However, as soon as the peace conference began in January 1919, the explosive potential of 
self-determination became discernable to all. The idea of self-determination implied a 
redefinition of the bond between domestic societies and the institution of the state through the 
exercise of popular sovereignty. While in earlier periods the realisation of the consent of the 
governed rested on the discretion of each state, Wilson had turned it into the precondition for 
post-war global order. Through successive invocations of the concept, Wilson expanded its 
foundations and its scope. In so doing, Erez Manela has shown, he also fostered hope for 
independence among peoples living under imperial rule.149 The moment the conference 
started, however, victorious colonial powers made it very clear that for no reason would they 
give up their colonial possessions. Colonial hierarchies were reiterated through the 
establishment of the Mandates System, guaranteed by the League of Nations. Self-
determination was thus narrowed down in its scope and used, ad hoc, in the redefinition of 
Central and South-Eastern European borders. Self-determination thus grew to be regarded as 
hypocritical: the principle for post-imperial statehood and membership in international 
society, while remaining for many no more than aspirational. 
 
The emergence of self-determination as a core principle of order after World War One needs 
to be relocated in the specific historical context in which it took shape. Despite the rhetoric of 
change surrounding the rise of international politics of self-determination, old ideas and 
practices did not just disappear. In spite of its revolutionary potential, self-determination was 
used to perpetuate international hierarchies and meet the interests of European and colonial 
powers. Accordingly, I begin by discussing the idea of self-determination before the 
beginning of the conference, stressing the multiple meanings attached to it. Then, I examine 
how in Paris self-determination came to be a principle of world order, yet limited in its 
application.   
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Contextualising the emergence of the “Wilsonian moment”150 
 
We have already said that the origins of self-determination as a political principle can be 
traced back intellectually to the writings of Locke and Rousseau and in practice, to the 
American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Revolution (1789).151 These 
events rethought the bond between the state and domestic societies. In France, both 1789 and 
1793 Declarations of the Rights of Man and of Citizen implied that people were no longer to 
be treated as the objects of the monarch and that the government was to be chosen by its 
people and to be responsible to them. 152  These documents embodied democratic and 
egalitarian ideals, but they bore little relevance in post-revolutionary France.153 Depending 
more on the goodwill of state authorities, popular sovereignty at the heart of self-
determination was not a shared international standard. Possibly due to its revolutionary 
appeal, throughout the 19th century self-determination increasingly took shape as an 
intellectual object of study and as a slogan for political mobilisation. Mikulas Fabry has 
shown that, although the term was not explicitly uttered, there was a tie between state 
recognition and self-determination in 19th century Latin American secessions. 154  More 
famously, at the same time self-determination was hailed by Giuseppe Mazzini for the 
unification of Italy, and by national groups mobilising under the Austro-Hungarian, German, 
Ottoman and Russian empires.  
 
It was not until the start of the 20th century, though, that self-determination gained a broader 
international scope. In 1913, Josef Stalin wrote about the “principle of national self-
determination,” later promoted internationally by Lenin.155 Both Stalin and Lenin portrayed 
self-determination as an anti-imperialist instrument that would liberate oppressed 
collectivities and allow them to choose freely their own destiny. The principle as formulated 
by the Bolsheviks had a radically new and subversive connotation: it concerned all peoples, 
all over the world, with no exceptions. This included marginalised populations from the 
European Empires and colonial territories. Possibly because of the context in which these 
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ideas were developed, namely tsarist Russia, self-determination corresponded for the 
Bolsheviks to a right to secession. Invoked by oppressed populations, it would liberate them 
from the domination of imperial powers and, subsequently, allow them to join a centralised 
and bigger state. How, in practice, this would happen, remained unclear. A major ambiguity 
was inherent to the process of self-determination as formulated by the Bolsheviks. It did not 
reconcile centralism with the autonomy of self-determined nations and this, we know, would 
later translate into practical problems.156 At the start of the war, these practical matters were 
not of great concern. It was rather self-determination’s subversive potential that preoccupied 
imperial authorities.  
 
The principle of self-determination as invoked by Wilson appears to be very different from 
the Bolshevik’s understanding of it. When Wilson initially defined self-determination as the 
principle leading to international peace and justice, he had not really clarified ideological and 
political differences. On the contrary, Wilson adopted a rhetoric echoing that used by Lenin 
and nationalist leaders, speaking in the name of “oppressed” people.157 At the same historical 
moment, this same idea, self-determination, acquired different, multiple, meanings according 
to who was pronouncing it. This discursive ambiguity, I suggest, helped to transform self-
determination from an idea into an international principle. Crucially, the president of a world 
power was speaking in the name of marginalised populations.158 At the initial stages of this 
promotion of self-determination, Wilson’s audience was made up both of European states and 
populations living under imperial rules. As described by Manela, the confusion between the 
socialist rhetoric and the liberal reformist one marked the start of an efficacious formula.159 
By the end of the war, Wilson had become for many the “prophet” of self-determination. 
 
As the war progressed, differences became evident. In addition to clearly demarcated 
ideological discordances, these also concerned the means used to achieve self-determination. 
Lenin used self-determination as a revolutionary motto. Wilson saw it as the peaceful means 
to achieve justice. Moreover, the Bolsheviks called self-determination an anti-imperialist 
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principle to be used by oppressed peoples. Wilson’s position turned out to be very different. 
When words turned to practice and the war started to come to an end, the President could not 
continue to speak both to the Great Powers and to the “oppressed” peoples. After all, by 
entering the war in 1917, the American president had first and foremost started off as the 
spokesman of the Allied and Associated Powers.  
 
As a scholar, Wilson’s intellectual background was rooted in liberal democratic theory. His 
admiration for Kant’s writings is widely reported. 160  Writing specifically on self-
determination, Margaret Macmillan has suggested that Wilson had an idealist conception of 
its scope and application - that he was a liberal thinker who believed in the possibility of 
bringing together the will of the peoples with concerns about peace and justice.161 How peace 
and justice were conceived is a matter that Macmillan does not scrutinise. This approach, 
however, dismisses Wilson’s background as a politician. As indicated by Edward Keene, “in 
most respects he and the other architects of the League system were operating with a world-
view that was broadly similar to that which had defined pre-1914 ideas about international 
order.”162 In other words, Wilson’s ideas should be put back into the context in which they 
emerged: that of old hierarchical views about domestic and international order. These were 
merely obscured in the years of the war, when Wilson came to be viewed as the “champion” 
of self-determination.163 
 
Wilson did not explicitly mention the principle of self-determination in his Fourteen Points 
before the US Congress on 18 January 1918. In fact, he did not mention it until his less 
famous discourse of February 1918, called the Four Points. In it, he defined self-
determination as an “imperative principle for action”.164 The Fourteen Points can, however, 
be regarded as an embodiment of the US President’s equivocal use of self-determination and 
contradictory conceptions of world order. For example, in his fifth point Wilson evoked the 
idea that colonised peoples could express their voice in relation to the organisation of the 
governments they lived under. Yet nowhere did he mention how this would eventually take 
place. Points nine and eleven stated that it was only for Italy, Montenegro, Rumania and 
                                            
160 Cobban, National Self-Determination.; MacMillan, Peacemakers Six Months That Changed the World.; 
Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, 2007.; Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System.” 
161 MacMillan, Peacemakers Six Months That Changed the World. 
162 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, 2002, 125. 
163 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, 2007, 17–19. 
164 Quoted in Cobban, National Self-Determination, 4. 
68
Serbia, that the readjustment of borders should take place according to “clearly defined lines 
of nationality,” leaving to one side other national and territorial claims. Points eleven and 
twelve related to the autonomous development of peoples under the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian Empires. Which peoples and which autonomy though were not mentioned. Then 
more specifically, Wilson pledged the constitution of Montenegro, Rumania, Serbia and 
Poland as sovereign states. While Wilson’s rationale for the constitution as sovereign states of 
the first three related to their existence as such before the war, the American President did not 
provide any justification as to why “Polish populations” (point thirteen) could have a state 
while other peoples formerly under imperial rule in Europe, also seeking self-determination, 
could not.165  
 
Wilson’s condensed speech had a strong international echo despite - or perhaps because of - 
its ambiguities. It formed the inspiration for the programme that could lead the world to order 
and peace in a context of violence and fragility. As Manley O’ Hudson wrote in 1923:  
 
“When President Wilson proclaimed his integral programme, condensed in his fourteen points, and the 
justice principle for all the peoples and all nationalities, that they have a right to live under identical 
conditions of freedom and security, be they strong or weak, the war became for millions of combatant 
men (…) a real crusade for the liberation of oppressed people. Later, by accepting these principles as 
the base of the armistice, Allied States found themselves morally compelled to undertake a wide 
project of territorial readjustment that would naturally arouse the most extravagant hopes among 
numerous European peoples.” 166 
 
In February 1918 and until the beginning of the peace conference in January 1919, it was not 
clear how both national quests and concerns about world order would be accommodated. The 
Allied and Associated Powers, however, knew that the conference had to produce, volens 
nolens, a system that acknowledged Wilson’s promised self-determination, without 
undermining the Allied and Associated Powers’ interests and practices.  
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Delimiting the scope of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference: a universal 
or ad hoc principle? 
 
Framed on an international scale, self-determination implied a reconsideration of legitimate 
units of political authority. Domestically, it implied a reconsideration of the relationship 
between political institutions and populations living within these units. Invocations of the idea 
of self-determination throughout World War I thus bore critical implications for the post-war 
reconfiguration of world order. These invocations challenged pre-1914 worldviews and 
questioned what the legitimate forms of political authority and modes of sovereignty should 
be. They also turned the allocation of political rights from an internal issue to a matter of 
international interest. That the treatment of domestic societies could be of international 
concern was not a new matter in itself. Throughout the 19th century, first in Vienna in 1815, 
then in Paris in 1856 and later in Berlin in 1878, attempts had been made to guarantee the 
rights of specific minority groups in given states. The extent of the concern globally, though, 
was new. Although that might not have been intentional, Wilson’s recurrent appeals to self-
determination called into question the 19th century order. They disseminated, worldwide, the 
very notion of consent of the governed. This bore all sorts of implications. In particular, it 
disputed the very existence of European colonial rule.  
 
When the conference opened in January 1919, statesmen and delegates present in Paris, and 
President Wilson in particular, received a multitude of letters and petitions concerning the 
demands of groups aspiring to self-determination. Many of the petitioners who, from all over 
the world, had sent their letters or who had come to Paris, adopted in their appeals Wilson’s 
rhetoric of self-determination.167 One of the most notable examples is Ho-Chi-Minh who, at 
the time, was working in a Parisian hotel and petitioned Wilson to support the Indochinese 
cause against the French, quoting the American Declaration of Independence. The avalanche 
of requests that the statesmen present at the Peace Conference received was completely 
unexpected and led to arguments between the members of the Allied and Associated Powers 
and within delegations.168 It became clear that a fundamental task of the Peace Conference 
would be reaching a consensus on the meaning and application of self-determination. 
Reflecting on the Paris Peace Conference in 1921, Robert Lansing, Wilson’s Secretary of 
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168 This in particular was the case of the US delegation. Lansing, the US secretary of State, and Wilson 
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70
State, famously wrote that the phrase self-determination was “loaded with dynamite.”169 
Indeed, finding an agreement revealed to be much harder than expected, in particular because 
of the ambiguities and promises created by Wilson before the end of the war.  
 
With its meetings, special committees and agreements, the Peace Conference that opened on 
18th January 1919 and came to an end on 21st January of the following year was a site of 
extended international interaction and debate. For more than one year representatives invited 
from twenty-nine countries from all over the world discussed and sought to settle peace. Over 
that period, self-determination was erected as the accepted standard for post-imperial 
statehood and membership in international society. At the conference, teams of historians, 
geographers and anthropologists worked on the contested matter: who should be granted self-
determination and upon which criteria? The actual application of self-determination came to 
be restricted to demarcated, European territories. From an imminent measure for all, the Paris 
peacemakers turned self-determination into an aspirational principle. Put simply, the interests 
of the Allied and Associated Powers, many of which were colonial states, were reasserted. 
This was done at the expense of the other delegations invited to Paris and, crucially, at the 
expense of colonial peoples whose hopes had been fostered during the war.  
 
From the start of the conference, colonial powers made clear that for no reason would they 
give up their overseas possessions. For them, the matter was quickly sorted: colonies were not 
yet ready to be granted the right to choose their own government and destiny. What was to be 
done, though, with colonies and territories formerly under the authority of the defeated 
imperial powers, Germany and the Ottoman Empire? Similarly to other colonial territories, 
the argument was used that they were not yet ready for independence. After all, they still were 
“races, peoples, or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive[d] them of the 
capacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations”.170 For their own benefit, the Great 
Powers argued, they had to be put under the tutelage of more mature and benevolent states. 
As Wilson claimed at the start of January 1919: 
 
“We are friends of these people. Our task in Paris is to organise the friendship of the world, to see to it 
that all the moral forces that make for right and justice and liberty are united and are given a vital 
organisation to which the peoples of the world will readily and gladly respond.”171 
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In the name of this friendship and of the Great Powers’ generous intentions, an ingenious 
system was designed to both safeguard colonial interests and “help” the advancement of 
colonial peoples. This was the League of Nations Mandate System. Put simply, this system 
implied that colonial territories would be organised in three categories, according to “the stage 
of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic 
conditions and other similar circumstances.”172 Each territory would be placed under the 
authority of a mandatory colonial power and such tutelage would be exercised on behalf of 
the League. The configuration of colonial peoples into A, B, C mandates (A for the more 
advanced and C for the least developed) ironically recalls both Pufendorf and Lorimer’s 
hierarchies of status.173 “A Mandates”, in particular those formerly under the “Turkish 
Empire,” were considered to “have reached a stage of development where their existence as 
independent nations [could] be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand 
alone.” “B and C Mandates” were placed under more restrictive conditions. C Mandates in 
particular, “such as South-West Africa and certain of the South pacific Islands, (…) owing to 
the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of 
civilisation, or their geographical continuity to the territory of the Mandatory” were placed 
under the full authority and laws of the Mandatory states.174 
 
Through what was presented as a “promise of emancipation,” self-determination was denied, 
or deferred, to colonial territories. In turn, with the help of benevolent powers and of the 
future League, colonial populations would achieve a stage of sufficient social, political, 
cultural and moral development.175 In the words of Jan Smuts, one of the peacemakers at the 
conference and General in South Africa:  
 
“The only safe and sound principle for the league to hold on to is that of self-determination and of the 
autonomous state. There will however be cases […] where an autonomous regime cannot be adopted 
from the start, and where the consultation of the country on the question is not formally possible”176 
 
Unsurprisingly, the line separating who could enjoy autonomy from who could not was still 
largely racial. Claims for self-determination that the Great Powers took into account in Paris 
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came from European territories formerly under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires.177 Deemed perhaps less backward than others, Central and South Eastern European 
peoples were considered to be ready for membership in the family of nations. As we will see, 
though, they too had to fulfil specific criteria set out by the Allied and Associated Powers, 
and demonstrate what Jackson Preece has termed “a willingness to comply with a standard of 
civilisation.”178  Hence, despite self-determination’s promise of subversion in favour of 
equality, the Paris Peacemakers continued to view world order along lines of hierarchy. They 
reorganised it accordingly.  
 
Self-determination: a principle of legitimate statehood and membership, yet omitted 
from the League of Nations Covenant 
 
Disputes over the delimitation of the scope of self-determination during the Paris Peace 
Conference are clearly embodied in the discussions that accompanied the drafting of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. Wilson was at the head of the conference commission in 
charge of composing the Covenant for the League that, withal, the United States never joined. 
For weeks, he insisted on including the principle of self-determination, even though neither 
the other delegations nor his advisers could agree. Some did not share the formulation; others 
simply disagreed with the insertion of the principle in the final document.179 In eight of his 
drafts Wilson proposed to include it, using the same formulation:  
 
“The future government of these peoples and territories shall be based upon the rule of self-
determination or the consent of the governed to their form of government shall be fairly and 
reasonably applied and all policies of administration or economic development be based primarily 
upon the well-considered interests of the people themselves.”180 
 
In his ninth and final draft, presented before the commission on 3rd February, Wilson finally 
omitted it. Manela explains this change as resulting from the meeting that Wilson had the 
previous day with George Creel, head of the US Committee on Public Information.181 During 
this meeting, Creel, who had just come back from a journey to Central Europe, told Wilson 
that he saw there that local populations respected the president so much that they hung his 
portraits in their houses and almost considered him a “popular saint”.182 Scared by this 
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overwhelming responsibility, Manela suggests, Wilson amended the draft.183 Wilson began to 
fear the consequences of the speeches he had previously given about the right of all peoples to 
self-determination. As he asserted before the US Congress at the end of 1919: 
 
“When I gave utterance to these words, that all nations have a right to self-determination, I said them 
without the knowledge that all these nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day”.184 
 
Hence, in the final draft presented by Wilson self-determination was not mentioned. Instead, 
territorial integrity and political independence were assured to the future members of the 
League (art. 10). Avoiding mention of self-determination in the Covenant did not, however, 
change the substance of the matter. It was too late to simply ignore the question of self-
determination and the rights of national populations. For months, self-determination had been 
presented as the solution for world peace. Wilson’s communicative action had led to the 
internalisation of the principle by populations, state leaders and domestic and international 
civil associations. As Baron Wlassics wrote in 1922:185  
 
“[…] self-determination has become today very wide-spread. Every one thinks he grasps the tenor of 
it; it is so simple, so natural and so just that nations should decide their own destiny”.186 
 
As we are about to see, the principle of self-determination was at the root of the treaties with 
the Successor States of the Empires and of the Minority Treaties drafted at the conference. 
The seeds of change had been planted. Self-determination had become, although for many 
only in future terms, the principle of legitimate statehood and membership after empire. In 
accordance with its differentiated, or hierarchical application, self-determination was, 
however, excluded from the League’s Covenant.  
 
Self-Determination and the Rights of Populations: a New Standard of Civilisation? 
 
In the previous section, I have argued that in Paris, self-determination became the shared 
principle of legitimate statehood and membership after empire. As a result of its invocations, 
self-determination introduced a fundamental innovation internationally. In becoming a core 
principle of world order, it implied a democratic rethinking of the relationship between states 
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and domestic societies. I have also underlined though that its application in post-war practice 
came to be restricted to specific territories. Due to their state of backwardness, Europeans and 
Americans claimed, colonial peoples were excluded, for the time being, from self-
determination. The principle was directed to those European territories formerly under the 
rule of Austro-Hungary and, although to a lesser extent, the Ottoman Empire. Located at the 
borderlands of both the European society of states and of those same empires, until the start of 
the war peoples living in the territories of Central and South-Eastern Europe were largely 
viewed by Europeans as hybrid populations. Able to mobilise national sentiment and organise 
politically, they were also deeply rural and poor. Once it became obvious towards the final 
stages of the war that in Europe imperial rule had come to an end, groups that had mobilised 
politically throughout the 19th century came to be qualified for self-determination. 
 
Because of the area to which it was directed, self-determination took on a specific tone. As a 
legacy of imperial politics of recognition, groups in Central and South-Eastern Europe 
identified themselves primarily along lines of ethnicity, language and religion.187 To maintain 
peace in the area, the peacemakers believed that territorial borders of post-imperial states 
should be drawn as far as possible along ethno-linguistic and, to some extent, religious lines. 
For months specialised commissions worked on the drawing of territorial boundaries. It 
became increasingly clear that if majoritarian ethnic groups were to have a state of their own, 
it would inevitably create minorities. In line with previous 19th century international minority 
provisions, the Allied and Associated Powers determined that if majorities were to realise the 
right to self-determination, minorities should have guarantee, or recognition and protection of 
their rights. As we are about to see, recognition of legitimate statehood for the new, post-
imperial states was made conditional upon the ratification of the Minority Treaties. 188 With 
their manifold contradictions, these treaties established the rights of the “self-determined” 
peoples and the correlative responsibilities that the new states would have, as to the treatment 
of domestic societies. Treatment of internal populations became a fundamental criterion of 
legitimacy in the post-war process of expansion of international society. If the new states 
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sought international recognition as legitimate members of the family of nations, their national 
representatives had to prove their goodwill by signing the treaties.  
 
Through these treaties, the “moral purpose of the state” came to be defined along lines of 
protection and good treatment of domestic populations.189 Yet how this was to be done within 
the new states, once the treaties were ratified, was not fully clear. Despite the work of more 
“mature” states’ delegates in setting the criteria of good domestic order in Paris, the treaties 
bore numerous imprecisions. Due to the delegates’ inexperience, prejudiced views and lack of 
knowledge of the area, the treaties presented several inconsistencies. In the spirit of this 
project, I have identified two of them specifically. First, the treaties implied political equality 
and equality of rights within the polity, yet suggested a hierarchical recognition of ethnic 
groups. Second, while they promoted, though weakly, a norm of non-interference in the name 
of new states’ sovereign equality, by setting the criteria of just “domestic jurisdiction” they 
also implied the opposite. Domestically, once the new post-imperial states were recognised, 
discrimination often prevailed over inclusion. In some cases exclusions were even justified in 
the name of contradicting international norms. Individuals could report their mistreatment to 
the special Minority Section set up at the League of Nations. However, no international 
mechanism of minority protection existed. Throughout the 1920s the Minority Treaties were 
thus used as moral, rather than legal markers of civilised behaviour. Setting expectations on 
appropriate domestic behaviour, the Treaties functioned as a cultural standard upon which 
judgements on the state of advancement of the new states would be articulated.  
 
The purpose of this section is to show how self-determination became, through the drafting of 
the Minority Treaties, a standard for civilised statehood and membership in international 
society. I do so by giving content to the three ingredients attached to self-determination - 
people, rights and responsibilities. I show how these delineated international expectations 
about what good domestic order ought to be within the new equal sovereignties. First I 
discuss how self-determination came to be ethnically connoted and how accordingly, ideas of 
minority recognition and protection emerged. Then, I present the rights and responsibilities 
attached to self-determination in the Treaties themselves along with their flaws. I thus outline 
the role of the Minority Treaties as cultural, rather than legal, benchmarks, once they were 
ratified.  
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Ethnic majorities and minorities in the new states 
 
It was during discussions about the settlement of populations and territories at the conference 
that the specific, ethno-national conception of self-determination clearly emerged. This was 
directly related to the geographical area to which self-determination was to be directed, 
though both the Bolsheviks and Wilson in his Fourteen Points had expressed their 
understandings of the ethnic basis of self-determination long before: Central, Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe. It should be noted, however, that for a while, after the armistice was 
signed on 11th November 1918, the Allied and Associated Powers did not predict the 
complete end of the structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In contrast to the Ottoman 
Empire, they hoped that the Peace Conference would bring into being a decentralised 
federation of the “Danubian people”, guaranteeing political order. These expectations were 
abandoned soon after the beginning of the conference.190 The architecture of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire had been undermined during the war, its regime and structure 
delegitimised both internationally and internally. The war had led to the strengthening of pre-
existing nationalist movements and, in certain cases, the Allied Powers had supported these 
movements for strategic reasons. Wilson’s Fourteen Points had been explicitly directed to the 
territories and populations under Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman rule. At the start of 1919, 
the Paris peacemakers could not ignore these aspects. 
 
During the first months of the Conference, the Great Powers’ representatives largely believed 
that it would be possible to make the borders of the new states coincide with those of the 
(ethnic) nations. Self-determination, it was thought, would be recognised along the lines of 
national majorities in the areas concerned. The problem was that none of the peacemakers, 
really, was familiar either with the distribution of populations in the region or with the ethno-
national allegiances that the claimants were advocating.191  Soon after the start of the 
conference, it became evident that for historical and demographic reasons initial promises 
could not be kept.192 There were too many populations not identifying, or not identified, with 
recognised majorities and these would exist beyond any territorial boundary that could ever 
have been drawn. National groups would overlap because they could not identify with clearly 
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demarcated territories, while small groups of nationalities would find themselves in states 
explicitly defined as ethnically exclusive. 
  
Tracing the frontiers of the new political communities was thus made complex. The areas to 
which self-determination was directed had been under the rule of two multi-national empires. 
These were characterised by overlapping membership regimes, both institutionally and 
territorially. The strategy that both Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman authorities used to handle 
this mismatch had been to grant cultural autonomy to members from ethnically or religiously 
recognised groups. Not all groups though would be recognised. For example, the Ottoman 
authorities considered Jews and Christians as “second class” subjects. In both Empires, 
though, their censuses contained information as to ethnic and religious categories. From the 
censuses, it transpired that populations identifying with similar ethnic, religious or linguistic 
groups were often dispersed over the territories of the Empires. Recognition was thus 
primarily non-territorial.  
 
As early as April 1919 it became clear that it would be impossible to draw territorial borders 
along exact lines of nationality. 193  Self-determination was, in the words of Wilson, 
fundamental for post-war peace, but if minorities were to be excluded that would destabilise 
the international settlement. Discussions within the commission on the creation of the League 
of Nations led to the idea that this unexpected discrepancy should be overcome by granting 
certain guarantees to minorities within new states. The peacemakers could not allow the 
domestic creation of categories of semi- or non-citizens, while recognising post-imperial 
states as new members in international society. Both President Wilson and Lord Cecil, the 
UK Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, proposed to codify and generalise rights of 
domestic populations to all, and not just to the new states, by including them in the Covenant 
of the League. In Wilson’s words:  
 
“Take the rights of minorities. Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the 
world than the treatment, which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities. And, 
therefore, if the great powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense, is it unjust that they 
should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantees have been given?”194 
 
                                            
193 Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents, 40–44. 
194 Excerpt from Wilson’s speech at the plenary session on 31st May 1919 AA VV, The Treaty of St. Germain, 
569. 
78
The proposition was, however, rejected, due to disagreements among the Allied and 
Associated Powers (would they also have to guarantee these rights within their domestic 
constituencies?). On 2nd May 1919 it was decided that specific treaties between the new states 
and the Allied and Associated Powers needed to be drafted.195 These treaties would deal with 
the definition of the borders of the new states, the constitution of their political communities 
and the setting up of special norms for minorities. In other words, as tools of international 
disciplining, the treaties would establish what good domestic order within the new states 
should be. With regards to the peacemakers’ view on overseas colonies, Edward Keene 
writes: 
 
“Simply put, Europeans and Americans believed that they knew how other governments should be 
organised, and actively worked to restructure societies that they regarded as uncivilised so as to 
encourage economic progress and stamp out the barbarism, corruption, despotism, and incompetence 
that they believed to be characteristic of most indigenous regimes.”196 
 
Although not as discriminatory, European and American views on Central and South-Eastern 
Europe were similarly hierarchical. The Minority Treaties were to set what the Great Powers 
deemed as civilised criteria for legitimate statehood and membership in post-war international 
society. Access to the family of nations for the new states was thus made conditional upon the 
ratification of the documents. In Paris, a special committee to deal with the drafting of the 
treaties was created, following the decision of the Council of Four, composed of Georges 
Clémenceau, David Lloyd George, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando and Woodrow Wilson.197 The 
Committee on New States and the Protection of Minorities held its first meeting on 3rd May 
1919. 198  Despite its sixty-four meetings between then and 9th December 1919, the 
establishment of international guarantees on the treatment of domestic societies was a matter 
of great controversy. The work of the committee influenced all the Minority Treaties resulting 
from the Paris Peace Conference, yet it failed to smooth many of the ruffled feathers. 
Altercations on the scope of self-determination continued, in particular between the 
committee and representatives of the new states.  
 
Numerous delegations present at the Paris Peace Conference, in particular those of the 
successor states of the Empires, were against these specialised treaties. New states’ delegates 
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sent to Paris to negotiate the treaties with the special committee were very discontented with 
the peacemakers’ decision that states should give international guarantees on the treatment of 
domestic populations. Were they not sovereign equals, after all? During the drafting of the 
Minority Treaties, national delegates made unofficial declarations and sent letters to complain 
about what they claimed would be a violation of the national sovereignty of the new states. In 
the words of Bratiano, president of the Romanian delegation, sharing his position with 
Kramar, representing the Czechoslovakian delegation, Paderewski from the Polish delegation 
and Trumbic from the Yugoslav delegation: 
 
“If minorities realise that the freedoms that they enjoy are guaranteed to them not by the state to which 
they belong, but by the protection of an external presence, the foundations of the state will be 
undermined.” 199 
 
In spite of their discontent, the signatory states officially accepted the international nature of 
responsibilities towards domestic societies as delineated in the final version of the treaties, all 
constituted to a similar pattern. All the successor states, in fact, ratified the Minority Treaties. 
The Committee on New States had made it clear: should the successor states want to take part 
in the Treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain concerning, respectively, the peace and 
territorial conditions for Germany and Austria, they were to sign their respective minority 
treaty.200 
 
It should be said though that even if the Paris Peace Conference was at the forefront of the 
contemporary codification of minority rights, the first minority recognitions had been 
enunciated much earlier.201 Minority protection is an old notion that took a specific and 
clearer shape at the conference. If one goes back in time, references to minorities are to be 
found in the 1648 Peace Treaties of Westphalia. In the Treaty of Osnabruck, part of the Peace 
of Westphalia, toleration of collective worship of minority faiths in private life and in 
“clandestine churches” was mentioned.202 The grounds for the 1919-1923 Minority Treaties 
were clearly laid over the 19th century. In 1878, the Treaty of Berlin, signed by the United 
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Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and 
specifically directed at the Balkans, introduced two important ideas in relation to minorities. 
First, it proposed that minority groups identified in the treaty by religion would enjoy a 
certain degree of autonomy. Second, it set forth that these minority groups could, in certain 
situations, be granted territorial rights.203  
 
The novelty in 1919 was that the treatment of internal populations was turned into an 
externally dictated condition, a standard of civilisation, for membership in international 
society and for sovereign equality. The treaties were to define rights and responsibilities 
attached to self-determination. These conditions, however, just like in previous periods, were 
to be decided by more mature states, members of international society. In some sense, the 
whole edification of self-determination as the criteria for post-imperial statehood and 
membership in international society was, after all, not that far from 19th century lawyers’ 
claims regarding hierarchy and order. In 1889 Oppenheim argued, for example, that, 
“statehood alone does not include membership in the family of nations.”204 After World War 
I, just as in the 19th century, access to international society was thus open only to states 
meeting criteria familiar to (and determined by) existing members. By being officially 
accepted at the Peace Conference, sending delegations, taking part in international 
discussions, the successor states of the empires had already been granted a certain degree of 
recognition, well before the signature of the Minority Treaties. Their acceptance of the 
treaties signified, I suggest, that they gave their guarantee to fulfil the conditions required to 
become rightful and equal members of the society of states. 
 
Legitimate statehood and membership: the contradicting grounds of the Minority 
Treaties 
 
Just as the democratic ideals that Wilson and other European and American peacemakers 
shared were flawed by hierarchical worldviews, the Minority Treaties that they crafted 
presented various contradictions. Two issues were particularly salient.205 First, the treaties 
professed to promote domestically the norm of equality within polities, at the same time as 
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hierarchical recognition of specific ethnic groups. Second, while the treaties asserted non-
interference in the name of states’ sovereign equality, by their very provisions they intruded 
in the “domestic jurisdictions” of new states. This uncovers, I suggest, a tension between 
egalitarian conceptions of self-determination on one hand, and practices of hierarchy 
associated with self-determination on the other. This tension was twofold, both domestic and 
systemic. I explore the latter in the next chapter. In what follows I present a few 
considerations on the former.  
 
Literature dealing with the Minority Treaties is primarily concerned with the minority 
provisions included in the documents.206 The treaties though also included clauses on the 
delineation of the political community itself. The treaties sketched out what the domestic 
provisions for the allocation of nationality should be. All the treaties assured that the criteria 
of citizenship allocation should be equality and that anyone who could not be granted the 
nationality of another state could acquire citizenship, through ius soli, if residing in the new 
state. The treaties also stated that all those having the same nationality should be equally 
treated by state authorities, and granted the same guarantees of protection as well as political 
and civic rights.207 To be sure, the enforcement of these provisions, as much as the criteria for 
acquisition of national citizenship, would depend, later, on each state’s domestic legislation 
and practices. It should be noted, however, that although minority clauses existed before 
World War One, no international provision had until then engaged with states’ competence in 
matters of acquiring or losing citizenship. That was a significant novelty attached to self-
determination. From then on, the treatment and delineation of domestic societies were to be, 
in principle, matters taken into consideration internationally. 
 
As a result of these provisions, it appears that minority rights were codified in the idea of 
equality of individuals, and not just that of groups. This notion of equality was conceived in 
the form of a guarantee for all citizens to have the same political and civil rights within a 
polity. In the treaties, the peacemakers explicitly introduced the idea of domestic political 
equality (through, for example, the acquisition of citizenship via ius soli) and equality of 
rights (both civil and political). All the templates of the treaties presented the same article on 
the equality of citizens of one state: “All … nationals shall be equal before the law and shall 
                                            
206 Claude, National Minorities  an International Problem; Fink, “The League of Nations and the Minorities 
Question”; Fink, Defending the Rights of Others. 
207 “Report on the protection of minorities” by the Committee established by the Resolution of the Council of the 
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enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, religion or 
language”.208 The treaties thus both “provided for protection of all individuals, against 
discrimination by the states” and allocated “a number of group rights relating to language, 
education and cultural [and religious] institutions”.209 The former was a precondition for the 
latter. While self-determination implied a right to political autonomy and independence, it 
also involved correlative – and somehow corrective – responsibilities in the form of a 
guarantee of equality of all and recognition of specific rights, for specific groups. 
 
In theory, all that made sense. In practice, the problem lay in the criteria used for such 
recognition. Despite available population censuses, the treaties did not recognise all the ethno-
religious groups present in the territories of the new states. For example, when the question 
was raised for the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as to the Jewish minority, the Committee decided 
that the (religious, rather than ethnic) group was not numerous enough in the country to bear 
mention in the Minority Treaty of Saint-Germain. A mark of anti-Semitism, the official 
justification redundantly asserted that, “it [was] desirable to limit conversation to the case of 
those minorities as to which it might be suggested that special treatment was desirable”.210 As 
Carole Fink has indicated, acknowledging the rights of certain groups while ignoring others 
gave rise to the problem of the “named and unnamed minorities, protected and unprotected 
people”.211 These distinctions, as we shall see in the next section, created de facto different 
categories of citizens within states.  
 
This, however, was not a matter of concern as to its consequences when the treaties were 
being drafted and ratified. After all, when the representatives of the new states signed their 
respective treaties they were asked to give two basic international guarantees. First, they had 
to guarantee that the Minority Treaties would be integrated into their domestic legislations. 
Second, they had to give assurance that minority protection would be viewed as an obligation 
of international interest, under the guarantee of the League of Nations.212 Because of the lack 
of any enforcement mechanism, the treaties were legally weak. As we will see in the next 
chapter, over the 1920s they came to constitute ambiguous cultural markers defining new 
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states’ good domestic order. Post-imperial states were politically and morally responsible to 
uphold international standards before international society. As instituted at the Paris Peace 
Conference, self-determination operated in a way not dissimilar to a standard of civilisation – 
a highly contradictory one.  
 
Another incongruity that has been acknowledged in the literature lay in the coexistence of two 
different and essentialist discourses on how to deal with self-determination for ethnic peoples. 
The first discourse supported the view that for peace to be achieved minorities should have 
protection within an ethnic nation-state. This was the view that Wilson supported. The second 
discourse, in contrast, suggested that what mattered most was that state borders should 
coincide as far as possible with those of the nation. If ethnic minorities existed within a state, 
they should simply be displaced. This conception derived from the view of the French 
anthropologist Georges Montadon who, in his 1915 memorandum, argued that, “the stability 
of national frontiers delineated according to ethnic criteria could best be secured through the 
removal of inassimilable ethnic minorities”.213 The first discourse was embodied in the 
Minority Treaties, and is taken into account in this research as it bears direct implications on 
the hierarchical recognition of groups within post-imperial states. The second view was 
instead most visibly embodied in the two conventions on population exchange signed under 
the auspices of the League of Nations. Referring to pathological homogenisation, this thesis 
acknowledges it but does not directly engage with it.214  
 
In Paris, it was the president of the Greek delegation, Eleftherios Venizelos, who most 
forcefully supported the latter view. He suggested that the accordance between states and 
nations would be best facilitated by reciprocal migratory agreements between states. Though 
morally problematic for many, it was decided that compulsory population transfers could be 
organised. These, however, could only take place if two states agreed on them.215 Two major 
arrangements were constituted. The first was signed between Greece and Bulgaria and the 
second, between Greece and Turkey. As Eric Weitz has indicated, almost ironically minority 
recognition and deportation emerged together in Paris.216 The tension inherent in the ethnic 
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connotation of self-determination and its devastating consequences have been largely 
recognised in the literature. The stigmatisation of ethnic self-determination, however, seems 
to me more of a judgement in retrospect, than something the peacemakers could have fully 
comprehended at the time – be that related to their inexperience, racism, ignorance or fear of 
interference. Importantly, however, agreements on population exchanges did introduce further 
hierarchies in the recognition (or lack of recognition) of groups and their rights within post-
imperial states. It is to these that we shall now turn and to their implications as to international 
acceptance of new states as legitimate members of international society.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued above that in Paris, from an idea with multiple meanings attached to it, the 
peacemakers turned self-determination into a principle of world order. In 1919, self-
determination came to constitute the accepted standard of post-imperial statehood and 
membership in international society. However, despite Wilson’s initial promises to expand 
the allocation of the principle of self-determination to all the peoples on the planet, this did 
not happen. The Allied and Associated Powers maintained instead pre-1914 racial hierarchies. 
Colonial powers kept their colonies, while territories formerly under the authority of defeated 
powers were put under the tutelage of the League of Nations, with the promise that one day, 
they would be ready for self-determination. Somehow hypocritically, I have suggested, self-
determination became an aspirational principle for all. In practice, it was narrowed down in its 
scope and used, ad hoc, in the redefinition of Central and South-Eastern European borders. It 
was precisely because of the nature of the area to which it was directed that self-determination 
took on an ethnic tone.  
 
Self-determination was recognised for those peoples that had mobilised nationalist sentiment 
during the nineteenth century, under the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. As any 
standard, it was explicitly tied to international expectations. These, I have suggested, were 
expectations about what “good” domestic order should be after statehood was recognised. 
They were framed in terms of specific sets of rights and responsibilities. Recognition of new 
states as equal members of the post-war “family of nations” was made conditional upon the 
ratification of the so-called Minority Treaties. These treaties each delineated internationally 
how national authorities should define and treat internal societies and groups. This, however, 
was done on slippery grounds. The treaties upheld political equality and equality of rights 
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within the polity, yet they concurrently promoted hierarchical recognition of national and 
ethnic groups. This was not a matter of too much concern to the peacemakers when the 
treaties were drafted and ratified. What mattered at the conference was that standards for 
civilised statehood and membership were set. How they would work would be a different 
matter, as we are about to see in the next chapter. 
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4  
 
Hierarchical Membership and Sovereign (in)Equality at the League of 
Nations 
 
 
In Paris, self-determination became the shared standard of post-imperial membership within 
international society. In turn, the Minority Treaties came to outline the contours of 
appropriate state conduct, along with the defining components of self-determination: peoples, 
rights and responsibilities. These treaties suffered from major flaws but, importantly for us, 
they stressed that political equality and equality of rights were to be the basis of self-
determination for the new states. However, they also fostered, in a more ambiguous way, 
logics of hierarchy, in recognition of certain groups over others. This contradiction did not 
matter much during the drafting phase of the treaties. What mattered to the peacemakers, 
really, was settling the borders of the new states without further prolonging discussions. In the 
years following the conference, the way domestic societies came to be delineated and treated 
within many newly formed states did not, however, follow international expectations. 
Following pre-1914 logics of imperial hierarchies, practices of hierarchical membership were 
inaugurated in many newly formed states. Post-imperial hierarchical membership was in 
contrast with international conceptions of equality that, despite obvious flaws, were 
embedded in the idea of self-determination upheld in Paris. In this section I contend that as 
with other Minority Treaties, the Treaty of Saint-Germain failed to grasp the complexity of 
the domestic context to which it was directed: that of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with its its 
ethno-national mosaic of peoples. Moreover, the international recognition of certain 
minorities and not others facilitated the establishment, by Yugoslav state officials, of 
domestic practices of hierarchical membership. Inaugurated along old social categories 
inherited from imperial politics of recognition, these were also justified in the name of 
international principles.  
 
With their contradictions, throughout the 1920s, the Minority Treaties continued to function 
as standards of appropriate state conduct and identity for the new states. These documents 
were legally binding though no mechanism of enforcement existed after their ratification. 
However, by their very role, they constituted tools of international monitoring within 
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domestic jurisdictions. In this chapter, I want to suggest that in the years following the 
conference, the Great Powers and the League of Nations used the Minority Treaties as elusive 
markers to delineate what good, civilised, domestic order ought to be. This did not have an 
immediate domestic impact for new states. Although individuals could petition against the 
state they lived in, once petitions were received not much could be done other than discussing 
them within the League. It would be a mistake, though, to dismiss these discussions as they 
do have something to tell us about both the logics of stability and change in world order. By 
ratifying the Treaties after the war, new states would have their sovereign equality recognised. 
Nevertheless, these discussions suggest that the status as sovereign equals for the new states 
was, during the 1920s, still conditional upon the existence of (rather than compliance with) 
these treaties. Petitions received at the League would function as a constant reminder of that.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter is organised in two main sections. The first is a practical illustration 
of the relationship between a Minority Treaty, practices of hierarchical membership and state 
formation, through the study of the curious case of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In the second 
section I present my argument, on conditional sovereign equality for the new states and 
stratification in international society during the 1920s. These two sections uncover the tension 
highlighted in the theoretical framework of this thesis. This is the tension between egalitarian 
conceptions of self-determination on one hand, and practices of hierarchy (both domestic and 
systemic) associated with self-determination on the other. 
 
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: Self-Determination and Minority Rights 
 
As the beginning of the conference came closer, the Allied and Associated Powers’ 
representatives sent invitations to participate to numerous nations from all over the world. 
National delegations were sent to Paris, and among them was the delegation of the newly 
proclaimed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, composed of almost a hundred 
delegates.217 The creation of the Kingdom had been proclaimed a month earlier, on 1st 
December 1918 and, despite its name, it included the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, part of Kosovo, part of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The delegation 
was heard for the first time before the Supreme Council of the conference on 18th February 
1919. It was during this meeting that Milenko Vesnic, the diplomatic representative of Serbia 
                                            
217 King Nikola of Montenegro refused to be part of the Kingdom’s delegation  in the name of the secret Treaty 
of London of 1915 and Wilson’s Fourteen Points that promised Montenegrin independence. 
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during the first two months of the conference, declared that the delegation he represented was 
not that of Serbia, a state that had been officially recognised in 1878 with the Berlin Treaty, 
but that of the Kingdom of the Yugoslavs. Formed on the base of self-determination, Vesnic 
contended, the Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes was the state of a “single people, with 
three names, three religions and two alphabets”.218  
 
The international history of the Kingdom thus started with some confusion at the conference, 
along with that of the six other states originating from the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Domestically, the Kingdom had been formed in the name of self-determination of the 
oppressed people; internationally, the existence of the state was legitimised by the same 
phrase. Made up of a mosaic of ethnic allegiances and kinships, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
presented, however, a distinctly complex situation in respect to the other post-imperial states. 
Within the Committee of New States, discussions about the Yugoslav case lasted 
considerably longer than those regarding the other states. The duration of discussions 
depended, to a large extent, upon the Italian opposition to setting the borders. The minutes of 
the meetings held by the Committee on New States indicate that longest debates concerned 
the status of identified minorities within the Kingdom.219 Who would be recognised? How? 
Were Yugoslavs a single people, as claimed by Vesnic, or were they a combination of 
different groups? 
 
The Kingdom’s delegates eventually signed the minority treaty that related to their case – the 
Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye. 220  This treaty did not prevent state officials from 
discriminating domestically. Discrimination was undertaken against the internationally named 
minorities and, importantly, against other minority groups that had previously enjoyed 
recognition under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In this section I contend that, similar to other 
Minority Treaties, the Treaty of Saint-Germain failed to grasp the complexity of the Yugoslav 
ethnic mosaic. For this reason, I believe, it fostered exclusion along membership categories 
inherited from imperial politics of recognition (rather than hierarchies themselves.) Moreover, 
the international recognition of certain minorities and not others facilitated the setting up, by 
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Yugoslav state officials, of domestic practices of hierarchical membership. Following from 
that, first I outline the story of the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and its presence 
at the Paris Peace Conference. Then, I scrutinise the nexus between self-determination, 
minority treaties and domestic practices of hierarchical membership. I show how hierarchical 
membership reflected categories inherited from imperial politics of recognition, rather than 
imperial hierarchies themselves, and how it was the result of contradictory international 
norms. I do not seek to present a comprehensive argument about domestic dynamics. My 
purpose is to outline the tension between the norm of equality attached to self-determination 
and practices of hierarchy undertaken in its name.  
 
The formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and its reception at the 
Paris Peace Conference 
 
It is often misleadingly believed that Yugoslavia was the “child of Versailles”.221 The Paris 
Peace Conference gave to the Kingdom its international visibility. The actual formation of the 
state though was part of a regional history tightly related to the development of nationalist 
movements in multinational empires. During the 19th century, nationalist movements arose all 
over the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. The Balkan region was no exception to the 
trend. The difference, however, from other movements that appeared contemporarily, was that 
in the Balkan Peninsula (with the exception of Greece) a pan-Slav discourse emerged in 
addition to ethnically exclusive claims. More precisely, four alternative conceptions of the 
pan-Slav nation developed, based on different understandings of the nation, as lying in 
language, religion, race and the state. The Serbian philologist Vuk Karadzic, The Croatian 
bishop Josip Strossmayer, the Croatian lawyer and politician Josip Frank and the Croatian 
politician Ante Starcevic, respectively, supported these four visions. 222 Interestingly though, 
pan-Slav formulations came principally from Croats and Serbs, in the idea that South Slavs 
formed a single nation, composed of several tribes. In 1918, the founders of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes used these discourses to legitimise the formation of the new state. 
Despite claims advanced by the “Yugomakers”,223 that is, that the unification movement 
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actors that participated to the construction of the Yugoslav state. 
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originated in the will of all the people, it was mostly the intellectual and upper classes that 
supported it.224 The Yugomakers thus faced the difficult task of reuniting different ideas, 
views, identities and interests. In the words uttered by an American military observer in 
Spring 1919:  
 
“While the government officials all take pains to protest that the Serbs and Croats are one people, it is 
absurd to say so. The social “climate” is quite different. The Serbs are soldier-peasant, the Croats are 
passive intellectuals in tendency […]”.225 
 
In 1914 the outbreak of the war had accelerated the unification of the Yugoslavs and the 
formation of the Kingdom. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28th July 1914, a 
month after the killing of the Austrian archduke Franz-Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Gavrilo 
Princip. As early as September 1914, Nikola Pasic, then Prime Minister of Serbia, informed 
Serbian representatives in the allied countries that the Serbian “aim [was] to create out of 
Serbia a powerful South-Western Slav state that would include all Serbs, all Croats and all 
Slovenes”. 226  Serbs, already constituted into a national state, 227  had awakened their 
nationalism, and so had Croats. In 1915, under the guidance of the Croatian politician Ante 
Trumbic, the Yugoslav Committee was formed in London with the objective of creating a 
union of the South-Slav groups.228 Thus, two ideas coexisted during World War One as to the 
form that the potential Yugoslav state should have. The first, embodied by Pasic, consisted in 
the understanding of Yugoslavia as a Serbian dominated state. The second, promoted by 
Trumbic, rested in the view of an equal union of all Yugoslavs in the form of a federation. 
 
As the war progressed, the idea of a Yugoslav state became increasingly established in 
different political circles in the region. The formation of a state of the South Slavs was 
perceived as the only solution for independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On 20th 
July 1917, after lengthy and conflicting discussions, Pasic and Trumbic, reunited on the island 
of Corfu, issued a common declaration, deciding the creation of the state of the Yugoslavs, in 
the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The agreement, however, was signed 
without mentioning the configuration that the Yugoslav state should take. Would it be a 
centralised state, or a federation of different groups and “peoples”? If so, which would be the 
ones recognised? Imperial politics of recognition acknowledged the existence of numerous 
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groups. It was decided that this should be a matter to be discussed after the war. Meanwhile, 
to complicate the picture, Wilson pronounced his Fourteen Points speech, in which he 
guaranteed national sovereignty to Montenegro and Serbia, as well as access to the sea for the 
latter. Wilson also contended that the borders of Montenegro and Serbia, along with Italy and 
Rumania, should be traced in accordance with lines of nationality. Acclaimed internationally, 
Wilson’s speech brought to the region additional confusion.  
 
It was the end of the war that led to the resolution of the Yugoslav question.229 The Austro-
Hungarian regime collapsed and, on 8th October 1918, the National Council of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes was formed. Three weeks later, on 29th October, the newly established National 
Council announced that “the Yugoslavs [were] a simple, indivisible people demanding self-
determination”, who promised to “grant cultural privileges to any racial minority in their 
midst”.230 On 1st December 1918, King Alexander –previously regent of Serbia - officially 
proclaimed the birth of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. However, when the 
Peace Conference began, in January 1919, the newly formed Kingdom did not possess clearly 
defined boundaries, be they linguistic, ethnic, religious or territorial. These boundaries were 
to be defined at the conference, where the Kingdom would be internationally recognised. 
Indeed, when the Yugoslav delegation was sent to Paris, the Kingdom’s sovereignty had not 
yet been recognised. The first country to make the step was Greece, on 26th January 1919. The 
United States acknowledged its existence soon after, on 7th February. It was only later, on 29th 
April, that the Allied and Associated Powers’ representatives collectively recognised the 
Kingdom as a sovereign state.  
 
It is largely assumed that the sovereignty of the post-imperial states was made 
conditional at the conference upon the signature of the Minority Treaties. I believe that this is 
somewhat imprecise. Similar to other states emerging from the breakdown of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had been recognised well 
before the ratification of the Treaty of Saint-Germain. What was conditional, I want to 
suggest, was the Kingdom’s status as sovereign equal in the post-war family of nations. By 
promising to endorse the criteria of legitimate statehood and membership after empire, the 
Kingdom was guaranteeing itself sovereign equality within international society. As 
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articulated in the words of the French Newspaper Le Temps a day after the Treaty of Saint-
Germain was enacted – though not yet signed by Yugoslavia:  
 
“What is the value of the treaty signed yesterday in Saint-Germain? It is hard to tell (…). Given that 
the Supreme Council (of the Conference) does not allow the Kingdom’s representatives to subscribe to 
the Austrian treaty without subscribing to the special treaty that protects minorities, it is obvious that a 
state exposes itself to serious consequences if it refuses to sign the special treaty. Yugoslavia in 
particular might find itself in a very embarrassing position if it did not sign the Treaty of Saint-
Germain as it would not have any juridical status, while its geographical situation requires it. 
Moreover, Yugoslavia would run the risk of inconveniencing several Great Powers, which friendship 
is necessary to its existence.” 231 
 
Similar to other post-imperial states, this process was surrounded by several inconsistencies.  
 
Minority Treaties and Sovereign Inequality 
 
When the conference started, with the exception of self-appointed experts such as Wickham 
Steed,232 the Allied and Associated Powers’ representatives did not know much about the 
Balkans. The Supreme Council of the conference named three experts on 21st January 1919, 
who were to produce a report on the Kingdom. These were Robert Kerner, Dana Munro and 
Charles Seymour.233 Hence, when the Committee on New States began its work, the team in 
charge of the drafting of the minority treaty of Saint-Germain was supposedly already 
familiar with the history of the region. Nonetheless, the drafting of the treaty took 
considerable time. Difficulties proceeded not only from Italian protestations regarding the 
boundaries of the Yugoslav state. They also originated from the discrepancy between 
demographic information that the Committee possessed and the claims of the Yugoslav 
delegates in Paris. While the national delegates declared that the Kingdom was composed of 
one single people, with three names – Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – the last Austro-Hungarian 
census of 1910, indicated that in the region corresponding to the new state there were at least 
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nine different ethnic groups.234 After extended discussions within the Commission, and 
negotiations with the Kingdom’s delegates, it was eventually decided that the minorities to be 
internationally recognised should be “those of specific concern in the Yugoslav region.” What 
this meant and how that selection was made, however, remains unclear. 
 
Similar to the other delegations representing the new states, the Kingdom’s delegation was 
very reticent when it came to signing its respective treaty. On the one hand, as did the other 
new states’ delegations, it claimed that the treaty violated the Kingdom’s sovereignty. In a 
telegramme sent to the Delegation by the Serbian Prime Minister Protic in September 1919, it 
was indicated that, “there is no need to push us on the signature and dictate it to us. The 
question is our sovereignty which is being violated without reason”.235 On the other hand, the 
Kingdom’s delegation claimed that the Yugoslavs formed one nation entitled to having their 
own state. Why, then, should other minorities be recognised? As Pasic maintained before the 
Committee on New States, “the question concerning the protection of minorities in this state 
[could] not have a practical scope”.236  
 
This was, of course, the official rhetoric adopted by the Yugoslav delegation during the 
conference. Its legitimating discourse in Paris consisted in claiming that in the name of their 
right to self-determination the Yugoslavs had managed to reunite in one “single nation.” 
However, what was meant by the “single nation” at the foundation of the new state was not 
clear. The meaning, in fact, varied according to who, within the delegation, uttered the phrase. 
As indicated by Dejan Djokic, “it is too easy, especially in retrospect, to point out ethnic 
rivalries as undermining Yugoslavia from the very start.”237 In Paris though, the two principal 
representatives of the Delegation, Pasic and Trumbic, did embody two very different views of 
the Yugoslav nation. Pasic understood Yugoslavism as synonym of Greater Serbianism. 238 
Trumbic, in turn, viewed Yugoslavia as the union of three equal groups. With their 
differences, neither approach recognised the existence of other minorities within the 
boundaries of the Kingdom. In direct opposition to these claims, the Yugoslav 1921 census 
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showed, two years after, that several other groups inhabited the country.239 In line with 
previous imperial politics of recognition, in the Balkans views differed quite importantly on 
minority questions. For example, under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, groups that were 
recognised in certain areas were not necessarily acknowledged in others, leading, after the 
war, to confusion and overlaps in membership regimes.240  
 
The Great Powers’ representatives signed the Minority Treaty of Saint-Germain on 19th 
September 1919, the same day as the eponymous peace treaty with Austria. It was only later, 
after almost three months of protestation, on 5th December 1919, that the Yugoslav delegation 
signed the minority treaty, in concomitance with the Austrian one. Within the Yugoslav 
minority treaty, the only four groups to be granted international recognition were the 
Bulgarian, Austrian, Hungarian and “Muslim” (most probably meant as Muslims from 
Bosnia, although this was not specified) minorities (articles IV and X). Crucially, despite 
Wilson’s promise to grant independent statehood to Montenegro in his Fourteen Points, 
Montenegrins were not given any special recognition. They were instead included in the 
Kingdom, as part of the Yugoslav people. Similarly to other minority treaties, minority 
provisions were to be integrated in Yugoslav domestic legislation. The principle of equality of 
people “without distinction as to race, language or religion” (art. VII) was concurrently 
introduced in the document and later in the Kingdom’s constitution, enacted on 28th June 
1921. However, it was only in September 1928 that the first national citizenship law was set 
in place in the post-imperial state. For almost ten years, the boundaries of the Yugoslav 
political community, and how they were to be delineated, were simply blurred. Yugoslavia 
was a state founded on the principles of equality and ethno-national self-determination, but 
with membership overlaps and uneven recognition. Despite international standards set in the 
Minority Treaty, the absence of legal norms on citizenship regulation rendered the question of 
national membership hazy.  
 
During the 1920s, a large number of petitions from individuals and associations identifying 
with minority groups were sent to the League of Nations’ minority session – the majority of 
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them being in fact left unanswered.241 Numerous individuals identifying with minority groups 
were discriminated against. For minorities and for the European rights associations, the 
League’s silence was generally perceived as international indifference on the matter. Within 
the League petitions did raise concern. Because of the way the Minority System itself had 
been organised, no action was taken. At the League many were aware of the limitations 
attached to the treaties. The large number of petitions received throughout the 1920s, and 
complemented by travellers’ accounts of the area, did, however, generate considerable debate 
within the Council and the Minority Section. Before turning to these, though, let us look at 
practices of hierarchical membership within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
 
Practices of hierarchical membership in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia  
 
Inis Claude has argued that, “obsessed by the ideal of national uniformity, minority states 
erected centralised administrative regimes and undertook to denationalise minorities”.242 
Claude’s remark directly speaks to the states that agreed on population exchanges as they 
sought to constitute ethnically grounded nation-states. For the case of the Kingdom, and 
possibly other states object of the Minority Treaties, I would nuance Claude’s remark. I 
suggest, by looking at the case of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, that state officials, rather, put 
in place discriminatory practices of hierarchical membership. These practices followed the 
lines of older imperial politics of recognition, where certain groups were recognised over 
others. They were also facilitated by two international principles: self-determination and 
minority recognition. On the basis of these two international principles, population groups 
were organised into informal hierarchies. Ironically, the Minority Treaties drafted by mature 
states led to the possibility of justifying domestic discrimination in the name of international 
tools. Though, to some extent, hierarchical views on ethnic groups did circulate at the Peace 
Conference. In the words of historian Georges Louis Beer: “it is far preferable to have Poles 
under Germans, and Yugoslavs under Italians than the contrary, if there is no other good 
alternative.”243  
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As already suggested in the theoretical framework of the thesis, by practices of hierarchical 
membership I refer to practices that, in domestic contexts, discriminate against population 
groups with the objective of constituting political communities strongly dominated by one 
core group. These practices are expressed through the granting or denying of certain rights to 
individuals, according to the group with which they are identified. These are rights that 
should allow partial or complete access to membership for individuals within a polity. Indeed, 
the concept of hierarchical membership implies a prioritisation of individuals considered as 
“more similar” than others to an idea of the corporate identity of a given state. The unequal 
allocation of certain rights allows the gradual exclusion of other groups (individuals that self-
identify with other groups) residing in the territory of a given state from its national political 
community. These exclusions are represented by the complete loss of political rights or by the 
loss of other rights that impede full membership in the body politic.  
 
Accordingly, it is possible to identify, within the Kingdom, four population groups that 
experienced different treatments. The first category, at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
encompassed all those individuals identifying with what Carole Fink has called the “unnamed 
minorities”; these were minorities that were not mentioned in the post-war international 
treaties.244 Individuals belonging to these groups were, in fact, denied their rights.245 The case 
of the Albanian minority is emblematic. Representing 3.67% of the entire population,246 most 
of the members of this minority group lived concentrated in the rural areas of the South of the 
Kingdom (that is, part of contemporary Kosovo and South Serbia). During the 1920s, 
individuals belonging to the Albanian minority were deprived of their lands on a huge scale. 
The Kingdom’s authorities indeed redistributed these lands to other – principally Serbian – 
individuals, “dans le but évident de changer la physionomie ethnique de la région”.247 Either 
because they were deprived of their economic resources and residence, or because the 
Kingdom’s authorities physically compelled them, numerous Albanian families fled. Indeed, 
according to a report presented by the minority section of the League in 1930, 10, 000 
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individuals of Albanian origin had been obliged to leave the Kingdom in the preceding nine 
years.248  
 
The second category encompassed groups self-identifying as minorities and yet included in 
the Serbian “tribe”. These were internationally unnamed minorities, which, despite manifold 
protestations during the drafting of the Yugoslav minority treaty, were not recognised. The 
difference from the first group of individuals is that the state authorities – strongly dominated 
by Serbs - were not interested in expelling them from the Kingdom’s territory. On the 
contrary, the Serbian majority perceived them as part of the same kin (mostly sharing the 
same religion) within the frame of the broader Serbian expansionist project. Indeed, in the 
1921 census, these groups were “subsumed in the category Serbo-Croats”. 249  
 
Two cases specifically fell into this category, interestingly echoed by 1990s problematics. 
These were Montenegrins and Macedonians. The Montenegrins had been promised a 
sovereign state in Wilson’s Fourteen Points. However, during the Peace Conference, they 
found themselves integrated without notice into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
The Allies had indeed initially invited Montenegro to participate at the conference, but had 
then not granted the state a chair. Despite the presence of a national delegation in Paris the 
numerous protests originating from the Montenegrin authorities were left unanswered.250 
From protestations against the international lack of recognition of Montenegro’s sovereignty, 
throughout the 1920s these claims became allegations of physical mistreatment by Serbian 
militaries, and of deprivation of civil rights. Schools were closed; public emblems (from 
statues celebrating the Montenegrin nationhood, to municipal buildings) were destroyed.251 
Moreover, Montenegrins were denied, in accordance with the Saint Germain Treaty, which 
did not recognise them as a national minority, any type of political recognition. Despite the 
numerous petitions received by the League, not much could be done: If, as Belgrade claimed, 
Montenegrins were considered to be Serbians, then, how could the League interfere?  
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Similar to the Montenegrin situation was the case of Macedonians from the area that Serbs 
viewed as “Southern Serbia”.252 Croats and Slovenes had no say on the matter in what was, as 
a legacy of the imperial membership regime, a decentralised political system. During the 
conference, Macedonians did not seek recognition as a sovereign state. They just sought 
recognition as a minority group within the Kingdom. In the first drafts of the minority treaty a 
specific article dealt with both the recognition of the Macedonian minority and the sending to 
the region of an international representative to observe the treatment of the population group. 
Because of disagreements within the Committee on New States and Kingdoms, the clause 
was entirely removed.253 As Pasic declared before the Committee for the New States, “there 
can be no question of a Macedonian ethnic minority in the State of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes. The Macedonian Slavs have always been considered by the authorities of our state 
as Serbs”.254 
 
Recognised minorities within the Treaty embodied the third category of discriminated 
individuals. As we have seen, the internationally recognised minorities were the Bulgarian, 
Austrian, Hungarian and “Musulman” groups. In addition to these, the Kingdom also 
recognised in its domestic jurisdiction the German minority. By signing the Treaty of Saint-
Germain, the newly formed state had committed to enshrine both minority recognition and the 
guarantee of equality of civil and political rights in its domestic legislation. Yet, while the 
constitution acknowledged these provisions, specific laws were very strict. In relation to 
education, for example, the constitution authorised minorities to have their own schools (art. 
XVI). However, by looking in detail at the law on national education, it seems evident that 
minority schools could not easily exist. Primary education was controlled by the state, and for 
this reason minorities could not receive any kind of education in their language of origin, until 
the end of first school. After that, if minority parents wished for the opening of a minority 
school, they needed to find at least thirty other potential pupils, all resident within the same 
municipality.255 While this was feasible in bigger cities, the Kingdom was predominantly 
rural (and not educated) and populations were dispersed over its territory. Finding thirty 
students for a single class appeared to be a difficult task. Even if found, often the Kingdom’s 
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authorities would claim that it was not worth opening a school with simply one class: just as 
effectively impeding the access to “minority” education.256  
 
Freedom of religion was guaranteed in article II of the Constitution. Religions practised by 
recognised minorities coincided essentially with those of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; these 
were Catholicism (for Croats, Slovenes, Hungarians and Austrians) and Orthodoxy (for Serbs 
and Bulgarians). Toleration of other religions, however, was a more complex matter. By their 
very name, “Musulmans” were granted recognition on a religious basis. Whereas this had not 
been clearly specified in the Treaty, following previous Austro-Hungarian censuses, Muslims 
equated to Bosniak Muslims (namely Muslisms from Bosnia). While other individuals also 
practiced Islam (ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia) these were not recognised 
minorities and thus were not allowed to publicly practise their religion, similarly to Jews, who 
constituted another unnamed minority in the country. 
 
In fine, specifically in relation to political rights, recognised minorities were authorised by 
law to have their own political organisations and parties. 257  Nonetheless, at the first 
parliamentary elections of 1923, only Muslims and Germans were granted seats at the 
Parliament.258 While other minority parties were allowed to participate in the elections, none 
was granted any seat. Indeed, whereas the Hungarian party officially received the support of 8 
561 votes (many votes were cancelled by state authorities),259 it was not given political 
recognition. At the same time, parties receiving fewer votes were recognised at the 
Parliament. As acknowledged after the elections, the Hungarian party had been proclaimed 
illegal by the Yugoslav authorities the same day of the elections, as had political meetings and 
newspapers. The party was accused of being insurrectionist.260 Violations of political rights 
concerned other minorities. Bulgarians for example never even had the possibility of 
establishing a political party, with the argument that, despite their international recognition, 
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there were no Bulgarians in the Kingdom. In turn Serbs claimed that they had been subsumed 
in the broader Serbian group.261  
 
The last discriminated category that can be identified in the first years of life of the Kingdom 
is more peculiar, as it includes Croats and Slovenes. These two “tribes,” or “groups,” 
allegedly and officially part of a single nation along with Serbia, did not go through 
discriminations directly related to the exercise of their political rights: they were in fact full 
members of the political community. However, as pointed out by Sabrina Ramet, throughout 
the existence of the Kingdom “Serbs relegated Croatian and Slovenian language and culture 
to a secondary status”.262 National authorities of Serbian origin, more numerous than the two 
others, prioritised Serbian co-ethnics largely undercover of assimilationist policies. It is 
interesting to note that Slobodan Milosevic later used the same strategy throughout the 1990s. 
In the 1920s, Serbian authorities found their justification in international discourse. The 
peacemakers recognised in the Minority Treaty pre-war Serbian obligations as a state. The 
Allied and Associated Powers in Paris had involuntarily legitimated Serbian primacy over 
other groups. They had acknowledged that Serbia lay at the foundation of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,263 thereby undermining the principle of equality on which, they 
also argued, the new state should be formed. To be sure, state authorities of Serbian origin 
instrumentalised these motives to foster practices of hierarchical membership that would 
privilege them, along older categories of imperial recognition. In turn, in Croatian and 
Slovenian territories’ local authorities of Croatian and Slovenian origin instigated, on a 
smaller scale, exclusion towards individuals identifying with Serbian ethnicity.  
 
In the years leading up to World War II, practices of hierarchical membership were used as a 
rationale for exclusion and mass killings. These were undertaken under the eyes of the League 
of Nations and its Minority Section, formed after the Conference. In some sense, flawed 
international provisions on self-determination and minority rights permitted the occurrence of 
discrimination. Despite international clauses on equality and recognition, no international 
action was taken to prevent discrimination. Problems at the League were enormous. As put by 
Fink, “the minorities and their advocates expected that the League would exceed the Great 
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Powers’ hesitant gestures; the minority states retained their opposition to any system 
whatsoever.” 264  International society thus came to tolerate practices spanning from 
hierarchical membership to “pathological homogenisation.” 265  These are all aspects of 
extreme importance to the unfortunate story of the Minority Treaties that the literature 
acknowledges. There is another aspect attached to the treaties that seems to me important, but 
that has been overlooked by the literature. I believe that despite their flaws, the Minority 
Treaties represented a cultural, rather than legal, marker that the League would use to signal 
their concern. In so doing, the League would use the Minority Treaties but also the numerous 
petitions attached to them to mark, elusively, that sovereign equality was still conditional for 
the new states upon the respect of international standards of appropriate, or civilised, 
behaviour.  
 
Hierarchical Membership and the Minority System: Tolerating the Intolerant?  
 
Within the Council of the League, the organ in charge of procedural decisions regarding 
minority questions, debates were very frequent during the 1920s. There was a fundamental – 
and then perceived as irresolvable - tension between the voice to be given to minority claims 
against the will of states, and concerned states’ protestations on the matter. The 
representatives of the successor states of the empires, along with other national delegates and 
members of the League, repeatedly protested against the entitlement given to minorities to 
make claims about alleged violations of their rights.266 The problem was that, while at the 
conference minority rights had been identified and recognised internationally, the League’s 
system to guarantee the protection of these rights had at no point been mentioned. Be it for 
fear of interference in the sovereignty of the new states or international inexperience, no 
enforcement mechanism attached to the Minority Treaties had been set up. Moreover, no 
general definition of minorities had been established.267 Only two Treaties, Versailles and 
Little Versailles offered a definition respectively with regards to Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
They referred to minorities (and their members) as those “inhabitants who differ from the 
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majority of the population in race, language or religion.”268 Since the definition appeared only 
in two documents, though, it could not be generalised to other groups in post-imperial states.  
 
The incumbent tasks in organising the Minority System fell to Erik Colban and the Minority 
Section of the League.269 In 1920, following the endorsement of the “Tittoni Report,” the 
Secretariat of the League decided, in accordance with the minority section and the League’s 
Council, that minority claims would be received in the form of petitions addressed to the 
section.270 These would be “political,” rather than “legal” documents, to be treated as sources 
of “information only,” unless taken up by an individual council member.271 Because of its 
very political nature, I would say, the petition system for minorities turned out to be very 
technical and bureaucratised. Petitions could be addressed by any source, meaning that 
individuals alone could solicit the attention of the League. However, only Council members 
could place the petition on the agenda of the Council. In other words, Council members 
would decide whether a complaint bore relevance or not. For this purpose, the Council 
established the “Committee-of-Three,” formed, for each specific case, by three different 
Council members. After studying the claim, the three selected members would decide either 
to dismiss it, to seek informal mediation, or to submit the question before the Council as a 
whole.272 States involved in petition complaints though had the right to respond while the 
Committee examined them. This slowed down and often obstructed the matter before the 
question could reach the Council. If the Council was in fact reached, it could decide whether 
the matter would remain there or be transferred to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.  
 
The newly founded Court could issue both judgements and advisory opinions, and it did so on 
certain occasions. This, however, rarely happened. Between 1922 when the Court was 
established, and 1939 when the Minority System came to an end, only 16 petitions reached 
the Court, out of 930 that were filed, while the Committee-of-Three deemed that 758 were 
simply not receivable.273 Instead, within the Council the whole process of consultation with 
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involved states was generally not made public. Most often, petitions that were considered 
receivable would be dealt with through what the Council termed procédure non-écrite. These 
were informal, “benevolent negotiations.” During these, states not complying with treaty 
provisions were threatened that matters would go public and further pursued by the Court, if 
no measure was to be taken domestically.274 Minority Treaties therefore represented the 
standard on which discussions were based, operating as constant markers of appropriate 
domestic behaviour for post-imperial states.  
 
Despite numerous weaknesses, the Minority System presented an innovative feature in 
relation to who was entitled to formulate minority petitions. In 1919, Colban had claimed that, 
“if the members of the League agree to it, there is no valid reason why an International Court 
should not hear an individual whose legal rights are based on an International Treaty.”275 A 
year later it was decided that not only minority organisations or groups could present petitions 
but that individuals had the right to do so as well. The right given to physical persons to 
formulate claims that would bear international relevance constituted a radical departure from 
statist views of international law. Just as for the Mandate System, individuals were given the 
right to petition. Their voice would be, although only for those living in post-imperial states, 
the object of international debate. By this, I do not mean that the peacemakers articulated a 
clear discourse on individual rights just after the war. Quite the contrary: Japan’s proposition 
to include a clause in the League’s Covenant on racial equality had been deliberately 
dismissed by the majority of members on the Covenant Commission. This clause would have 
generalised minority rights, “reducing the necessity for differential treatment of minority 
groups”.276 Yet, by looking at post-war minority rights as rights concerning individuals 
specifically, that is collective rather than group rights, we can comprehend more easily the 
nexus with post-World War II articulations on human rights. At the League, human rights 
were somewhat an incipient norm. In the meantime, outside the League, the language of 
human rights was spreading among civil society.277  
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Inevitably, the right granted to individuals to petition outside national spheres of authority 
caused important protestations. Post-imperial states viewed the right to petition as 
unambiguous interference within their “domestic jurisdiction,” a term established by the 
Minority Treaties themselves. Representatives of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the League 
who, unsurprisingly, were increasingly of Serbian origin, complained throughout the 1920s 
that minorities would be able to report unproven mistreatments. This in turn, they claimed, 
would discredit the credibility of the Kingdom and its sovereignty. 278 However, other 
members of the Council did not share this view. At the Conference, the Great Powers had 
made it clear: as much as self-determination, the protection of minority rights was essential to 
guarantee international peace. In the years following the conference, the Minority Section and 
the League’s Council internalised the same rhetoric and used it as a constant reminder. This 
was a reminder of the importance of the Minority Treaties and their content. 
 
Extant scholarship highlights that non-interference was becoming a prominent norm 
associated with state sovereignty. As established by the literature, the very bureaucratisation 
of, and limitations to, petition processes are illustrative examples of this trend.279 In my view 
though, this argument obscures what I see as another, perhaps more ambiguous, part of the 
story. It would not be impossible to think, in fact, that the notion of progress associated with 
the recognition of self-determination claims, with the Minority Treaties and the petition 
system, was accompanied by restrictive practices towards new states. After all, the Minority 
Treaties applied to post-imperial states as standards that needed to be achieved for these to be 
deemed legitimate members of international society. At the Conference, more “mature” 
members of the Family of Nations explicitly set such standards of civilised behaviour and 
identity. Orthodox literature on the Minority Treaties, however, presents the work of the 
League as if it was detached from these standards. This literature stresses the prominence of 
non-interference in domestic affairs of the new states and the fact that attention was primarily 
directed to the bureaucratic functioning of the organisation. The point I want to make is that it 
is unlikely that norms and ideas endorsed just a year or two earlier were just forgotten by the 
League members. Moreover, many national representatives working at the League were the 
same statesmen that had participated and set the standards at the Conference. This is quite an 
important element in the story of the Minority System. I want to suggest that in continuity 
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with 1919, Great Powers’ statesmen at the League continued to believe in the international 
standards that they set in the Treaties. I also want to suggest in this space that because of the 
very functioning of the organisation, their expectations counted more, within the League’s 
unequal system, than post-imperial states’ views. Post-imperial states in fact would not really 
have a say on the matter of definition and compliance with standards of legitimate statehood 
and membership in international society. They were allowed to show their discontent by 
sending letters to the Minority Section and taking part in discussions of the Council. 
However, at the League no one was required to take into consideration new states’ 
disagreements. 
 
Post-imperial states were constantly reminded, through “benevolent discussions” and received 
petitions, that their status as equal sovereigns was dependent upon meeting international 
expectations about appropriate state behaviour. Moreover, the League was entitled to send 
missions to the new states to verify the state of affairs. To be sure, measures would only be 
very rarely taken and even when taken, procedures would be technical and slow. The League, 
however, left the possibility open that measures could be taken and that these could interfere 
in the domestic sphere of the new states. If standards of post-imperial statehood and 
membership in international society were not respected, new states would be reminded that 
their behaviour was not appropriate, not civilised enough. My suggestion is that throughout 
the 1920s, the possibility of having hierarchies of status between new and old states, between 
more or less civilised ones was a leitmotiv at the League. This would all be an informal 
process, taking the form of elusive arguments, rather than clear-cut statements. Throughout 
the 19th century, the Great Powers openly upheld standards of civilisation for appropriate 
behaviour in international society. Now, the whole civilisational idea was mitigated, in some 
sense, by the League taking over the task of setting criteria for legitimate statehood and 
membership in the family of nations. This did not signify that it simply disappeared. I would 
suggest rather that it became more ambiguous. In this regard, it seems interesting to mention 
that in order to make sense of petitions, the Minority Section regularly used the accounts of 
travellers to post-imperial states. These were used to assess the domestic situation of the new 
states. During their journeys through the Balkans Lord Birkhill and Sir Willoughby Dickinson 
would note the state of degradation, or, in the words of the former, of “enormous deterioration 
of European civilisation”280 that characterised Yugoslavia in the immediate post-war years.281 
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This was not very far from pre-1914 prejudices about the area, though Lord Birkhill, for 
example, concurrently called into question the unequal application of the nationality principle 
in Central and South-Eastern Europe.282 
 
The interpretation that I propose might then give us a different idea of the expansion of 
international society after World War I. In other words, it reveals that the process of 
expansion was complemented by stratifications of status internationally. We know that 
explicit hierarchies persisted after the war, as attested by the very existence of the Mandate 
System. The hierarchy that I have highlighted here though is more ambiguous. It is one 
between old and new members of international society. 283 While self-determination had 
become after the war the accepted standard for post-imperial membership in international 
society, criteria attached to it would serve throughout the 1920s as constant indicators of 
appropriate conduct. By keeping new states under constant scrutiny, other members of the 
League, in particular more “mature” ones, would call into question their sovereign equality. 
The tension between conceptions of equality and practices of hierarchy at the League, I would 
say, is yet another manifestation of what Keene views as the 20th century coexistence of 
toleration of diversity and civilisational hierarchies in world order. Keene shows that this 
coexistence takes a global shape after 1945, as human rights were globalised.284 I would 
argue that after World War I the coexistence of the two logics, with regards specifically to 
post-imperial states, can also be uncovered, as membership in international society was 
enlarged. 
 
Conclusion 
 
After World War I self-determination became the accepted standard for post-imperial 
statehood and membership within international society. Correlative to the granting of self-
determination to Central and South-Eastern European peoples was the endorsement, on their 
                                                                                                                                        
281 Robert Birkhill, Seeds of War, written in 1922 reported the mistreatment of minorities; a year later Sir 
Dickinson wrote a full report after his journey through the Balkans addressed to the League’s Council. R1648, 
R1649 LNA, Geneva. 
282 Sir Birkhill was particularly critical of the Treaty of Trianon, signed between most of the Allies and the 
Kingdom of Hungary in 1920. For an overview of Birkhill’s critique see: Stephen Gal’s “The Political 
Adjustement of Carpathian Europe: British Concepts,” Danubian Review, vol. 7 no. 7, 1939. Available at: 
http://epa.oszk.hu/  
283 See for a helpful comparison of the minority and mandate systems: Anghie, “Nationalism, Development and 
the Postcolonial State,” 2006. 
284 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, 2002, 122. 
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part, of the Minority Treaties. The recognition of new states as equal members of the post-war 
“family of nations” was made conditional upon their ratification. The treaties, I have argued, 
delineated the rights and responsibilities attached to self-determination. They instituted 
international expectations about what good domestic order ought to be within the new, post-
imperial states. However, I have shown, they did so on contradictory grounds. While the 
treaties upheld political equality and equality of rights within the polity, they also promoted 
hierarchical recognition of national and ethnic groups. For numerous reasons, such 
contradictions were not a matter of primary concern in Paris and in some respects they were 
even in conformity with the politics of the time. In the years following the conference, 
however, they played a part in facilitating the instigation of practices of hierarchical 
membership within post-imperial states. I have looked specifically at the interesting case of 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. I have shown that clauses on citizenship and minority rights 
present in the Treaty of Saint-Germain blurred even more the picture of national membership 
– a picture that was already confused by inherited logics of imperial hierarchy. To the surprise 
of many, in the name of self-determination and minority recognition, hierarchies were 
perpetuated domestically. 
 
Notwithstanding how violent these practices became, throughout the 1920s no international 
action was taken to prevent discrimination in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, or in any other 
state. We know that no mechanism of enforcement was attached to the Treaties and this made 
the documents legally weak. I have suggested, though, that during the 1920s the Minority 
Treaties played a more elusive role. They functioned as standards of appropriate behaviour 
and identity for the new states. In Paris, the Great Powers had delineated in the Treaties 
criteria for post-imperial membership in the society of states. Once membership was acquired, 
they continued to monitor the new states through the League of Nations, using rights and 
responsibilities attached to the Treaties as markers of civilised behaviour. These were cultural, 
rather than legal markers. Hence, while acknowledging a norm of non-interference, by their 
very role the Treaties, later along with the Minority Petition System, made visible that new 
states were not as equal as more mature ones, particularly if they did not comply with 
international expectations. I have contended that throughout the 1920s, the League of Nations 
would constantly remind Yugoslavia and other new states that their status as sovereign equals 
was dependent upon meeting expectations defined in the Treaties. This, I have argued, reveals 
that an elusive process of stratification of status within international society was taking place 
concurrently with its first wave of twentieth century expansion. With the universalisation of 
108
self-determination after World War II, things changed. Though as we are about to see, logics 
of continuity with the past also persisted.  
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5  
Self-Determination, Decolonisation and Human Rights  
at the United Nations 
 
 
Ethnic self-determination, as defined at the Paris Peace Conference, emerged much weakened 
by the Second World War. It was precisely in Europe, in the areas to which the principle had 
been carefully directed, that its systematic application coincided with unparalleled 
catastrophes. At the end of the war, the Allies had to acknowledge a major limit to the 
principle of self-determination as formulated after World War I. Exclusion and killing had 
been undertaken in the name of internationally recognised principles. The ethnic norm grafted 
onto self-determination could clearly be used to support exclusionary practices. In this context 
of general confusion, one thing seemed to be clear: the idea of self-determination had to be 
either recognised as an international principle, and therefore reviewed and reformulated, or 
removed. The latter option soon proved indefensible. In line with its pre-war ideological 
commitments, the Soviet Union, supported by Yugoslavia and other communist sympathisers, 
continued to claim that self-determination was a fundamental instrument for minority 
autonomy and for freedom from imperial oppression. Self-determination was thus included in 
the first article of the UN Charter, and thereby formalised in international law. However, it 
was loosely defined (articles 1 and 55), and was conceived more as an aspirational principle 
than as an immediately and universally applicable right. While asserting the significance of 
self-determination, the Allies, in effect, put it aside, at least for the immediate future.  
 
Right after the war, at the UN, national delegates were concerned with the codification of 
universally recognised rights and freedoms protecting individuals beyond national 
boundaries. The priority in the aftermath of the war was thus the codification of general 
individual rights, and not the self-government of dependent territories. Self-government was a 
possibility, but one infrequently achieved. While, as Mary Ann Glendon shows, many at the 
UN aspired to a “world made new” 285 to which the human rights project was central, I 
suggest that these aspirations were also complemented by older, hierarchical worldviews. 
Hence, after the war, empire and colonial rule were considered legitimate forms of political 
                                            
285 I borrow the phrase from her title: Glendon, A World Made New. 
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authority and organisation at the UN. I thus share the view supported by Mark Mazower that 
in its early years, the UN was characterised by a general pro-empire orientation.286 
 
To be sure, important changes were in motion. Major transformations though were yet to take 
place. I endorse the argument that Christian Reus-Smit makes: that it was in the 1950s that 
major transformations occurred, when “Third World” 287 countries used the UN as an arena to 
uphold the cause of self-determination for all colonised peoples. During that decade, post-
colonial delegates and, to a lesser extent, local colonial élites, seized the Western-defined 
language of human rights, which they used to justify their claims to self-determination and 
independence for all.288 The process was long and complex. In the name of equality and 
human rights, however, empire was delegitimised against the will of colonial and other 
western powers. In turn the right of self-determination and human rights were built one upon 
the other in, what was a mutually constitutive relationship. 
 
In this chapter, I want to argue that through their struggles post-colonial representatives 
granted fresh meaning to self-determination’s normative components: people, rights and 
responsibilities. First and foremost, against the will of colonial powers, the principle came to 
be grounded on universal moral foundations in the name of equality and of its association 
with human rights. It came to refer to all the peoples on the planet, though its practical 
application was limited through the principle of uti possidetis juris to those under colonial 
rule. Second, both rights and responsibilities attached to self-determination came to be 
embedded in the language of human rights. As a result, I suggest that a nexus between human 
rights and political rights within bounded polities (necessary for the exercise of self-
determination) was also formalised. The allocation and respect of political rights was, if not 
now at least later, to be a matter of international concern. It also redefined conceptions of 
“good” domestic order for new, “self-determined” states in terms of equality, inclusion and 
respect of human rights. Struggles at the UN culminated in the passing in 1960 of resolution 
1514 by the General Assembly. The resolution demanded the termination of colonialism and 
thereby the end of the whole constellation of ideas, norms and rules governing colonial 
empires. Crucially, the resolution upheld the right to self-determination as the expression of 
                                            
286 This is the underlying claim present in Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. 
287 The term “Third World” was created in 1952 by Alfred Sauvy in an article published in the French magazine 
L’observateur. For a matter of simplicity, I use it slightly anachronistically, to refer to those post-colonial 
countries members of the UN even before 1952. 
288 Reus-Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System, 2013, 183–189. 
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peoples’ “political will” and “autonomy from external interference,” “in the universal respect 
for, and observance of human rights.” 289  The standard of legitimate statehood and 
membership in post-colonial international society was set. It was complemented, however, by 
norms of both sovereign equality and non-interference that the UN Charter strongly upheld.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter is concerned with the period spanning from 1945 to 1966, - that is, 
from the end of the war to the General Assembly’s adoption in 1966 of the Human Rights 
Covenants, asserting the right of self-determination in their first articles. They also embody 
the UN’s last, and thus most recent, definition of the idea of self-determination. Examination 
of this wide historical period should furthermore allow me to locate the idea in broader post-
war debates. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section describes the 
development of self-determination and human rights at the UN in its early years. In it, I argue 
that together with the promotion of egalitarian principles such as sovereign equality and 
human rights, UN practice remained characterised by hierarchical worldviews. In the second 
section I show how, in the 1950s, post-colonial delegates at the UN managed to use the 
western defined language of equality and human rights to ground their claims for self-
determination. I then briefly discuss how such struggles were echoed within colonial contexts, 
in particular following the 1955 Bandung Conference. Having identified the process through 
which self-determination came to be erected as the universal standard for membership after 
empire, the fourth section delineates self-determination’s normative components.  
 
1945-1950: Setting the Foundations for a New World Order, Maybe, but for Whom? 
 
Throughout the 1930s and then during World War II, Nazi and Fascist leaders invoked the 
principle of self-determination, to exclude minorities and perpetrate genocide all over Europe, 
in the name of a norm of ethnic homogeneity within states. As Eric Hobsbawm has put it, 
Adolf Hitler was possibly the most “logical Wilsonian nationalist.”290 Less widely known in 
this period was Ante Pavelic’s programme, set up in the Balkans to methodically eliminate 
Serbs, Jews and Gypsies and establish a self-determined, fascist, Croatia.291 Ironically, 
genocide in the name of a right to ethnic self-determination originated precisely in those areas 
where, in order to guarantee post-war stability and order, Wilson and the peacemakers had 
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290 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 133. 
291 For more details on Pavelic’s ethno-national project see: Ferrara, Ante Pavelic Il Duce Croato. 
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directed the principle in 1919. Less than two decades after the efforts made in Paris to delimit 
self-determination, the principle was used to justify substantial exclusions and the extensive 
use of violence.  
 
In 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt drafted the Atlantic Charter, later endorsed by all the Allies. 
The Charter was constituted of eight points, each containing a different goal for the post-war 
world. The third point upheld the “respect [of] the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they [would] live; and [the] wish to see sovereign rights and self-
government restored to those who [had] been forcibly deprived of them.” This formulation, 
which did not contain the exact phrase “self-determination”, directly revived the hopes of 
many colonial peoples. These, as Erez Manela has shown, were mainly intellectual and 
political élites that had never abandoned the idea since after World War I, as well as men 
fighting during World War II on the side of their respective métropoles. Realising that this 
might foster hopes that the Allies could not sustain, after the diffusion of the Charter 
Churchill immediately rectified the point made in the document. Self-determination for all in 
fact referred, exclusively, he claimed, to “restoring the sovereignty, self-government and 
national life of the states and nations of Europe under the Nazi yoke, besides providing for 
any alterations in the territorial boundaries that may have to be made.”292 The recognition of 
the right of self-determination for all was thus postponed, exposing the imperial imprint of the 
worldviews of the Allies (and later peacemakers). 
 
Self-determination and empire in the early years of the United Nations 
 
Self-determination was carefully avoided at the Dumbarton Oaks meetings of 1944, which set 
the foundations for the formation of the United Nations. The confusion surrounding the 
meaning and scope of self-determination, however, could not be circumvented for too long. 
On the one hand there was the urgency to redefine the moral foundations of the polity in 
ethnically blind terms. On the other hand, and more pragmatically, the strong insistence and 
international visibility of Soviet requests in San Francisco pushed other Allies to accept the 
inclusion of self-determination in the UN Charter. Hence, in 1945 the dominant assumption 
among the Allies was that Soviet requests had been satisfied and that self-determination had 
entered the agenda for a new world order. The meaning and scope of the principle, however, 
                                            
292 Reported from the House of Commons, 8th vol. Session 1940-41. Quoted in Cassese, Self-Determination of 
Peoples, 37. 
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were left for further revision, to be undertaken at some other unspecified time. Following 
article 55 of the UN Charter, self-determination was formulated as a future goal for world 
order. 
 
The norm of self-determination was introduced in the Charter, and then left aside in further 
discussions. International attention was turned to post-war reconstruction and to defining the 
contours of the human rights project after the horrors of the war. This, at least, is what we are 
largely told.293 This view, however, seems to obscure what I see is another, more ambiguous, 
part of the story. In the wake of the war, I have said, self-determination was apprehended at 
the UN as an aspirational norm.  
 
It is not impossible then to understand this move as reflecting the imperial orientation of the 
UN in the first years of its existence. Although both individual and sovereign equality was 
affirmed in the Preamble of the Charter, the general UN position on the colonial question was 
quite clear. Imperialism was, for the moment, not to be contested. Neta Crawford has shown 
that the establishment of the Trusteeship System at the UN modified the rightness of 
colonialism, as human rights and racial equality were also explicitly linked to the “non-self-
governing” territories under UN authority.294 She argues that the Trusteeship System did 
envisage eventual decolonisation of specific territories.295 Indeed, it is true that some viewed 
the idea of independence for colonial subjects as a possibility. However, in 1945, it was 
certainly not imminent. After all, to justify colonial rule, numerous British colonial officials 
also upheld the idea that, one day, colonies might become independent.296 Many, and in 
particular western and colonial states, simply did not envision self-government after the war. 
In this sense, the codification of self-determination was not perceived as an urgent matter. 
After all, European overseas empires still represented a form of legitimate political authority. 
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This however, is not to say that métropoles were not aware of the power of the self-
determination rhetoric for many subject peoples within colonies.297 I would rather suggest 
that the revolutionary potential of self-determination was in fact immediately downplayed, on 
its entry in the realm of international law. Article 1 of the Charter loosely framed it around 
other post-war principles:  
 
The purposes of the United Nations are […] to develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace […] 
  
In turn, article 73 of the UN Charter reiterated the long-established idea that colonial peoples 
were not yet ready to achieve self-government after the war but that, one day, they would. 
The role of colonial powers was restated as fundamental, inasmuch as they brought progress 
to subject peoples. The benevolent role of “more mature” members of the UN in the name of 
a “sacred trust” was also confirmed. In the exact wording of the article: 
 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of 
territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise the 
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred 
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories […] 
 
The Charter divided “non-self-governing territories” into two categories. The first was a 
broad category encompassing all colonies and territories that “[had] not yet attained a full 
measure of self-government.”298 The second included the eleven territories that were formally 
put under international supervision of the UN. The legitimacy of colonial rule was reaffirmed 
through the transmission of the League’s Mandate System to the UN Trusteeship complex, in 
Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter. The UN Trusteeship System was in continuity with the 
pre-war colonial system. Indeed, the everyday administration of Trusteeship territories was 
attributed via Chapter XII to France and Britain. The two colonial powers were given the task 
to “promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of 
trust territories”299, which, following article 22 of the older League’s Covenant, were “not yet 
able to stand alone in the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”  
 
                                            
297 See: Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, 2007. In his book Manela shows precisely how self-determination 
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However, differently from the Mandate System, individuals living within these territories 
were granted the right to petition directly to the UN. This was a radical change that did 
preoccupy both France and Britain. As indicated by William Bain, France made the point 
quite clearly that “nothing under consideration by the Trusteeship Committee shall authorise 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which [were] essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.”300 Petitions would thus be studied by the Trusteeship Council, set 
up in 1945 as one of the core organs of the United Nations. Every two years, the Council sent 
international missions to assess whether or not a territory was ready for self-government. In 
two cases, special missions were sent to colonial territories to verify the allegations of the 
claimants.301 Whereas over time petitioning became an increasingly exercised practice, in the 
immediate post-war years colonial powers were essentially in charge of all domains. 302 
Between 1952 and 1964 the examination of petitions was further devolved to a Standing 
Committee. Many however, and the Soviet delegation in particular, criticised the 
establishment of the Committee, which they viewed as a means to postpone the study of 
petitions and further bureaucratise the system as a whole.303 
 
It is interesting to note the way in which, today, the United Nations describes the work of the 
Trusteeship Council from 1945. The “basic objective” of the Trusteeship System is described 
as “to promote the political, economic, and social advancement of the Territories and their 
development towards self-government and self-determination,” as well as “[encouraging] the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and recognition of the interdependence of 
peoples of the world.” The Council is defined as the organ in charge of supervising “the 
administration of Trust Territories and to ensure that Governments responsible for their 
administration took adequate steps to prepare them for the achievement of the Charter 
goals.”304 Whether in the minds of colonial powers’ delegates the aim was achievement of the 
Charter goals or a state of progress, I believe, is a matter that remains open to interpretation. 
In the aftermath of the war colonial powers’ did hold back self-determination for all. They did 
so in the name of a state of advancement that colonial people had allegedly not reached. Self-
determination was not to be recognised for those people not advanced enough to meet 
international requirements for independent statehood. The definition of these requirements 
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and the stage at which peoples or territories would be regarded as having reached them, 
however, was certainly not a matter open for debate. Empire was thus reaffirmed in the 
Trusteeship system, but, as William Bain has shown in a complex, possibly diluted form,305 
that soon would be called into question.  
 
Already at the third meeting of the Council the questions had been raised by the delegates of 
Thailand and El Salvador: should indigenous peoples from trust territories be able to 
participate in the work of the Trusteeship Council? Could they be granted a right to speak, 
perhaps without the right to vote, in Trusteeship decisions, given that these directly concerned 
them? Britain and France drastically opposed these views, claiming that the composition of 
the Council had already been defined in article 86 of the Charter.306 The Charter stated that 
the Council was to consist of the UN members that administered trust territories, the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, and “as many other non-administering members 
as needed to equalise the number of administering and non-administering members” elected 
by the General Assembly on a three year-basis.307 Accordingly, the Great Powers neatly 
avoided clear answers to these questions. However, as long as the work of the Council 
continued, the line of division between France and Britain on the one hand, and non-western 
delegates on the other, became increasingly obvious. If the Trusteeship system had been 
established in the interest of colonial subjects, and if the principle of equality of rights for all 
men and women was upheld in the Charter, why were indigenous peoples from trust 
territories excluded from those processes that precisely involved them? As much as in other 
UN bodies, the inconsistencies of the 1945 formulations for a new post-war international 
order were becoming increasingly evident. 
 
Between hierarchy and equality at the UN 
 
In his book The Last Utopia, Samuel Moyn suggests that “human rights entered global 
rhetoric in a kind of hydraulic relationship with self-determination: to the extent that one 
appeared, and progressed, the other declined, or even disappeared.”308 I disagree with Moyn’s 
use of this argument, made on a broad historical scale to convince his reader that 
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decolonisation as a whole was not a human rights movement; that the politics of self-
determination and of human rights were distinct projects. Overall, this chapter is engaged in 
demonstrating precisely the opposite view, namely that self-determination and human rights 
after 1948 mutually constituted and reinforced each other. However, Moyn’s statement 
appears to be well suited to an understanding of the prevalent mentality and justifications 
given by Great Powers to avoid recognising self-determination for all. In the early years of 
the UN, the effort was presented as one to frame human rights. This was done in the name of 
alleged liberal ideas of peace, justice and equality. Who would want to disturb this project and 
consider instead self-determination? 
 
In the final version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as proclaimed in 1948, 
self-determination was not once mentioned. The delegates of socialist and communist states 
that had argued in favour of the inclusion of a self-determination clause during the negotiation 
period abstained from voting on the passing of the Declaration before the General Assembly. 
Six out of the total eight abstentions were from socialist states, the two others being from 
Saudi Arabia and the Union of South Africa.309 Not one vote went against the final draft: 
forty-eight were in favour. The Declaration was adopted. In 1947 the Commission on Human 
Rights had decided, however, to create two separate human rights tools: a Universal 
Declaration and a Covenant “which [would] impose far reaching obligations on acceding 
states and which accordingly [demanded] detailed and precise drafting appropriate to a legal 
document.”310 In 1948, negotiations on the latter had not started. Major discussions were yet 
to come. 
 
Following the delineation of the human rights enterprise and the denunciation of Hitler’s 
racism, UN delegates from colonial powers found themselves in fact surrounded by a growing 
inconsistency. How was it possible to codify universal rights for all, denounce Hitler’s racist 
policies, while at the same time justifying the systematic denial of political and civil rights to 
colonial people, along a racial and sometimes ethnic line, “domestically?”311 René Cassin, 
French delegate at the UN and champion of the human rights project, was explicitly against 
                                            
309 SO 221/9 (02) UN archives, New York (UNA). The eight abstentions were from: the Byelorussian Soviet 
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the allocation of those rights to colonial peoples. Métropoles had attributed to themselves the 
superior task of promoting the well-being of non-self-governing populations; explicit 
discrimination was seen as the obvious means to achieve such development. 312 For years, 
Cassin repeatedly claimed that subject peoples were not yet ready for human rights – the same 
argument used to deny self-determination. As indicated by Gordon Lauren, though, the very 
project of human rights codification concurrently contributed to making colonial ideologies 
less self-evident. The project “created a troublesome mirror that reflected [colonial powers’] 
own abuses on rights (…) and potentially threatened their own power and claims to national 
sovereignty.”313  
 
I argue that major inconsistencies at the UN derived from an inadequacy in dealing with the 
question of equality within the organisation. Colonial powers continued to uphold, although 
in transformed ways, hierarchical worldviews. However, these were in contrast with 
conceptions of equality (of both individuals and sovereign states) endorsed in official UN 
documents. Such explicitly opposing visions could not hold together for too long. Why, 
despite international codifications, was each individual not supposed to have equal rights? 
This question started to be addressed in relation to the issue of self-determination as well:314 
why, even if article one of the Charter stated that self-determination was for all, could this not 
happen in practice? The idea that métropoles could decide for colonial people in an 
unconditional manner increasingly lost ground. Certainly, I do not claim that this occurred 
because colonial powers suddenly realised their long-standing moral failings after the 
adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights. As I see it, this delegitimation was rather the 
result of the presence at the UN of former colonies which, in the inter-war years, had been 
granted independence. In the name of sovereign equality as the base of UN membership, they 
were allowed to join the organisation in 1945. This signified that the UN was no longer, as the 
League of Nations had been, an exclusive organisation controlled by the Great Powers. The 
UN was in principle the matter of all those deemed sovereign equals.  
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Post-Colonial Struggles at the UN: Self-Determination, Human Rights and the 
Delegitimation of Empire in the 1950s  
 
As a result of this inclusive understanding of membership within an international 
organisation, representatives of former colonies that had acquired independence in the inter-
war period had the same right to speak and vote as the rest of the UN members. Among them 
were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria, later followed by India and Pakistan 
(1947), accompanied by an array of Latin American states that had gained independence in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. It was this formal equality that allowed post-colonial states to use 
the UN as a platform for discussion. Post-colonial countries turned the UN human rights and 
colonial bodies formed immediately after the war into channels for major transformations of 
the international system. Such bodies were mainly the Third Committee, the Commission on 
Human Rights and the Trusteeship Council.  
 
Over the years, meeting after meeting, post-colonial delegates seized the 1948 western-
defined rhetoric of human rights, expanded it and used it to formulate persuasive claims for 
equality. In turn, this language of rights was used to ground self-determination in pre-existing 
values, and to further justify claims to independence. Reus-Smit is thus correct that “post-
colonial states successfully grafted the right to self-determination to emergent international 
human rights norms.”315 Self-determination was justified on universal grounds in the name of 
equality and human rights and, concurrently, colonial rule was formally delegitimised. This, I 
would add, brought a fundamental political and moral shift in the meaning of self-
determination, as it became both a continuing right (without respect for self-determination 
there can be no respect for other fundamental rights and freedoms) and the universal norm for 
statehood and membership in post-colonial international society.  
 
In spite of differences, both Christian Reus-Smit and Roland Burke support the view that the 
1950s claims to self-determination, as they originated at the UN and were internalised by 
several anti-colonial movements within empires, were attached to human rights. This 
standpoint, as already been said, is opposed to the views of historians such as Samuel Moyn, 
and Brad Simpson who deny, because of their narrower understanding of human rights 
politics, a constitutive relation between the 1950s anti-colonial movements and human rights 
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ideas. 316 The latter contend that the use of human rights language by “Third World” 
representatives was occasional, and nothing more than what they see as a “mere” rhetorical 
tool. Contrarily to this view, Reus-Smit makes the point that rhetoric “is a purposive social 
practice,” one that “actors employ deliberately and artfully because successful rhetoric is 
politically enabling.”317 In other words, post-colonial representatives within and outside the 
UN found in the language of human rights a major tool of collective empowerment and 
legitimation. In it, they managed to ground, visibly and legitimately, first their claims to 
equality and then to self-determination (and thereby sovereign equality for the new states.)  
 
It should be noted here that whereas I establish a connexion between self-determination and 
(individual) human rights, I do not seek to find, in my interpretation, an answer to whether 
self-determination was ultimately framed as to refer to individual, rather than collective 
holders of rights. This is an important disclaimer given the propensity in scholarly work to 
qualify self-determination in one or the other terms.318 It is my sense, however, that nowhere 
in UN documents can a clear position be identified (and certainly not until the 1990s).319 
During the Covenant negotiations several actors at the UN held the explicit view that self-
determination was to be understood as a collective right. Soviet delegates, for example, talked 
about a “national” self-determination, though others who held the view that self-
determination was collective did not refer to it as national, but as “self-determination of 
people,” such as was often the case of the Yugoslav delegates. Others, in turn, saw it as a tool 
of individual empowerment and others, possibly, as a human right. Afghani Foreign Minister 
Sardar Naim, for instance, claimed in 1955 that, “our conception of independence is not 
different in any respect from our conception of the observance of fundamental human rights, 
especially the right of peoples and nations to self-determination” – though, even there, 
whether self-determination was equated with an individual human right remains a matter of 
interpretation.320  
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Accordingly, I first present “Third World” struggles. I do so in the form of an outline, as both 
Reus-Smit and Burke have already advanced the arguments in detail in their respective 
works.321 I then discuss how international discussions were echoed within several colonial 
contexts, speeding up after the Bandung conference the process of decolonisation. After 
Bandung, numerous colonised élites referred to a common international language (though, 
certainly, interpreted differently according to specific ideologies and beliefs) in their domestic 
struggles against colonial rulers. In spite of that, the endorsement of this language in the 
decolonisation period, as I shall argue in the next chapter, was not translated into the domestic 
practice of post-colonial states.  
 
Post-colonial struggles at the UN 
 
It was within the two principal human rights bodies that discussions began. One was the 
Commission on Human Rights, created in 1946 as a subsidiary body of the ECOSOC. 
Following article 68 of the UN Charter, the Commission was conceived as a political forum 
for discussion on the promotion and protection of human rights. From its creation, and for the 
following decade, it was principally used to elaborate treaties and make recommendations to 
the General Assembly. The other was the Third Committee, the same organ in which the 
drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration took place. Formed in 1945 as one of the six main 
committees of the General Assembly, it had a similar structure to the Assembly, formally 
granting equal representation to all UN members. The Third Committee was in charge of 
drafting major documents on social, humanitarian, cultural and human rights issues. These 
included recommendations and resolutions. In contrast to the Trusteeship Council, here post-
colonial states could equally express their voice.  
 
After the endorsement in 1948 of the Declaration of Human Rights, within the Third 
Committee the Soviet Union, Communist and post-colonial delegates found themselves 
united in claiming equal rights, recognition and self-determination for those oppressed groups 
whose human rights and fundamental freedoms were not respected. 322 These were to be 
integrated in the future Covenant on Human Rights that the Committee would negotiate. For 
more than a year, Soviet and Egyptian delegates insisted on the need to expand the scope of 
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the recently formed sub-commission on prevention of discrimination and protection of 
minorities, to all discriminated racial, national, religious and linguistic minorities. These 
delegates thus argued for the expansion of rights recognition, to also include peoples of Trust 
and non-self-governing territories. It became soon clear that “Third World” and Soviet 
delegates did not refer to the same categories of people or rights. At the 5th session of the 
Commission, in spring 1949, the Soviet delegation proposed the insertion of an article in the 
draft Covenant, bringing together the recognition of minorities, their rights along with the 
principle of national (thus collective) self-determination:  
 
“Every people and every nation shall have the right to national self-determination. States which have 
responsibilities for the administration of non-self-governing territories shall promote the fulfilment of 
this right [… ] The state shall ensure to national minorities the right to use their native tongue, and to 
possess their national schools and libraries, […]”323 
 
While the article highlighted the quest for equal recognition of autonomy and freedom for all, 
in line with their ideological commitment Soviet claims implied that self-determination was 
meant for specific “national minorities.” Post-colonial delegates, on the other hand, naturally 
viewed oppressed peoples as colonised groups within imperial systems, in search of 
recognition and political equality. The Soviet suggestion stressed also the role of cultural and 
social rights as collectively understood, over individual and political ones. Yet, as the Indian 
delegation later claimed, it was political rights that mattered for those oppressed peoples who 
sought to see their will recognised in the institution of a legitimate government. Indian 
delegates claimed that these were the rights that could not be implemented if the people to 
whom they were granted lived under despotic or autocratic regimes.324   
 
1950 thus marked the start of the use by post-colonial delegates of human rights language as 
“revolutionary discourses,” to challenge hegemonic understandings of world order. 325 
Debates increasingly took place on the need to expand rights to all, and to ground expressions 
of the free and popular will of the people within notions of political equality and equality of 
rights. At the end of the year, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 421 D (V). The 
resolution called for the ECOSOC to request the Commission on Human Rights to study ways 
and means that would ensure the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination. It also 
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asked for the elaboration of recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly in 
its sixth session, the following year. In adopting resolution 421, as Mexican delegate Raul 
Noriega stated during the 310th meeting of the Third Committee, the General Assembly had 
recognised the competence of the Committee and the Commission to deal with self-
determination in non-dependent territories.326 The right of self-determination for colonies was 
now at the UN a matter open for discussion. Hence, during a whole year, in 1951, post-
colonial delegates involved in the drafting of the UN Covenant on human rights insisted on 
the inclusion of self-determination in the document. Arab delegates were possibly those 
supporting the move with most conviction. Accordingly, Lebanese representative Charles 
Malik claimed that the more people progressed towards self-determination, the more they 
would be likely to respect human rights, and vice-versa.327  
 
Such genuine enthusiasm was, however, countered not only by European colonial powers but 
also by other western states. In a 1952 memorandum addressed to the Secretary General, 
Canada argued that it was impossible to include a collective entitlement in a Covenant on 
individual rights.328 The other argument that western states used against the recognition of 
self-determination was embedded in the so-called “colonial clause”. Western states suggested 
that a clause of exemption should be added in the future Covenant to exclude its application 
to non-self-governing territories. Referring to stages of advancement and progress, colonial 
peoples were still not ready for full self-government. Moreover, as noted by the Belgian 
delegate: 
 
“[Human] rights presupposed a high degree of civilisation (and) were often incompatible with the 
ideas of people who had not reached a high degree of development. By imposing those rules on them 
at once, one ran the risk of destroying the very basis of their society. It would be an attempt to lead 
them abruptly to the point which the civilised nations of today had only reached after a lengthy period 
of development”329  
 
The colonial clause was in the end rejected - resolution 422, calling for the universal 
application of the future human rights tool. It was also decided that the latter would be split 
into two Covenants. One dealt with civil and political rights, which India and Greece thought 
had absolute priority; the other focussed on economic, social and cultural rights.  
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 Adopted with forty votes in favour, fourteen against (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, South Africa, 
United Kingdom, United States) and six abstentions, it was resolution 637 that legally 
highlighted the incompatibility between colonial rule and ideas about self-determination and 
human rights. Via that resolution, four major points were articulated. First, self-determination 
was to be the prerequisite for full enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms. 
Second, decolonisation was an international matter. Third, and although this was not framed 
as a legal obligation, the resolution encouraged colonial powers to hasten the procedure of 
access to self-government for colonies. Fourth, it affirmed the importance of political rights 
for fulfilling the will of the people.  
 
Crucially for us, these points indicate that the resolution reiterated the democratic aspirations 
to self-determination at the basis of the concept. Moreover, it delineated the exercise of 
political rights as a matter of wider, international concern. While the allocation of political 
rights -along with other citizenship rights was – and, to be sure, still is – a sovereign 
prerogative, resolution 637 stated that the right to have plebiscites in colonial territories 
should facilitate self-determination. In order to “satisfy their political aspirations,” the 
resolution advanced that “democratic means to prepare local populations for self-government 
and to ensure direct participation of indigenous people in legislative and executive bodies” 
had to be established.330 This certainly did not equate with independence, but the resolution 
underlined the need for equal grounds in the allocation and exercise of political rights. Just as 
after World War I, political equality and equality of rights was therefore set again 
internationally as the ground for the exercise of the right of self-determination.  
 
In 1952, two major criteria existed to assess whether a territory had or had not attained a full 
measure of self-government. The first one was “political advancement”, a phrase that 
interestingly continued to appear in the works and reports of the Trusteeship Council until the 
end of the 1950s. More often than not, though, western states used it to insinuate that colonial 
people had not attained yet an adequate stage of development to be granted self-
government.331 The second was the “opinion of people”.332 Resolution 637 stated that this 
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should be facilitated by the right to have plebiscites in colonial territories and by other 
democratic means. The matter remained however, as to how this opinion could be measured 
if, at the same time, colonial authorities regularly denied to colonial peoples access to full 
membership within the political community, and therefore to political rights to express their 
views. Resolution 644, also adopted in 1952, sought to put an end to such discriminatory 
practices. It recommended the “abolition in those Territories of discriminatory laws and 
practices contrary to the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights”. It also asked for the “examination” (rather than abolition) by colonial authorities of 
those laws differentiating citizens from non-citizens on racial and religious grounds.333 In so 
doing, it made a major contribution as to the definition of what could be considered rightful 
distinctions among population groups.  
 
The exercise and allocation of rights within bounded polities was turned into an issue of 
potential wider concern. Who was a citizen and who was not, who could vote and who could 
not, who could be represented and who could not, were matters no longer to be grounded on 
systems of unequal treatment. Concurrently with the progressive delegitimation of 
institutionalised systems of unequal rights, liberal ideas of equality and inclusion, as defined 
after the war within the frame of human rights, gained greater resonance. As Reus-Smit 
argues, post-colonial delegates at the UN managed to associate western-defined liberal ideas 
of human rights with the right of self-determination for non-western, colonial peoples. Formal 
recognition of political equality at the UN thus represented a major tool of collective 
empowerment and legitimation of domestic, anti-imperialist claims. The exercise of popular 
sovereignty domestically, and thus by association also within colonial territories, in the name 
of self-determination, was “backed up” by internationally recognised human rights. This 
operation was accomplished in November 1955, when, after several years of discussions, 
article 1, as it had been already formulated in 1952, was included in the draft Covenants: 
Article 1. 1/ All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
2/ All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without 
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own 
means of subsistence. 
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3/ The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right 
of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
Post-colonial delegates thus constituted themselves as moral entrepreneurs, who, during the 
Conference, shaped in various ways human rights ideas, along with the norm of self-
determination. This process as a whole played a part in creating a collective, “Third World” 
identity. This was a unique form of affiliation, which UN delegates from newly formed states, 
but also political groups and intellectual élites within colonies, could identify with, and 
invoke. In turn, the reinterpretation of both human rights rhetoric and the idea of self-
determination represented a challenge to western powers and, to a certain extent, to the 
communist bloc.  
The empowerment of subject peoples within colonies was crystallised in the years following 
the 1955 Bandung Conference, when such “Third World” identity took form. The Conference 
represented a major moment of realisation of common interests for non-western states and 
peoples. From then on, it was thought, these could be consistently invoked, along with a 
shared, but perhaps also increasingly elusive, identity. The realisation of a common identity 
granted a greater negotiating power to post-colonial states at the UN. The Conference in part 
restated liberal principles governing the United Nations, but in so doing, it also formalised 
human rights and self-determination for non-western territories, though with a different 
substance. By this, I do not mean that Bandung represented a liberal gathering but, rather, that 
“Third World” élites managed to appropriate a certain international language that they 
reinterpreted and used to justify their claims. The identity of the “Third World” was 
enthusiastically delineated as democratic and “non-aligned” 334  - although the official 
movement of the Non-Aligned was forged in Belgrade in 1961. At the conference, the 
importance of self-determination and (equal) exercise of political rights was also reiterated. In 
the words of Charles Malik: 
 
“ What are the ultimate fundamental human rights? For the Communists, these rights are for the most 
part social and economic rights. But for some of the rest of us the ultimate human rights that should 
now be guaranteed by the world and by the diverse nations are the personal, legal, political rights to 
freedom – to freedom of thought, to freedom of expression and certainly of free elections (my 
emphasis). […] To the communists, in the present context of this conference freedom meant the 
liberation of the various nations and peoples of Asia and Africa from foreign Western rule. But to 
some of us – while this certainly belongs to the notion of freedom, freedom was much larger and 
                                            
334 Note written for the Cabinet of External Affairs on the impact of the Conference. Canberra, 30th May 1955. 
Item number 94/28 [13]. Document available online, National Archives of Australia. 
130
deeper than liberation from foreign rule. To us freedom meant freedom of mind, freedom of thought, 
freedom of press, freedom to criticise, to judge for yourself, freedom in short, to be the full human 
being.”335 
 
Post-colonial interests, as they emerged during and after Bandung, were to bring together 
human rights with a deeply democratic idea of self-determination.336 The fight for one was 
made coterminous with the fight for the other.337 This nexus, I suggest, came to delineate the 
standard of self-determination internationally, as endorsed in 1960 through Resolution 1514 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial People. This inevitably shaped international 
expectations that would have accompanied it. Before turning to these, though, let us briefly 
consider what in the second half of the 1950s was the general atmosphere within colonial 
territories. 
 
After Bandung: accelerating decolonisation from the inside  
 
Although rarely discussed in scholarly accounts on self-determination, the Bandung moment 
was pivotal in hastening the adoption of resolution 1514, decolonisation and the demise of 
imperalism.338 Twenty-nine national delegations were present: six from Africa, the continent 
being still predominantly under colonial rule, and all the others from Asia. These countries 
represented nearly 1.5 billion people on the planet. During only a week of discussions and 
meetings, ideas about human rights, equality and self-determination were articulated around 
the constitution of a common “Third World” identity. As Baron Casey, at the time minister 
for Australian external relations, stated a month after the Conference, the Bandung moment 
“created a common feeling” for Asian and African peoples as a whole.339 This identity was 
explicitly defined around a common interest: independence for people still under colonial 
rule. Moreover, the Conference defined the “Third World” as an indivisible whole, from 
oppressed peoples to those already independent. Bandung therefore played the role of major 
“platform” 340 for diffusion of a “Third World” identity and of its cognate interests within 
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colonial contexts. Intellectual élites and political groups in colonial territories were to be the 
vehicles of that diffusion. 
 
Within colonies, the identity and ideology conveyed in what came to be known as the “spirit 
of Bandung” fitted well with the disillusion of intellectual élites and political groups 
increasingly sensitive to unequal systems of rights allocation. As Erez Manela has argued, in 
the interwar period numerous politicians, intellectuals and civil groups from colonial 
territories had adopted Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination to ground their aspirations.341 
After Bandung, such rhetoric was reinforced, often associated with invocations of human 
rights, and enthusiastically employed by the leaders of colonised peoples to formulate their 
demands for independence such as in the case of the Front of National Liberation in Algeria. 
Recounting what Nasser told Tito in 1960, Arne Westad writes that, “the future of the 
territories still under colonial control was first and foremost an issue for the Third World itself 
(…) it was third world solidarity with the local resistance that in the end would force the 
imperialists out.”342  “Domestically,” discourses on self-determination found their direct 
equivalents within international debates and norms. The idea of self-determination as 
associated to human rights became a crucial tool to challenge imperial systems, both from the 
inside and from the outside. Westad tells us “that even in Europe [in particular within 
socialist circles] the discourse about colonialism and state control began to shift from its 
previous emphasis over power, rationality and progress, to a new underlining of self-
determination and human rights.”343 
 
That said, the scope of subject peoples’ mobilisations within all colonial contexts should not 
be overgeneralised. While in colonial Asia ideas about self-determination were rather 
widespread, this was not always the case for colonial Africa. In Africa, those socialised with 
Bandung’s ideas were limited and well-defined groups: intellectual and political élites, 
political parties, unions, associations and emerging NGOs. In a few cases these actors 
managed to spread widely ideas associated with the “Bandung spirit” and increase political 
mobilisation, as, for instance, in Algeria and Kenya. More often than not however, ideas 
about human rights and self-determination remained limited to small, urban but visible 
sections of colonial populations that actively mobilised against colonial rule. These were 
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strongly influenced by socialist circles and intellectual diasporas living in Europe.344 As 
Reus-Smit has argued, within colonies, self-determination and human rights claims 
constituted a revolutionary rhetoric within environments defined by hierarchical norms.345 In 
many circumstances, this rhetoric was marginal. However, appealing to internationally 
recognised principles empowered and granted visibility to domestic populations. In parallel, 
post-colonial delegates at the UN worked as the mediators of subject peoples’ interests, to 
grant their growing claims international recognition. Colonial authorities could no longer 
behave as they liked towards colonial people, in a totally uncontested manner as France, we 
have seen, claimed.  
 
In several circumstances the process of delegitimation of colonial rule led to the start of 
peaceful decolonisation via the organisation of plebiscites before the 1960 resolution 1514, 
granting independence to colonial peoples. This, in particular, was the case for Trust 
Territories. Emblematically, Ghana was the first to gain independence from the British 
Empire in 1957 – even though independence was first acquired through an Assembly vote in 
Britain and only later did it become a republic through plebiscite. The conduct of the 
plebiscites within Trust territories fell primarily under the responsibility of respective 
administrative authorities, although they were officially organised under UN supervision.346 It 
is hard to tell if the decision by colonial powers to organise referenda was taken with the 
intent of attributing autonomy to those territories that anyway already had a semi-autonomous 
status, so as to better maintain other colonial possessions; or whether it was because 
decolonisation was actually set in motion. One thing is, however, clear: while plebiscites were 
intended initially for Trust Territories, they came to constitute a precedent to which all 
colonial peoples could appeal. Up until 1960 colonial authorities generally contained those 
appeals in other “non-self governing territories,” continuing to describe subject peoples’ 
protests as matters of domestic concern. In a number of instances, heavy repression on the 
side of colonial powers exacerbated both subject peoples’ claims and their political struggles, 
leading to the use of violence on both sides.  
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Domestically, colonial powers justified authoritarian practices by arguing that colonial 
peoples could not rise up against those same authorities that were so generously participating 
in their development. If oppression was the means to be used, it was for their good. On one 
side, French authorities employed the assimilationist argument, grounded on their highly 
colonial policies. All colonial peoples would become, one day, fully-fledged French citizens. 
Why would they want to be different, by struggling against colonial rule? In the British and 
Belgian cases instead, the argument used was that the day would come when all colonies 
would be able to determine themselves. Colonial people need not hasten the process, as they 
were not yet ready for independence. However, the colonial powers’ argument clashed with 
the changing international environment. At the UN, as we have seen, colonialism had clearly 
become a matter of international preoccupation, and arguments about the benevolent role of 
colonial powers could hardly be explicitly held without causing protestation among post-
colonial delegates.  
 
In practice, though, the louder the claims to self-determination and equality were, the more 
colonial authorities continued repressive and violent measures. In three emblematic post-
World War II cases, colonial repression against self-determination movements led to states of 
war between colonised and coloniser parties: Indochina (1946-1954), Kenya (1952-1960) and 
Algeria (1954-1962). The use of extensive violence against mobilised subject peoples asking 
for equal rights and self-determination revealed the discriminatory and repressive nature of 
colonial regimes. This I suggest played a part in speeding up the UN decision in 1960, to 
formally bring colonial rule to an end. In each of these three cases, mobilised peoples were 
organised in movements of liberation widely supported by the rest of the colonised 
populations: the Viet Minh in Indochina, the Mau-Mau in Kenya and the Armée de Libération 
Nationale (ALN) – Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria.  
 
These three cases became internationally visible precisely because domestic populations 
consistently and widely reacted to colonial oppression. When their claims to self-
determination and equal respect of individual rights were restrained, subject peoples started 
using violence themselves, organising their own armies and insurgency groups. Historically 
colonial powers had always managed to repress insurrections within empires. In the 1950s 
they could no longer do so legitimately. Subject peoples would otherwise appeal to 
internationally codified principles such as human rights, to assert their increasingly “just 
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cause” of self-determination, both domestically and internationally. 347 It was in this context 
that self-determination was erected as the universal standard for post-colonial statehood and 
membership in international society. After years of struggle, at the dawn of 1960 many hopes 
and expectations were thus attached to the idea of self-determination. 
 
The Standard is Set! Self-Determination in the Post-1960 World Order 
 
At the United Nations, after the inclusion of article 1 in the drafts of the Covenants in 1955, 
discussions on the role of self-determination were never-ending: which were the rightful units 
of self-determination? Which areas or peoples were to enjoy it? Which matters did it govern? 
Which were the methods to reach self-determination? No comprehensive answers were really 
provided. Instead, following the 1955 Hungarian uprising, seeking perhaps to detract attention 
from colonial contexts and to propound an anti-communist critique, colonial powers started to 
claim that imperialism existed in Europe. This was the region where self-determination 
therefore had to be applied first. Attention would be devoted to overseas territories 
subsequently. Because of these circumstances detracting attention from colonial contexts, 
post-colonial delegates insisted on setting up two UN ad hoc commissions on self-
determination. The purpose of self-determination, they claimed, needed clarification. The first 
commission was to survey the status of the right of permanent sovereignty over the natural 
wealth and resources of the peoples and nations of the world. Chile had in fact successfully 
managed to include, in 1952, a clause on the matter in article 1 of the future Covenants. The 
second commission was to conduct a study on the best way to implement self-determination. 
However, while the first was set up in 1958, the second “never saw the light of day, with 
debate repeatedly postponed.”348  
 
This though did not mean that post-colonial struggles at the UN were over. In 1957, 
resolution 1188 was passed, calling for the respect of self-determination and equal rights for 
all, in the name of friendly relations among states. The resolution, directed to European 
colonial powers, was bolstered three years later by resolution 1514, also known as the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples. In 1960, the resolution was 
voted on, with 89 for, none against and nine abstentions (Australia, Belgium, Dominican 
Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States). 
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Crucially, the declaration transformed self-determination into a legal imperative directed to 
peoples wishing to set themselves free from imperial rule. More broadly, resolution 1514 
embodied a whole decade of discussions that had directly called into question colonial rule. 
This clearly appeared in the results of the vote. At the start of the 1950s colonial powers 
generally voted against any provision that would either undermine them or empower colonial 
peoples. In 1960, along with other western states, they all abstained from voting. Both the 
resolution and its vote indicated a fundamental shift in the conception of the architecture of 
the international system.349 
 
Resolution 1514 grounded the right to self-determination on moral universal foundations. The 
resolution defined self-determination as the shared norm for post-colonial statehood and 
membership within international society, granting fresh substance to its normative 
components. The rights attached to the norm were twofold. The resolution recognised both an 
entitlement to self-government and the right to equal treatment (political equality and equality 
of rights). The people were, in turn, less clearly defined. The resolution referred to “all 
peoples” having the right to self-determination. In practice, however, the principle of uti 
possidetis juris was used to reorganise the borders of the new, “self-determined” states. The 
principle guaranteed that the borders of the new states followed the boundaries of the old 
colonial empires from which they originated. As indicated by Steven Ratner, at the UN, the 
principle was appreciated, as it kept decolonisation an orderly process.350 The tension 
between self-determination’s “revolutionary form” as in the years before 1960 and its more 
“reactionary form” set through international disciplining was translated in international law, 
as international society came to define the appropriate units of political authority. 351 In 1960, 
Ivor Jennings words, pronounced only a few years earlier, in 1956, made complete sense: “on 
the surface [self-determination] sounded reasonable: let the people decide. In fact, it was 
ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.”352  
 
Hence, just one day after the adoption of resolution 1514, the General Assembly adopted 
resolution 1541, inter alia establishing the specific forms that the exercise of self-
determination could take for colonial territories. It could either lead to the formation of a 
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sovereign independent state, to free association with an already existing sovereign state, or to 
integration with an independent state.353 All these forms were associated in the resolution to 
the idea of individual equality, human rights and freedom. Accordingly, principle VIII of the 
resolution stressed that, within the newly formed states, equal citizenship and status, as well 
as equal guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms, were to be respected. The resolution 
did not state how the respect and equality of all at the domestic level was to be guaranteed. It 
did mention some of the responsibilities attached to the exercise of the right (or perhaps, just 
allocation of the norm.) These responsibilities were delineated along the lines of respect for 
equality and human rights. 
 
As Antonio Cassese has argued, in becoming a principle of jus cogens, self-determination 
played a part in strengthening state responsibility with regard to the protection and rights of 
domestic populations.354 He has thus suggested that it introduced a new criterion by which to 
judge the legitimacy of domestic power internationally: the respect for the wishes and 
aspirations of peoples.355 Cassese describes such process as an erosion of the traditional 
definition of sovereignty. I depart from this view, supporting instead the idea that 
expectations attached to self-determination contributed to the shaping of post-colonial 
conceptions of statehood and membership in a very specific way. In 1960, the respect for 
human rights, political equality and equality of rights came to redefine what good domestic 
order ought to be. Two years later, in 1962, when discussing the principles of freedom and 
non-discrimination in the matter of political rights, the General Assembly clearly stated that 
political rights, freedom and equality could be guaranteed only if self-determination 
existed.356 Conversely, political rights embodied the most democratic means to achieve self-
determination. In his 1962 Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Political Rights, 
addressed to the Commission for Human Rights, Chilean delegate Hernan Santa Cruz thus 
stated:  
 
“[…] The effective exercise of political rights is a means of attaining all other rights and freedoms. 
Thus the eradication of discrimination in respect of these rights may be viewed as a way of 
suppressing other forms of discrimination, and helping all peoples to enjoy their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”357 
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Unlike 1919, no mechanism of supervision was set up to guarantee the respect of the standard 
of self-determination. After all, Resolution 1514 restated the “liberal pluralism” of the UN 
Charter, grounded on sovereign equality of all states and on non-interference. The matter was 
settled.  
 
Throughout the 1960s, discussions at the UN shifted from self-determination to those specific 
situations in which hierarchy was still formalised. Through extensive use of violence, 
Portugal kept in fact an important number of its colonies until Salazar's death in 1974. In 
South Africa, the official Apartheid regime was maintained until 1994. Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s several UN resolutions continued to recall the importance of self-determination for 
people under “foreign domination.” 358 In 1962 a special committee, known as the committee 
of 24, was established to monitor whether colonial empires were recognition self-
determination claims within their possessions. In 1966, The Covenants on Human Rights 
were ratified. In 1973, resolution 3103 clearly defined empire as a crime. Yet today, the 
remnants of colonial rule have not disappeared. For instance, Madeira is an integral part of 
Portugal. France still possesses a great number of both Territoires and Départements d’Outre-
Mer. Britain, in its turn, has turned towards the “fraternal” association of the Commonwealth, 
formed by 53 independent states – all former colonies of the British Empire that have 
voluntarily decided to join the organisation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the years following the war, this chapter has shown, the aspirations for a so-called liberal 
world order that UN delegates upheld were complemented by hierarchical worldviews. This 
chapter has thus argued that in the aftermath years of the war, numerous members of the UN 
considered empire and colonial rule were considered legitimate forms of political authority 
and organisation. Despite the insertion of the right of self-determination in the UN Charter, 
self-government for colonial peoples constituted, in the eyes of many, a very marginal 
prospect. It was post-colonial delegates that, in the 1950s, made it a norm with universal 
application – at least in theory. Endorsing the points made by Christian Reus-Smit and Roland 
Burke, this chapter has argued that post-colonial states at the UN used the western defined 
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language of human rights to ground their specific claims for equality and self-determination, 
granting a different content to such language. Empire was formally delegitimised and self-
determination became the universal standard for statehood and membership in post-colonial 
society. This process, I have suggested, was accelerated in particular after the Bandung 
Conference. In 1955, Asian and African representatives of independent, post-colonial states 
came to delineate a common, “Third World” identity for the entire non-western world. 
Interestingly, in addition to the call for independence for people still living under colonial 
rule, this identity was delineated along liberal ideals of freedom and human rights. These 
premises echoed to acclaim, within numerous colonial territories, where populations 
increasingly invoked the idea of self-determination and human rights. 
 
This process, which lasted for more than a decade, led, in 1960, to the adoption at the General 
Assembly of Resolution 1514, granting independence to colonial people. It was followed the 
day after by resolution 1541. I have shown how both resolutions granted substance to 
international society’s expectations attached to self-determination. Self-determination was in 
principle a right for all peoples, without racial, ethnic or religious distinctions – even if in 
practice it was limited to colonial territories. The resolutions identified self-government, 
political equality and equality of rights as the rights attached to the norm of self-
determination. Responsibilities associated with the exercise of self-determination, once 
statehood was gained, were defined in the UN documents, in turn, in terms of the respect of 
inclusion, equality and human rights of domestic societies. The standard, once more, was set, 
redefining what legitimate statehood and membership in post-colonial international society 
ought to be. Sovereign equality and non-interference were also reiterated in the UN 
documents, underlining its pluralist orientation. Again, older members of international society 
delineated new expectations (if not in their substance, at least in their application) attached to 
self-determination. Differently from the past, though, toleration was, unambiguously, to guide 
international society’s behaviour towards the new, “self-determined” states. 
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6 
Ends of Empire, Post-Colonial Statehood and Membership in 1960s Africa 
 
 
 
Struggles at the UN led to the adoption of 1960 General Assembly Resolution 1514, 
demanding the termination of colonialism. The resolution upheld the right of self-
determination as the expression of peoples’ political will and autonomy from external 
interference, “in the universal respect for, and observance of human rights.” 359 
Simultaneously, Resolution 1514 prompted, in the name of self-determination, both the 
equality of peoples and human rights and the immediate constitution of new states in areas 
still under colonial rule. In just one year, 1960, 19 new states were formed, joining and 
thereby expanding international society, 17 of which were in Africa. This rapid 
transformation of the system of states in the name of equality, self-determination and human 
rights was accompanied, internationally, by many hopes and fears. In the words of Ralph 
Bunche, 1960 would be the “year of Africa” due to the “explosive rapidity with which the 
peoples of Africa in all sectors are emerging from colonialism.”360  
 
The states that had emerged from the end of colonialism, after international ruling, were 
founded on the right of self-determination that, itself, was strongly governed by liberal norms. 
Nonetheless, when the new post-imperial states came to draw the boundaries of their political 
communities, discrimination often prevailed over inclusion; hierarchy over equality. Just as in 
1919, the tension between egalitarian aspirations of self-determination, and practices of 
hierarchy associated with self-determination was manifest. The novelty, in 1960, lay in how 
pronounced the tension was. Reasons for that, I shall argue, were twofold. On the one hand, 
as I have shown in the previous chapter, from being an ad hoc principle, self-determination 
was now a norm with global application, explicitly embedded in the human rights frame. On 
the other hand, in several African states, the uneven distribution of (political) rights followed 
the lines of imperial hierarchies.  
 
As I shall argue in this chapter, whereas colonial territories that acquired statehood in the 
name of self-determination had long-established institutions and norms, these did not conform 
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to the dominant international views of equality after empire. New states, in fact, largely 
inherited imperial rights regimes in which entitlements were allocated along hierarchical 
lines. In several post-colonial states, hierarchical membership endured. Just as in 1919, too, 
international expectations attached to the idea of self-determination were not met, resulting in 
what many perceived internationally as a mistranslation of the right. Post-colonial African 
states that gained independence in the 1960s were thus built on a series of domestic and 
international tensions that post-colonial scholars have engaged with.361  
 
Accordingly, the chapter is organised into five sections. The first section sets the historical 
context in which hierarchical membership re-emerged and outlines in greater detail my 
argument with regards to post-colonial Africa and territorial self-determination. The second 
and third sections respectively identify continuities between French and British colonial 
membership practices, after World War II and the uneven allocation of rights in post-colonial 
states. The fourth section deals specifically with the case of Nigeria, as a practical illustration 
to some of my claims. After independence, hierarchical membership was openly formalised in 
a context of increasing violence that raised international concern as claims to self-
determination reappeared domestically. I present in the fifth section a further, more 
provisional claim. With decolonisation, international supervisory regimes retreated, due to 
norms of sovereign equality and non-interference. However, I suggest that in a more tentative 
form, hierarchical worldviews were reconstituted in the arguments of numerous scholars. 
 
Territorial Self-Determination and the Legacies of Empire in Post-Colonial Africa 
 
In spite of liberal expectations attached to self-determination, in this chapter I argue that 
membership hierarchies often prevailed within newly formed African states, even if 
informally, over ideas of equality, individual freedoms and rights. National and local African 
leaders found in ethnicity and other kinship criteria empowering supports to justify new 
distinctions grounded in old ideas and practices. These were ideas and practices of 
hierarchical membership that colonial authorities had historically promoted. States that came 
into existence in the name of self-determination were territories formerly under the authority 
of empires, or systems based on “regimes of unequal entitlements.”362  
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 The belief held by many, that instilled colonial conceptions would simply disappear with the 
diffusion of self-determination, with the proclamation of independent statehood and the 
enforcement of human rights was, perhaps, naïve. “Third World” rights claims had led to the 
formal demise of imperial rule and to the endorsement of liberal values defining the nation-
state internationally. These rights claims made internationally, however, did not resonate in 
the same way within many former colonies that in 1960 had seen their right to self-
determination recognised and gained sovereignty after international ruling.  
 
In the case of Africa, the right to self-determination was equated with the application of the 
principle of uti possidetis. Internationally, I have already suggested, the allocation of 
territorial self-determination kept the process of decolonisation orderly. The international 
justification of self-determination on universal moral grounds led to the delegitimation of 
imperial institutions. Domestically however, the application of the principle of uti possidetis 
entailed very different consequences. First, it meant that statehood was recognised following 
old colonial borders, and not following peoples’ understandings of membership, popular will 
and self-government. This is not to say that the boundaries of belonging of the colonised 
peoples themselves were clearly delineated. For example, the Pan-Africanist movement itself 
alluded to very different understandings of self-determination, spanning from nationalist 
claims to a union of all the African peoples.363 Second, it implied that institutions were 
formally devolved to national élites of the new, independent states.364  
 
From 1960, transitions from empire to nation-state following resolution 1514 very often took 
place in a formal and peaceful manner.365 Differing from 1919, the majority of the newly 
“self-determined” states that were granted statehood after resolutions 1514 and 1541 were 
unconditionally recognised as equal sovereigns.366 While the nation-state came to represent 
the condition for membership within the international system, the application of its 
constitutive attributes, as internationally defined by ideas of equality and inclusion, I argue in 
this chapter, simply did not follow within post-colonial states. Instead, local élites and 
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institutions directly inherited colonial norms and rules through the transfer of the 
administrative and political apparatuses presupposed by formal decolonisation.367  
 
To be sure, arguing that post-colonial states presented an institutional vacuum, as to western-
defined rights associated to the model of the nation-state, does not equate with the claim that 
rights did not exist within African colonial systems. Rights were allocated. However, they 
were allocated on uneven bases. As argued by Reus-Smit, the legitimacy of empires was 
sustained “by institutional structures, the social and legal norms of which exert a form of 
structural power, generating unequal subject positions and allocating them with differential 
capacities and entitlements.”368 It is precisely this hierarchical allocation of rights that 
naturalises hierarchy. Moreover, as indicated by Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, colonial 
empires were more explicit in codifying difference than were “aristocratic empires.”369  
 
In the early 1960s, post-colonial states directly inherited these hierarchical structures and 
institutions. This, I suggest, was also the result of the formal devolution of power involved in 
the application of the uti possidetis principle. In some sense through decolonisation, self-
determination lost in fact its “democratic and revolutionary potential.”370 Thus, at the moment 
of 1960s African independences, despite the endorsement, after international ruling, of the 
nation-state model, hierarchical structures constituted the norm in the allocation of rights to 
domestic populations. The way in which hierarchical logics manifested themselves varied 
and, I argue, was more, or less explicit, according to the type of rule and policies set up by 
colonisers.  
 
During colonial rule, in Belgian and British colonies for example, hierarchies appeared more 
visibly because of the clear “divide and rule” practices set up by imperial officials. Those 
practices consisted in favouring politically, socially and economically specific local chiefs or 
local groups over others, by granting them more entitlements and recognition, in exchange for 
a greater collaboration with colonial rulers.371 Differences among groups were reified through 
politics of differentiation, often along ethnic and religious lines. 372  Such politics of 
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recognition, I suggest, directly contributed to the inauguration of practices of hierarchical 
membership after statehood was proclaimed in territories formerly under Belgian and British 
rule. To be sure, practices of hierarchical membership existed also elsewhere, for example in 
those Asian territories formerly under British rule that were granted independence before and 
after 1960.373 My focus is, however, directed on Africa. It was there in fact that the 
application of resolution 1514, setting self-determination as the universal standard of 
legitimate membership and statehood after empire in the name of equality and human rights, 
was most striking.  
 
Differently from British colonialism, French and Portuguese empires had less clear-cut 
hierarchies, both being characterised by what are known as “assimilationist” practices. By no 
means did assimilationist practices make colonial regimes more equal. As Partha Chatterjee 
has argued, notwithstanding official discourses or policies, difference rested at the heart of 
any colonial empire.374 Imperial arguments about assimilation though made discrimination 
and hierarchy less visible, simply because they were more ambiguous. As Martin Shipway 
has argued, France’s claims to be seen as a “liberal” colonial power rested on the hierarchical 
integration of colonial dependencies in its constitutional structures.375  
 
While in British colonies difference was constructed along settled ethnic, kin, and religious 
group lines, in Portuguese and French colonies inclusion and exclusion were in great part the 
matter of individuals’ merit. Colonial authorities drew the line very clearly between citizens 
and subjects. However, in the case of certain French colonies, individual subjects could be 
granted more, or less, recognition in relation to their loyalty towards the empire. In particular 
during the Third République (1870-1940), Paris argued that indigenous people in Algeria who 
had become “civilised” could apply to become French citizens. However, they had to 
renounce local forms of civil law and meet increasingly high standards that, as argued by 
Frederick Cooper, only few could provide.376  
 
At the UN though, at time of the independences, inherited hierarchies within post-colonial 
states did not attract much interest. After all, they were set up within domestic states and 
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among domestic societies. If sovereign equality and non-interference were to be the norms 
governing international society, why would domestic hierarchies be a matter of international 
concern? The case of the “Harkis” from Algeria represented, perhaps, an exception. The 
Harkis were “French Muslims” who volunteered in the French army during the two world 
wars and later fought alongside France during the Algerian war. In exchange for their 
collaboration, during colonial rule they were granted greater public recognition as well as 
social and political rights.377 With the end of colonial rule, however, harkis were the object of 
widespread discrimination and violence on the side of the Algerian Front de Libération 
Nationale.378 Whereas concerns were raised at the UN, since these were individuals that had 
collaborated with France, the matter was promptly deemed as one of French concern.379  
 
In other words, in the Cold War interpretation of the UN Charter, domestic discriminations, 
although occasionally leading to extensive use of violence, did not constitute a threat to 
international peace and stability. Throughout the 1960s, discussions at the UN turned instead 
to those situations regarding the endurance of imperialism, strictly defined along a racial line. 
This was the role of the Special Committee of 24, established a year after the adoption of 
resolution 1514 and in charge of the implementation of the Declaration on Granting 
Independence to Colonial Peoples. Following resolution 1514, colonialism was defined as the 
“subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation [constituting] a 
denial of fundamental human rights (…) and an impediment to the promotion of world peace 
and cooperation.”380 Accordingly, the work of the Committee was almost exclusively directed 
to territories still under Portuguese rule. Until the death of Salazar in 1974 and the following 
demise of the dictatorship, Portugal continued to claim that colonies were a domestic matter, 
refusing to produce any kind of justification for its extremely violent practices. Discussions at 
the UN also increasingly concerned the situation of South Africa with regards to its Apartheid 
regime. In 1963, a special committee was formed to deal with the matter.  
 
Hierarchical membership within newly formed, independent states was thus not a question of 
international debate. Instead, put bluntly, it was largely associated with the view that because 
African states were weak, human rights violations were more recurrent. This view was also 
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conveyed in scholarly literature. Famously, in the study of International Relations, Robert 
Jackson made the argument that the human rights regime was codified as a reaction against 
the weakness of post-colonial states.381  
 
It should also be said that right after 1960, it seemed hard to conceive the endurance of a 
hierarchical culture within those very same states formed in the name of the liberationist 
principle of self-determination, to which so many hopes had been attached. However, whereas 
the hierarchical culture inherited within African post-colonial states was no longer visibly 
framed around a racial norm, ethnicity and other forms of local loyalty affiliation replaced 
it.382 It is widely acknowledged in the literature that ethnicity characterised a fundamental 
feature of African post-independence politics of state formation.383 Post-colonial scholars 
have shown the relevance of locating ethnicity and other kinship ties peculiar to post-imperial 
politics of recognition on a line of continuity with imperial systems of unequal treatment.384  
 
As said, explicit hierarchies in population groups, as in the case of former British colonies, 
did not always emerge. Moreover, not always were they institutionalised. In the case of 
former French colonies, for example, inherited assimilationist views in the understanding of 
membership and rights shaped post-imperial politics of state formation. Although they did not 
correspond to hierarchical membership as inaugurated in former British colonies, these should 
also be acknowledged, as they do represent a form of inherited hierarchy. 
 
The French Empire and its Legacies:  
Assimilation and Discrimination in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa 
 
Within French former colonies that gained independence in a peaceful way after resolution 
1514, logics of hierarchy were disguised under assimilationist discourses about inclusion in 
the political community. I want to argue that such informality was to a great extent the direct 
result of French colonial assimilationist policies. British membership-related practices were 
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grounded in explicit differential ideas. French officials instead propounded the illusion that 
sooner or later, all colonised people would become French citizens, that all colonies would be 
an integral part of France.385  
 
As Derek Heater stresses however, “imperial civic egalitarianism was never a possibility in 
the French colonial Empire.” 386  Within the Empire, discrimination was vested in the 
assimilationist model, but it went along two lines. First and foremost, of course, along a racial 
line, often justified in terms of cultural states of advancement. Second, along the “personal 
status” of each colonised individual.387 The British authorities’ official practice was to divide 
groups along (often imposed) kinship ties within each colony and to govern them. The French 
instead constructed the illusion that every colonised person could be granted greater 
entitlements if they adopted French values and adapted their behaviour to French standards of 
conduct. Of course, subject peoples were neither legally nor in practice ever treated as equals 
to French citizens. In the words of post-colonial philosopher Achille Mbembé: 
 
“Since the notion of citizen overlaps that of nationality, the colonised, being excluded from 
the vote, is not being simply consigned to the fringes of the nation, but is virtually a stranger 
in his/her home. The idea of political or civil equality – that is, of an equivalence among all 
inhabitants of the colony – is not the bond among those living in the colony. The figure of 
obedience and domination rests in the colony on the assertion that the state is under no social 
obligation to the colonised and this latter is owed nothing by the state but that which the state, 
in its infinite goodness, has designed to grant and reserves the right to revoke at any 
moment.”388 
 
During the Third République and until 1946, the claim to eventual equality for all was in fact 
countered by a set of laws known as the Code de l’Indigénat (“Indigenous code”). The code 
created a hierarchy of five separate legal statuses for people living in all the French colonial 
possessions.389 “French indigenous citizens” formed the first category, at the top of the 
membership pyramid. It included all settlers living in French colonies, likewise all the pieds 
noirs in Algeria, notwithstanding their country of origin. These individuals were fully-fledged 
French citizens, possessing the right to vote within the French polity and other corollary 
social rights that other individuals within the colonies could not have.390  
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 “French indigenous subjects” composed the second category. These were individuals who had 
French nationality but no citizenship and therefore no right to vote. The majority of colonised 
people, in particular in Africa, was included in this group. The third category was made up of 
French subjects with special status of évolués (evolved). The évolués were those indigenous 
peoples who, it was argued, had endorsed French values and behaviour and could therefore be 
granted greater entitlements. Seen as the products of French assimilation, évolués were treated 
as an élite among colonised people.391 Occasionally the special status implicated a territorially 
demarcated understanding of rights, as in the case of the inhabitants of the Four Communes in 
Senegal, or of or French Indian possessions. Interestingly, while they had the right to vote 
within their place of origin, they would lose their citizenship on leaving it. Often though, the 
status of évolué was granted in the name of an individual capacity.392 The fourth category was 
composed by “French protected indigenous” who were individuals native to French 
protectorates, without, however, French nationality. In fine, the last group was composed by 
the “French administered indigenous,” namely individuals living in Trusteeship Territories.  
 
The Code de l’Indigénat was legally abolished in 1946, coinciding with the creation of the 
French Union and proclamation of the Fourth République. Its new constitution declared: 
“France forms with its overseas people, a union grounded on the equality of rights and duties, 
without distinction of race nor religion.”393 In the final declaration of the 1944 Conference of 
Brazzaville, Charles de Gaulle had already recognised that citizens of French colonies would 
share the same rights as French citizens and that they would have the possibility to vote at the 
legislative elections. However, with respect to the right to vote for example, the existence of 
other legal norms simply impeded colonial peoples from being considered equals to French 
citizens.394 In 1945 de Gaulle formally allowed a limited number of indigenous Africans to 
vote, corresponding to the previous évolués. 395 What de Gaulle did not publicly state was that 
the voting procedure implied a separate voting system and the existence of different 
representatives for French citizens and colonised people. Nonetheless, following de Gaulle’s 
decision twenty Africans received a seat at the French Parliament. This was an extremely 
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limited number. Nonetheless, their election represented a fundamental step in fostering debate 
within the French parliament between French citizens and colonised people.  
 
The direct consequence of this political transformation was the endorsement by the First 
Constituent Assembly of the Fourth République of the Lamine-Guèye law. Adopted in May 
1946, it was the result of the work of the deputy mayor of Dakar and member of the French 
Parliament, Amadou Lamine-Guèye. The law granted citizenship to every individual 
originating from “overseas France” in the same way as to any French national from the 
métropole.396 Importantly though, the law did not state which citizenship it referred to. While 
French Union citizenship was granted to all, French citizenship was instead maintained only 
for French from the métropole. In addition, the law stated that special local regulations would 
control the criteria and means of allocation of citizenship. The membership system that 
emerged in 1946 delineated the allocation of rights in terms of merit. In the French empire, 
such hierarchy was formed vis-à-vis status and rights that each individual could potentially 
acquire.  
 
During the Fourth République, with the exception of some fringes of the Communist Party, 
the official discourse was that colonised individuals could progressively come to enjoy 
greater rights and economic benefits of being union citizens or partial French citizens of the 
empire. Assimilation continued to be strongly advocated through imperial institutions after 
World War II.397 It is important to note then that in this institutional context, differently from 
the British Empire, subject peoples’ claims did not, at least not right after the war, mirror 
demands of independence. Instead, they reflected claims for greater equality and recognition 
of both colonised individuals and colonies as political units. In everyday practice, however, 
colonised people were denied provisions for increased rights or autonomy.398 
 
In post-colonial Africa, the French colonial membership regime was largely mirrored in the 
early years of independences. While discrimination in the form of hierarchies existed, it took 
place informally at the local level and was not set up through national rules, which, on the 
contrary, advocated for the inclusion of all. Discrimination thus generally concerned who 
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could have access to the land and access to local judicial and social bodies.399 Ivory Coast in 
its first years of existence as an independent state was in this sense a case in point. In 1958, 
Ivoirians were asked, in a Constitutional Referendum held in all the French colonies, whether 
they accepted the new French Constitution that would include Ivory Coast in a new and 
greater French Community or whether they preferred independence. 99,9 % of the population 
voted for Ivory Coast to be an autonomous entity, to be part of the Franco-African unity.400 
Results in several francophone African colonies reflected a similar outcome. With the major 
exception of Guinea, populations voted to remain part of a broader alliance with France. 401 
These results, I suggest, challenge Daniel Philpott’s argument that subject peoples in French 
colonies took up arms to raise their voice against colonial rule more frequently than those 
living in the British Empire.402 They also bore witness, importantly, to the profound imprint 
of assimilationist policies in transitions towards independence.  
 
A year before independence, in 1959, Houphouet-Boigny, who was already serving as a 
minister in Paris and was strongly in favour of such an alliance with France, was proclaimed 
first president of Ivory Coast. His party, the Parti Démocratique de la Cote d’Ivoire, became 
the single political party in the country. While everyone who was a citizen of Ivory Coast 
could vote - following the Paris 1956 decision to expand universal suffrage to all subject 
peoples – electoral lists were limited to just one party.403 Immediately after his victory, a new 
Constitution was enacted in 1960. In democratic terms, the Constitution listed in its articles 3 
to 7 all fundamental and citizenship rights constituted around the inclusion of all. Tolerance 
towards colonial institutions and practices was stressed.404 However, with several local ethnic 
groups recognised within the country, Houphouet-Boigny managed to create a cartel of 
primary state, and secondary ethno-regional elites. In every region, all major ethnic groups 
were assured, according to their degree of collaboration with the political regime, greater 
entitlements through the setting up of informal rules.405  
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It seems interesting to note that even in post-independence Algeria, which had witnessed a 
major popular insurrection, radically calling into question French rule, assimilationist 
practices endured. During colonial rule, Algeria was the object of greater discrimination in 
comparison to other African colonies. Different statuses existed for native populations, 
hierarchically organised in relation to the rights granted (or denied) to them. 406 In line with 
French policies, with the exception of three specific legal categories, these were not 
formalised. While after 1946 all indigenous people living in Algeria were granted citizenship 
of the French Union, three further legal categories of individuals with special entitlements co-
existed in Algeria after World War II.407  
 
The first category included the so-called “Algerians” who were in fact all the pieds noirs - 
French and other settlers – possessing French citizenship. The second category comprised of 
“Muslims”. These were indigenous people that the French saw as developed enough to take 
part to some segments of French institutional life. A further group invented in 1944 
complemented this category: citoyens français à titre personnel. Differing from Muslims, 
these individuals were allowed to take part in French political life just like évolués, yet their 
citizenship status could not be transmitted from one generation to the next, being based in fact 
on personal merit.408 In fine, similarly to other colonies, after the war the rest of the 
population only had the citizenship of the French Union. In Algeria, citizens of the Union 
were allowed to take part in local elections. While all the inhabitants of Algeria could vote 
locally, two electoral systems coexisted, the vote of nine Muslims counting as the vote of one 
settler.409 The dominant assimilationist discourse of French colonisers disguised very deep 
inequalities. 
 
Daniel Philpott claims that French oppressive assimilationist practices led to the use of 
violence on the side of colonised indigenous people as the only available means for them to 
gain independence.410 I believe that Philpott makes an overstatement in including all French 
colonies in his argument. However, his argument is substantiated by the Algerian case. 
Differing from many other African colonies, Algeria was administratively a fully-fledged 
French overseas department. French argued that l’Algérie c’est la France (“Algeria is 
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France”)– a slogan that was only abandoned in 1962 after the Evian Agreements bringing the 
war to an end and proclaiming the emergence of an independent Algeria. As Philpott claims, 
the war - viewed as civil war by French and as war of liberation by native population - created 
a strong consciousness of national unity.  
 
The constitution of a myth of an Algerian commonality, excluding settlers and collaborators, 
however, led almost ironically to the establishment after 1962 of strongly assimilationist 
membership practices – although categories had been reversed. A political regime of Marxist 
orientation advocated the equality of all, along with a national and civic identification to the 
state.411 After independence, though, as many authors have stressed, assimilation concerned 
the materialisation of an Arab-Islamic identity, in fine recognised.412 Sporadic events called 
into question Algerian assimilationist practices, such as the Berber 1963 uprising. These were 
immediately constrained.413 It was only in the 1980s that assimilationist policies started to be 
radically called into question by groups that sought greater political and religious recognition, 
against the one party that had dominated the national political scene since 1962: the Front de 
Libération Nationale. Whereas post-independence politics of state formation in Algeria are 
generally associated with a modernist effort, it is not implausible to consider the setting up of 
strongly assimilationist policies as being in continuity with logics of empire, inherited 
domestically. 
 
In numerous post-colonial states, formerly French colonies, discrimination followed 
assimilationist discourses. François Bayart has associated these with what he terms “the 
politics of the belly,” namely the tendency in post-independence Africa to privilege certain 
individuals and groups over others, in the interest of the political and economic interests of 
ruling élites.414 This is certainly true. In this section, however, I have suggested that it is not 
impossible to think in terms of a legacy of assimilationist norms and practices in how 
membership was understood (and thus privileges that Bayard refers to, allocated) in post-
colonial states formerly under French rule. Although these were not characterised by explicit 
hierarchical membership, informal hierarchies often persisted, as political élites officially 
endorsed assimilationist discourses. In former British colonies that had peacefully acquired 
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statehood, the story was different. As we shall see, here practices of hierarchical membership 
were instead instigated largely in explicit continuity with previous imperial politics of 
recognition.  
 
The British Empire and its Legacies:  
Ethnicity and Membership in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa 
 
Not often enough are works outside of academia recognised as useful for scholarly 
consideration. The film Burn! is a clear illustration of this trend.415 Overlooked both by 
academics and cinema critics, the film, loosely set in the 19th century, after the 1833 British 
Abolition of Slavery Act, on an imaginary Caribbean island, gives a timeless portrait of 
British divide and rule policies. In his 1969 film, Gillo Pontecorvo tells the story of an agent 
provocateur, interpreted by Marlon Brando, sent by the British Crown to the island of 
Queimada, a fictional Portuguese colony. Brando’s character is in charge of organising an 
insurrection of black slaves, in order to overthrow the Portuguese colonial government of the 
island. Britain wants to get the control of the island, an important sugar cane producer. 
Britain’s plan is, once the insurrection is overcome, to replace Portuguese authorities with 
white landowner inhabitants of the island, thereby creating a system of indirect control and 
membership hierarc, through the formation of a privileged group.  
 
In parallel, to convince the slaves to rise against Portuguese authorities, Brando’s character 
persuades them to fight for their liberation and freedom using discourses of rights : why 
should they continue to be slaves while they could, with the help of the British, acquire 
recognition for their work and have a voice as to the organisation of their activities in the 
plantations? This is actually the plan that Marlon Brando’s character exposes to the white 
latifundists of the island - the idea being to transform slaves into a working class, still 
dominated, but believing themselves to have reached collective empowerment. In his work 
Colonialism in Question, Cooper makes exactly the same point: hierarchies were locally 
established within British colonies through the setting up of divide and rule policies and the 
transposition, although loosely, of the British class system.416 To be sure, Pontecorvo’s film is 
an imaginary piece of work. It presents, however, with a touch of political activism, the broad 
picture of British policies of divide and rule, and their setting up in the name of progress and 
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civilisational development. It represents an engaging ground from to gain insight into the 
British colonial membership regime. 
 
British imperial policies in Africa were characterised by a membership system clearly 
delineating hierarchies of status. Two types of hierarchies existed: hierarchies specific to each 
colony and hierarchies ordering the empire as a whole.417 Within the Empire as a whole, until 
1948, four categories of membership existed: the British citizen, the subject, the British 
protected person – in practice often coinciding with the subject - and the alien. With the 
enactment of the Nationality Act in 1948, British authorities made an attempt to clarify 
imperial citizenship law.418 While this was not the case before, the traditional status of 
“British subject”, which was remodelled into “commonwealth citizen”, became a derivative 
status, for the new concept of citizenship for each territory member of the commonwealth.419 
Each individual was thus to be citizen of a specific commonwealth territory, in order to be 
able to get what was, until 1981, British citizenship.  
 
Similarly to the French case, British, or commonwealth citizenship was different from that of 
the United Kingdom. While, within the empire, everything was done to make the difference 
seem superfluous, the hierarchy of statuses was clearly visible at the international level. 
Commonwealth citizenship was not recognised as a legal status outside the empire. Subject 
peoples from British colonies (with the exception of British dominions) thus were, as a matter 
of fact, stateless. Colonies did not have a citizenship status for themselves - citizenship being 
then the prerogative of independent states. It could be said then that the 1948 Nationality Act 
carefully crafted the hierarchy between citizens and subjects, vesting actual discrimination, in 
the semblance of an increasing equality. Such a move was framed - both legally and 
politically - on the guarantee of more equality between citizens and subjects. In practice, this 
was by no means the case.  
 
The 1948 Nationality Act brought in fact a “delocalisation” of citizenship status. Colonial 
governors became those determining, locally, who could be granted or denied access to 
commonwealth citizenship and local recognition. Loosely following London’s instructions as 
to residence requirements for citizenship allocation, British colonial officers were in practice 
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the sole decision makers. Within colonial territories this led to the introduction of further sub-
categories of membership and, likewise, to the enforcement of divide and rule polices. 
Historically, divide and rule policies favoured ethnic and religious groups most closely 
collaborating with British authorities. After 1948, access of privileged groups to 
commonwealth citizenship and to local entitlements was also facilitated. For other groups and 
individuals, in contrast, procedures were often complicated and delayed.420  
 
Colonial authorities were to decide, in loco, who could be included and who could be 
excluded from access to local membership and to commonwealth citizenship. Ultimately, the 
latter was a status that did not have rights attached to it. Colonial rulers instead would define 
the allocation of entitlements not upon the status of an individual, but in relation to their 
affiliation with a more, or less, privileged group.421 
 
From World War II, colonial authorities were increasingly aware that local populations 
sought forms of increased recognition and expression. As pointed out by Andrew Cohen, head 
of the African division, in 1946 “[there exists] a rapidly increasing political consciousness 
among Africans, a rapid extension of the educated class and the special problem of returned 
soldiers.”422 This, Cohen claimed, risked undermining the legitimacy of colonial rule in 
certain colonies.423 If colonial authorities did not act to recognise greater entitlements to 
colonial populations, he feared, confidence in colonial institutions would be lost. Now, it was 
feared, western-educated élites and returned soldiers socialised by western discourses about 
rights and socialist ideas might spread their beliefs to local populations. How would it be 
possible to contain claims in an uncontested way if colonial peoples appealed to the same 
rights language used in Great Britain? Colonial authorities were afraid of the consequences 
that this contact could have on local populations. As put by Frederick Cooper, “struggles for 
rights, rather than rights themselves, kept contaminating the institution of empire.”424 
 
Fearing a possible loss of control over subject peoples, colonial authorities initiated a set of 
political concessions that would empower, although in a limited manner, African indigenous 
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people.425 In the years following the war, the Colonial Office granted to autochthonous 
populations political recognition and right to political association. Within colonies unions and 
political parties could be, at least in theory, formed.426 This, in turn, implied that populations 
were entitled to vote and be granted a greater degree of recognition, if not within the colony, 
at least within the units of each colony.427 This type of western political association first 
developed in urban areas and rapidly expanded to the countryside. Political affiliation largely 
followed ethnic and religious criteria – those very same categories of recognition and 
differentiation that British officials had carefully stressed over decades. If not in the colony as 
a whole, locally political parties largely reflected kinship bonds. Accordingly, as elections 
were increasingly held, votes were cast following the same criteria of affiliation.  
 
Again though, who could exercise the right to vote was the matter of resident colonial 
authorities’ decision. Of course, even those who were allocated the right to vote were 
discriminated, as their vote would count less than those of settlers. The discriminatory 
electoral formula that was to be applied was set up in February 1949 at the Victoria Falls 
Conference. The votes of 100 Africans equated to the vote of one settler.428 Africans had 
separate electoral lists on the ground of race, and separate types of representation, along both 
racial and ethnic lines. After all, as Oliver Stanley, Colonial Secretary during the second half 
of World War II, stated in 1943:“it is not part of our policy to confer political advances which 
are unjustified by circumstances or to grant self-government to those who are not yet trained 
in its use.”429 The establishment of trade unions and political parties related to clearly justified 
circumstances. After the war, imperial rule and benevolent practices attached to it had to be 
reaffirmed.  
 
Some fifteen years later, though, things had very much changed. At the UN, institutionalised 
systems of unequal treatment and colonial empires had lost ground. Intellectuals and political 
groups regularly appealed to a language of (political) rights shared internationally. Those very 
rights that British authorities had so carefully allocated to reassert the primacy of imperial 
authority after the war became the source of imperial delegitimation itself. Even throughout 
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the 1950s, colonial officers continued to describe self-government as a lengthy reform.430 In 
Africa, Westminster claimed, the route to self-government was still very long. Though a 
Trusteeship Territory, Ghana’s independence in 1957 highlighted that colonies would be able 
to reach some form of self-government faster than previously expected. 1960 transformed 
such presumption into a certainty. In recognising the array of new states that emerged after 
the adoption of resolution 1514, Britain acknowledged the end of formal colonial rule. 
Colonial settlers and officers progressively left British Africa, whereas London started to look 
for new forms of association with its former colonies. The formal process of decolonisation, 
implying the devolution of power and institutions to newly proclaimed local authorities, was 
set in motion, taking often several years to be completed.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Philpott argues that British decolonisation took place peacefully, in 
contrast to French decolonisation, which was comparatively more violent.431 He explains this 
alleged contrast by claiming that while in both empires revolutionary ideas gained power, the 
kind of decolonisation that followed depended on the type of extant colonial membership 
policies. Because of British explicitly differential policies, Philpott contends, the use of 
violence was not needed by either of the two sides: subject peoples had already some kind of 
recognition and British authorities did not need to respond to growing claims with arms. 
British practices, Philpott claims, created sufficient space for identification and autonomy that 
subject peoples used to construct their revolutionary ideas, leading to independence.432 
However, it would seem that any insight into local processes of decolonisation simply 
undermines Philpott’s arguments. Moreover, his distinction between the “small conflicts” 
that, he claims, characterised the end of British Empire, and the more lengthy and violent ones 
that characterised the end of the French Empire seems rather questionable. Certainly the 
Algerian war lasted eight years, but so did the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, where British 
officers made extensive use of torture. The use of violence was obscured by racial worldviews 
and justifications by British officials that the conflict was a matter of “domestic” concern. I 
believe though that it is deeply equivocal to use the degree of internationalisation of a 
colonial conflict to qualify it as “big” or “small”. 
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Reus-Smit’s broader argument about the end of colonialism is instead far more convincing. 
Reus-Smit contends that independence was gained much more peacefully after the adoption 
of resolution 1514 than, proportionally, before the institutionalisation of self-determination 
(with the exception of the Portuguese colonies.) He suggests that resolution 1514 both 
empowered colonial peoples and delegitimised violence on the side of colonial powers to 
retain power.433 The UN successfully created a normative space for rights claims and claims 
to self-determination to resonate internationally. Domestically however, within the new states 
formed after resolution 1514 in the very name of the norm of self-determination, hierarchy 
often continued to exist. In former British colonies, this took the form of practices of 
hierarchical membership. Almost paradoxically, it seems that the more peaceful and 
uncontested the end of colonial rule was, the more formalised practices of hierarchical 
membership were.  
 
In the first years of existence of numerous African states formerly under British rule, ethnicity 
constituted a major criterion of hierarchical membership (along with other kinship ties.) In the 
colonial era, indirect rule in particular had favoured the establishment of ethnicised structures 
of belonging and recognition. As put by Mamdami, “through the combination of a state-
sanctioned and ethnically-defined custom informed by a state-appointed and ethnically-
labelled ‘customary (native) authority,’ colonial powers tried to fragment the subject 
population for a racialised majority to several separate ethnicised minorities.”434 Constructed 
in its modern form through the encounter of local logics of membership with British norms 
and institutions, for decades politicised ethnicity had been a tool of control over local 
populations. This however, signified that it had also been internalised by indigenous 
populations. As such, it had also represented an instrument of indigenous revolt, as the Mau 
Mau uprising and Kikuyu identity illustrate. Ethnicity was the available, but also the natural 
means on which the organisation of domestic order would be grounded.435 The analogy has 
already been drawn between ethnicity and class in several British colonial and post-colonial 
contexts in the immediate post-independence years.436 Often with independence, empowered 
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groups during colonial rule became, through the institutional and administrative devolution of 
power, national ruling classes.  
 
After independence, ethnicity did not always appear explicitly within domestic pieces of 
legislation. It was, instead, generally used as the criteria for political affiliation, party and 
union membership. Following the suggestions of British officials that “helped” newly 
proclaimed authorities to frame national laws, imperial citizenship laws were often simply 
transferred to the domestic legislations of new states and adapted.437 Post-independence 
citizenship acts nominally defined the modes of allocation and denial of membership status. 
As a result, citizenship was largely defined in legal terms as a mere status. Whereas the model 
of the nation-state had been imposed upon former colonial people, the western understanding 
of citizenship, implying a set of well identified political, civil and social rights, had been 
absent during colonial rule and was absent within post-independence legislations. In turn, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly, human rights and fundamental freedoms (attached to the right of self-
determination internationally understood) were regularly referenced. This was somehow a 
paradox. The importance of political rights was stated in several UN resolutions, defining 
them as the means to exercise popular will. Within national laws, however, their exercise was 
often separated from the status of citizenship itself.438   
 
The major exception to this general trend was embodied by Tanganyika, later Tanzania that 
used to be a Mandate territory and later Trust territory. Openly endorsing a socialist ideology, 
its president Julius Nyerere, believed that ethnicity was counter-revolutionary. He therefore 
promoted in the first years after independence a national, Tanzanian, identity based on the 
idea of equality of all.439 In other words, Nyerere depicted ethnic identity and other kinship 
ties as undermining the bases of the political community and withheld them from public 
discourse. Nyerere argued for an African socialism, emphasising collective responsibility over 
the individual. This, he advocated, was closer to “traditional” African forms of society than to 
western models.  
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In several other domestic contexts, however, hierarchical membership following kinship lines 
often prevailed quite explicitly, though equality was formally mentioned.440 This was the case 
in particular in more conservative regimes that maintained continuities with colonial 
institutional and administrative systems following independence. Often, British officials were 
replaced with local élites and with those groups that locally supported such élites, through 
systems of coalitions. Differently from former French colonies, practices of hierarchical 
membership were set up in continuity with British colonial practices, as shown by the case of 
Nigeria. Ethnic distinctions insidiously took over the racial line.  
 
Politics of State Formation in Nigeria (1959-1967) 
 
Nigeria gained independence in 1960. From then on, ethnic and religious affiliations were, in 
continuity with colonial policies, regularly used as grounds to include or exclude individuals 
from full membership in the political community. Hierarchical membership was highly 
formalised both legally and in political behaviour. This formalisation led to an extensive use 
of violence on the side of the various ethnic groups recognised. Though displaying greater 
discriminatory norms and practices when compared to other former colonies of the British 
Empire, Nigeria is a particularly relevant case to be studied, both because of the pervasive 
violence and because of the resurge of self-determination claims domestically. These fostered 
international debate in the 1960s and 1970s though not at the UN. It was civil society and 
non-governmental organisations that started to question the boundaries of the idea of self-
determination as defined after 1960.441 Accordingly, first I present the history and politics of 
Nigeria in the initial years following independence, drawing the line between colonial and 
post-colonial hierarchical membership. I then discuss the implications of hierarchical 
membership for the use of extensive violence in the country leading to the proclamation of 
Biafran secession.  
 
History and politics of Nigeria in the post-independence years 
 
In 1960s Nigeria, hierarchical membership went along two lines: one national and one local. 
At the central level, discriminatory practices were set up with the support of legal norms. 
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Since its creation by Britain in 1914, Nigeria had been internally divided into three main 
ethnic regions. After independence, these regions continued to constitute the national 
organisational rationale, both territorial and administrative. The Northern Region was the 
largest, but also the poorest and most rural. Demographically, it was constituted by an 
aggregate of recognised minorities, among which the Hausa-Fulani constituted the widest 
group. The Western Region was instead richer and more urban. Under colonial rule, it hosted 
major commercial and administrative activities in which the Yoruba, the principal regional 
ethnic group, participated – obviously within the limits of those posts opened to Africans. The 
Eastern Region, the last of the three, accommodated until 1960 the bulk of colonial settlers. 
The Igbo people that lived in that region, the third main ethnic group of Nigeria, were 
generally perceived in the rest of the colony as westernised and richer, closely collaborating 
with British officials.  
 
Accordingly, Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbos were the three main groups recognised by 
British authorities; they were also the groups with more legal entitlements within national 
legislation after independence. The approximate remaining 40% of the population that did not 
identify with these groups but with other minorities was, and continued to be after 
independence, excluded from political recognition, although acknowledged within 
demographic censuses.442 The political and social structure of colonial Nigeria was thus 
maintained after independence, with power being transferred directly to those loyal 
individuals that had most closely collaborated with British authorities: the Igbos. While all 
Nigerians were formally equal citizens, individuals were still compartmentalised in ethnic 
groups. The spirit of the pre-1960 claims to access to land, of the struggles for social rights, 
and for the end of colonial rule was not really reflected in the post-independence 
discriminatory national political agenda.443  
 
With regards to legal citizenship, provisions were inclusive for the population already living 
or born in the country. For those individuals born after 1960, the jus sanguinis criterion was 
instead preferred to the territorial one. According to the 1960 Constitution, Nigerian 
authorities had the discretionary prerogative to decide by unqualified administrative 
procedures to deprive any individual of national citizenship, without the possibility for the 
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injured party to appeal at all.444 Importantly, dual citizenship was not permitted.445 This was a 
common clause in post-colonial Citizenship Acts and constitutions. It was articulated to urge 
British settlers to leave or at least to exclude them from the national body politic, forcing 
them to opt either for British or Nigerian citizenship – the latter being rarely chosen. All other 
individuals belonging to any “community indigenous to Nigeria” could seek citizenship 
status.446  
 
The possibility to discriminate on ethnic grounds was allowed with far less transparency 
through other legal means. To satisfy internal groups’ claims, but also strengthening divide 
and rule policies, in 1954 the British enacted a new constitution that institutionalised the three 
constitutive regions of Nigeria, allowing for greater local autonomy. The 1960 independence 
Constitution recognised the regions’ borders.447 These were drawn along ethnic lines, in 
relation to the three core recognised groups within Nigeria. Discontent was widespread. On 
the one hand, unrepresented minorities under colonial rule argued for the creation of special 
regions in which they would be recognised. On the other hand, each of the three main groups 
demanded greater shares of territory, so as to include their respective members. The legal 
provision was, however, reinforced in 1963, with the enactment of the second Constitution, 
transforming Nigeria into a federation. From 1963, each region had its own constitution, 
government, legislature, civil service and judiciary. The central government dealt with 
national defence and public policies. A fourth region, the Mid-West, was also added to the list 
in order to satisfy representation claims of those minorities living in the no man’s lands 
between the three regions.448  
 
In applying inherited colonial administrative boundaries, Jonathan Hill has argued, “the 
architects of the post-independence political settlement had hoped to minimise the frictions 
between [the groups]. Each was to be governed by those of their own kind, by individuals 
who shared the same values, religion and language.”449 However, several inconsistencies 
were attached to this project. First, this constitutional “consociational” system disregarded 
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any other minority within each of the three constitutive regions. It strengthened instead the 
position of, respectively for each region, Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbos. Second, the 1963 
federal constitutions were articulated in a very ambiguous way. They impeded individuals 
changing place of residence and moving to another federal unit from having access to certain 
services and, importantly, to political participation. The allocation of rights was not conceived 
in relation to the place of residence. It was the place of origin that was to be decisive, just like 
under colonial rule, underlying the centrality of ethnicity in the understanding of membership. 
Co-ethnics were therefore favoured regionally, while others were a priori excluded from 
access to certain rights. While within one of the three ethnic regions members of the two other 
main groups were recognised at the national level and could, at least in principle, ask for more 
equality, unrecognised minorities, instead, were totally excluded from any form of collective 
appeal.  
 
Divisions inherited from colonial empire were more apparent within the domestic and 
regional party systems.450 As within other African British colonies, Nigerian people were 
allowed to set up structured political parties and unions during World War II. From then on, 
in Nigerian political life was organised around a tripartite system defined along ethnic and 
kinship lines.451 The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), born to be a 
pan-Nigerian party and led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, became soon after World War II an Igbo-
dominated organisation based in the Eastern Region.452 The Action Group (AG), led by 
Obafemi Awolowo and born in the West to forestall Igbo control, overtly promoted Yoruba 
identity. In the North, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was even more exclusive, 
explicitly allowing political membership only to those individuals originating from a northern 
indigenous group. In practice, only Hausa-Fulani leaders directed the NPC, Tafawa Balewa 
being its main representative. During the 1950s and until 1966, these three parties constituted 
the core of Nigerian political life both nationally, at the level of the central government and 
regionally, forming respective local oppositions and coalitions.  
 
A year before independence, at the 1959 elections, none of the three parties won a majority at 
the central level. This led the two parties that won most seats, the NCNC and the NPC, to 
form a governmental coalition, with an Igbo president, Azikiwe, and a Hausa-Fulani prime 
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minister, Balewa. Despite repeated frictions the alliance continued to function until 1964, 
when, following the release of the population census, political and ethnic tensions started to 
deeply divide both the country and the regions. In the Northern Region the NPC local 
government did not hesitate to violently obstruct other candidates, so as to impede them on 
filling in their nomination papers. Before the elections even took place, these candidates were 
dismissed, allowing the de facto victory of 67 NPC candidates.453 Again, regional and 
national opposition to those results did not prevent Balewa from making official the results. 
The AG commissioned then what came to be known as “operation wetie”. The operation 
consisted, very simply, in setting political opponents’ and supporters’ properties on fire.454 As 
a result, Akintola, the successor of Awolowo at the leadership of the AG, was accused of 
electoral fraud and was in fact assassinated some months after. Violence spread all over the 
country.  
 
In January 1966, a military coup was organised. The coup was directed by a group of Igbo 
militaries who sought to reassert Igbo predominance within national institutions and to 
exclude Hausa-Fulani from state offices. General Ironsi, who, for a very short time, became 
head of state, led the coup. The Igbo attempt was, however, frustrated a few months later, in 
June 1966, when a group of militaries originating from small Northern minorities directed a 
second coup. Interestingly, as Ademoyega, one of the officials in charge of the second coup 
later stated in his memoirs, many saw the second coup as a way to bring about revolution in 
what had been for decades an Igbo dominated land.455 General Gowon instantly proclaimed 
himself head of state of the newly formed military government.  
 
Hierarchical membership led to an escalation of violence and tensions throughout the country. 
General Gowon set up a policy of what he termed “de-igboisation”, dispossessing Igbo people 
of their lands and discarding them from governmental and high positions, while favouring 
instead constitutional dialogue with the AG.456 At the same time, violence erupted in the 
Northern Region where, between May and September 1966, 80 000 to 100, 000 individuals 
identified with Igbos and other Eastern group minorities were killed.457 Colonel Ojukwu, who 
had been previously appointed military governor of the Eastern Region by Ironsi, called for 
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Igbos living outside the Eastern Region to return to their land of origin. Around one million 
Igbos responded to his call.458 
 
On 27th May 1967 the Eastern region declared secession from Nigeria and the consequent 
formation of the Independent Republic of Biafra, in the name of self-determination. Gowon 
declared the act unconstitutional. The newly proclaimed “Republic” was totally isolated when 
the civil war started. Its isolation lasted for three years, until 1970, when the Igbo “rebels” 
laid down their arms.459 Interestingly, in 1967 Gowon justified the use of arms against the 
seceding Igbos by support of the constitutional understanding of rights. Following the 
recommendations of the British-led Wikkink Commission, both 1960 and 1963 constitutions 
contained provisions about human rights, based on the partial appropriation of certain clauses 
stated within the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.460 Ten rights were actually 
recognised within the two constitutions, out of twenty-eight stated within the Declaration.461 
However, in both constitutions the legal clause on the recognition of human rights proclaimed 
the possibility for state authorities to derogate from the respect of certain fundamental rights 
in so-called “emergency situations”.462 Those special rights from which derogation was 
possible were the right to life, the right to personal liberty and, importantly for us, the right 
not to be discriminated. A simple decision of the parliament sufficed to establish such 
derogation. In 1967 Gowon proclaimed nationally a situation of emergency. This was the eve 
of the Biafran civil war.463  
 
Highlighting practices of hierarchical membership: the case of the Igbos 
 
The general picture regarding membership practices and the understanding of rights in the 
first years of independent Nigeria appears to be fairly complex. Practices of hierarchical 
membership were set up with the assistance of several legal provisions. The content of the 
formed categories was in continuity with previous imperial politics. Hierarchies at first 
followed imperial lines, but soon after independence started to fluctuate, reflecting changing 
political coalitions. The Nigerian political landscape in fact rapidly changed between the first 
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years of independence, and the years preceding the Biafra war. It was the 1963 elections 
perhaps that constituted, however, the major turning point. While 1960 independence was set 
in continuity with colonial culture and hierarchical membership, 1963 crystallised the 
changing demographic and political game, the Hausa-Fulani becoming politically, socially 
and economically the dominant ethnic group in Nigeria.464  
 
Before independence and until 1963, Igbos constituted the top of the pyramid of membership 
rights. During colonial rule, they were favoured as to their presence within political and 
economic institutions resulting from their close collaboration with British officials.465 The 
Yoruba were second in the hierarchy, followed by the Hausa-Fulani, largely viewed as poor 
and uneducated.466 In the 1950s, several minority groups living in the middle of the colony 
had organised to set up a political party and seek greater recognition. These were the same 
groups later seeking for the creation of a fourth region in independent Nigeria.467 Other 
minorities were largely unrecognised, unless closely collaborating with Igbos and thereby 
with the British authorities. Consequently, despite being acknowledged within censuses, 
individuals not identifying with one of the three constitutive ethnic groups of Nigeria were 
simply not granted political recognition. Conversely, because the British allocated political 
representation, as well as social and economic advantages on collective grounds, individuals 
of Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani origin were allowed or denied, in the name of their 
affiliation, access to specific entitlements.  
 
Until 1959, the colonial, ethnically based recognition system remained practically unchanged. 
Yet with the 1959 elections, Igbo political élites realised that if they wanted to maintain their 
power they had to constitute an alliance with a numerically strong political party. Because of 
the electoral law established by British officials, granting more seats at the Parliament to the 
most populous region, the Igbo-led NCNC decided for an alliance with the NPC, the Northern 
party. The Yoruba were bluntly relegated to the bottom of the scale, being forbidden to join 
national political bodies and cabinets.468  
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In parallel, each region had at its own level different hierarchies reflecting internal systems of 
coalition and cooperation. In the Western region for example, Yorubas regularly prevented all 
Igbos from access to residence certificates and social services, as under colonial rule. In the 
Northern Region, in turn, individuals identified with the Igbo people were granted access to 
political representation. The Yoruba, however, were generally excluded from membership 
within the local political community, through more, or less, violent means. In fine, in the 
Eastern Region Igbos primarily favoured those minorities that collaborated with them, while 
from 1959, physically and administratively excluding Yoruba individuals.  
 
After the release of the 1963 census, though, the Nigerian political and social landscape 
changed. Fearing the predominance of the Hausa-Fulani and other northern groups, Igbos 
sought to reassert their leadership at the central level. Inevitably, the census marked the end of 
the political coalition between the Igbos and the Hausa-Fulani. The rapidity of these events 
led to an escalation of violence, directed in particular against Igbos who, in 1966 sought to 
reassert their dominance through a military coup. In 1966, the Hausa-Fulani were excluded 
from any official position and, at the regional level, Igbos started to threaten all those 
individuals that contested the new homogenising policy, notwithstanding their ethnic 
affiliation.469 In turn, those individuals identified with Igbos living in the Northern Region 
were harassed, dispossessed of their belongings and sometimes killed. Northern groups 
perceived them as the cause of their exclusion and oppression over decades. In the North, 
Igbos could not have access to residence certificates allowing them to vote, and they were 
excluded from any social or educational service. These local exclusions had implications 
nationally. By being denied residence certificates locally they could not exercise their right to 
vote nationally.  
 
With the second coup, those exclusions were extended to all individuals identified with the 
Igbo community living outside the Eastern region. Nationally, the Igbos were simply 
excluded from any type of political representation. The new military junta set up a strong 
anti-Igbo policy. In turn, within their region of “origin”, Igbos enjoyed the support of a very 
limited number of minorities – the Efik and the Ijaw. Individuals identifying with other 
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groups that did not collaborate with the Igbos were, if they had not left before, repeatedly 
harassed.470 Such violent practices went on until the Eastern Region declared its secession.  
 
While Nigeria presented the most violent array of practices of hierarchical membership 
developed in the newly independent states formerly under British rule, those practices were 
not as violent in all British colonies. In Kenya, for example, President Kenyatta managed to 
maintain an equivocal position in the early years following independence. Constantly 
referring to the equality and inclusion of all Kenyans, in practice Kikuyu individuals were 
privileged, though these practices were not legally articulated, or clearly institutionalised.471 
In their first years of existence as independent states, Nigeria and Kenya were representatives 
of two distinct patterns. In-between these cases, a wide range of more, or less, discriminatory 
practices emerged during the politics of state formation of African states, formerly British 
colonies. In Uganda for example, as in Nigeria, hierarchical membership led to the extensive 
use of violence. The manifestation of hierarchical membership as well as their degree of 
institutionalisation changed from state to state, according to local histories and decolonisation 
experiences.  
 
The case of Nigeria is particularly interesting for this thesis, as the increasing use of domestic 
violence and the Igbos’ declaration of secession as an ill-treated Nigerian minority opened up, 
again, questions about the meaning of self-determination. The act of (unrecognised) secession 
was grounded in the same phrase, “self-determination,” that less than a decade earlier had 
been embedded in the language of human rights. At the UN, the matter was carefully avoided: 
self-determination concerned alien subjugation and state formation after empire. It did not 
relate to the rights of minorities within states. 472 A whole range of other international actors 
underlined, however, that the question of self-determination had not just been solved with the 
end of decolonisation: 
 
“For Biafra’s supporters, the carving of a new state out of the remnants of Nigeria offered an 
opportunity to challenge the dominant conception of self-determination as nothing more than an act of 
decolonisation. To backers of Nigeria, Biafra was an omen of things to come if more expansive 
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definitions of self-determination gained traction in international law and state practice, threatening 
state fragmentation and the balkanisation of the African continent.”473 
 
Meanwhile, non-governmental organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières and the 
International Committee for the Red Cross raised international awareness on the treatment of 
populations within domestic borders. MSF in particular propounded humanitarian 
intervention in Biafra in the name of that very right to self-determination and human rights 
that had been crafted over the first two decades following World War II.474 The “Charter 
pluralism” that characterised the UN in the Cold War era, however, marked, in the name of 
sovereign equality, the reluctance of the organisation to “question seriously the democratic or 
humanitarian credentials of its members.”475  
 
Post-Colonial Order and the (Supposed) End of International Hierarchies? 
 
In the 1960s, as self-determination had been allocated through international ruling, every 
internationally recognised state was an equal member of the UN. As such, it enjoyed the same 
rights and prerogatives as other members: sovereign equality and non-interference. When 
self-determination was recognised for territories formally under colonial rule, what happened 
there domestically was thus not to be a matter of primary concern for the UN. However, I 
want to suggest here that international society’s detachment, for example as with regards to 
Nigeria, by no means signified the end of international judgements as to domestic practices.  
 
Most visibly, as post-colonial scholars argue, hierarchies of status between new and old states 
were replaced by arguments about the economic development of the “Third World,” made by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.476 International financial institutions 
required post-colonial states to adapt (and “develop”) towards a market economy. A strong 
reaction against this form of dominance came in the 1960s and 1970s from post-colonial 
Asian and African states, calling for economic self-sufficiency, through, for example, the 
establishment of the New International Economic Order.477  
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In this space, though, I would like to discuss an aspect related to political, rather than 
economic self-determination. When compared to the interwar years, and then later to the 
1990s, the Cold War seems to represent some sort of historical parenthesis as far as the 
politics of self-determination are concerned - a parenthesis during which, in international 
practice, judgement on domestic order was restrained. At the same time, though, from 1960 
onwards, self-determination came to be entrenched, as we have seen, in the international 
human rights regime. All “people” around the globe were entitled to choose their own form of 
government in the name of self-determination. However, the very same principle was 
concurrently being assimilated within a wider liberal discourse at the UN, through its 
association with human rights - and thereby with the protection of individuals and their rights 
beyond state boundaries. In other words, whereas domestic societies were theoretically 
entitled to exercise their free political will, self-determination was also entrenched within a 
specific normative universe restricting, in some sense, the range of legitimate political 
practices and identities. This was – and still is - a normative arrangement to which old and 
new states had to formally agree (rather than, perhaps, conform to) as a requirement for 
membership in international society.  
 
Hence, I endorse the argument previously advanced by other scholars: that human rights came 
to represent, after 1945, a new standard upon which a judgement on the domestic behaviour 
of (old and new) states could be made. 478 This judgement has coincided with the international 
definition of appropriate identity and behaviour, through the globalisation of a certain, liberal, 
order at the UN. This normative development, however, has also been paralleled by the global 
formalisation of yet another set of norms on state freedom and sovereign equality. This type 
of normative contradiction, Stephen Krasner tells us, should certainly not come as a surprise 
as, the international system has been characterised historically by a “variety of often mutually 
inconsistent principles that have been used to legitimate policy.”479 In a way not dissimilar to 
Krasner Reus-Smit has argued (though this has led him to different implications) specifically 
for the post-1945 era that an “inherently contradictory modern discourse” reuniting 
sovereignty and human rights as two elements of a single conception of order has 
characterised international relations.480  
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In the years following 1960, post-colonial territories thus gained their right to self-
determination and independence in an international context characterised by an ambivalent 
discourse. This has been a discourse revealing on the one hand logics of toleration of diverse 
domestic practices and identity, and on the other, liberal expectations about appropriate 
domestic order accompanied by an intolerance towards those that do not conform. It is my 
sense that this has been an ambivalent discourse that the post-colonial understanding of self-
determination has fully embodied. On the one hand, self-determination has implied the idea 
(and practice) of free political will, without interference. On the other hand, at the UN self-
determination has been associated with the language of human rights and thus to a specific set 
of expectations about appropriate behaviour and identity.  
 
Whereas international concern about domestic behaviour was not necessarily translated into 
practice after 1960, I want to make the point, here, that judgements on the matter took more 
elusive forms following the apogee of decolonisation. With decolonisation, supervisory 
regimes retreated, due to norms of sovereign equality and non-interference upheld at the UN, 
but perhaps also because decolonisation was occurring beyond the eastern and western blocs. 
While hierarchies were not mentioned in practice, not after the redefinition of the 
international order in egalitarian terms, hierarchical worldviews took more ambiguous forms. 
Although this is a tentative proposition that I do hope to develop in later work, it is my sense 
that, specifically in relation to human rights, hierarchical views were reconstituted in 
scholarly arguments.  
 
In fact, it was in the 1980s that several liberal authors proposed to explicitly distinguish states 
according to their internal, democratic, organisation. 481  For Anne-Marie Slaughter, for 
example, the presence of a representative government, of separate powers, and the 
constitutional guarantee of political rights define the liberal state, and concurrently allow for 
the distinction between those who conform or not to such a definition.482 Following from this 
distinction, namely from the internal characteristics of a state, she assumed that it was 
possible to “determine a state’s standing in the family of nations.”483 More relevant for us is, 
perhaps, the work of John Rawls. In his article The Law of People, Rawls distinguished three 
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types of societies in international relations: the liberal that conforms to international norms 
and expectations, the semi-liberal that purports illiberal measures but does not represent an 
international threat (how that could be established though, is not clear) and the illiberal 
states.484 A few years after, Rawls expanded these categories in a book, The Law of Peoples. 
In it, he advanced a categorisation of states into five groups: “reasonable liberal peoples,” 
“decent peoples,” (some of which are hierarchical), the outlaw states, societies burdened by 
unfavourable conditions, and benevolent absolutims.485  
 
Interesting for us, he proposed that we should think in terms of “burdened societies.” These 
are societies that, because of unfavourable conditions, are unable to conform to international 
norms and thus need the support of other liberal states.486 He also advanced a second, very 
ambiguous category: that of “decent hierarchical peoples.” Rawls describes these as well 
ordered yet hierarchical societies that the liberal system could tolerate. In the name of “self-
determination,” decent hierarchical societies in fact “should be able to have the opportunity to 
decide their future for themselves,”487 without external interference. These two categories, 
and the last in particular, cannot but evoke the situation of numerous post-colonial states in 
which hierarchical membership endured, at times more, at times less explicitly, after 
international ruling. Tolerated internationally, only later was their domestic order called into 
question. Towards the end of the 1980s and the start of the 1990s, hierarchies within 
international society took, again, more explicit forms, with respect to the treatment of 
domestic populations. The normative foundations for such hierarchies, though, as I hope to 
have shown over the past two chapters, had already been set internationally after 1945 and 
later confirmed, in 1960. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Post-colonial states that emerged after international ruling were founded on the right of self-
determination, strongly governed by liberal norms. However, I have argued, when in Africa 
newly “self-determined” states came to draw the boundaries of their political communities, 
hierarchy often prevailed over equality. This did not conform to international conceptions of 
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rights, self-determination and the model of the nation-state. Hierarchy in the form of a legacy 
of empires had, however, endured, domestically, both in the understanding of membership 
and allocation of rights. This was the case in particular in those areas where colonial rule had 
come to an end in a peaceful manner, after resolution 1514. In former French colonies, I have 
suggested, hierarchy was often vested in inherited assimilationist practices. Former British 
colonies, instead, presented relatively institutionalised practices of hierarchical membership, 
inherited from the pre-existing imperial regime of divide and rule. The case of post-
independence Nigeria, I have shown, was striking. In the first years following independence, 
hierarchical membership was highly formalised, leading to the extensive use of violence and 
to the re-emergence, domestically, of self-determination claims.  
 
Simply, with the end of colonial rule, the matter of self-determination had not been solved. As 
in 1919, international expectations attached to the idea of self-determination as associated at 
the UN with the human rights regime were not met. Norms of sovereign equality and non-
interference, however, largely characterised the Cold War international environment. Perhaps 
more precisely, in practice, in the words of John Vincent, “the loose bipolar system (had) 
intervention within the blocs, non-intervention between them, and a tenuous non-intervention 
prevailing outside them.” 488  Accordingly, the UN restrained itself from pronouncing 
judgements on the organisation of domestic orders. This, however, I have suggested, did not 
signify that hierarchical worldviews simply disappeared. Though in a more tentative form, 
hierarchical worldviews were reconstituted, for instance, in the arguments of numerous 
scholars. 
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7 
Solving Claims of Self-Determination: International Involvement in the 
Dissolution of Yugoslavia  
 
 
In the decades following the enactment of resolution 1514, it was widely assumed, or hoped 
perhaps, that decolonisation would bring to an end the complicated question of self-
determination. The crisis in Biafra had certainly marked a parenthesis, but one that was 
promptly closed in the name of both non-interference and sovereign equality. After 1960, 
several international documents continued to make reference to the idea. First, in 1966, self-
determination was embedded in the language of human rights (art.1, ICCPR and ICESCR). 
Later, in 1975, the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE), confirmed self-determination’s application beyond the colonial context. 
Though, as Martii Koskenniemi has said, it is debatable “whether that statement of principle 
was intended to be taken literally.”  
 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the start of the 1990s, claims of self-determination in 
the name of ethnicity emerged again internationally. Not without difficulties, in 1919, the 
Paris peacemakers had directed the principle of self-determination to the Balkans, hoping to 
guarantee a smooth transition from imperial authority to new nation-states. Following the 
breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the principle had therefore been 
used, in spite of its flaws, to unify the South Slavs into one state. Less than a century later, 
that same idea was invoked to justify, in the same region, ethnic division. The dissolution of 
what had been, since the end of World War II, the multinational federation of Yugoslavia, 
was furthermore accompanied by widespread violence. Only months earlier, in 1990, in Paris, 
member states of the CSCE had stated their ideological commitment to democracy and human 
rights through the endorsement of the Charter for a New Europe. Certainly, such commitment 
was not without incongruities. Whereas the Paris Charter depicted a common liberal identity 
for European countries, some of these states supported, directly or indirectly, authoritarian 
and discriminatory practices abroad, and even at home.489 Still, the Charter stressed a specific 
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promise for a common future and yet, in practice, the opposite was occurring and at the heart 
of Europe.  
  
When the Croatian and Slovenian federal republics of Yugoslavia started to show the first 
signs of their will to proclaim independence in early 1990, international responses to such 
claims were altogether negative. A year and a half later, in August 1991, when violence and 
exclusion had by then spread throughout the whole of the Balkans, the European Community 
(EC) decided to create a special EC arbitration commission on the events, best known as the 
Badinter Committee. On 7th September 1991, the European Conference on Yugoslavia began. 
Led by former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, the Conference was composed of 
EC mediators and of all the representatives of the parties involved: the Yugoslav delegates 
and the representatives of each constituent republic. The primary task of the Conference was 
to establish a ceasefire in Croatia. In late autumn however, it was clear that the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia was an unstoppable process. The Conference thus invited the EC Commission to 
intervene more directly, in the form of international “opinions,” on the events. The 
Commission was asked to pronounce on the scope and application of the right of self-
determination in the Balkans. 
 
Much of the scholarship on the break-up of Yugoslavia is concerned with underlining the 
incorrectness or the illegitimacy of the opinions of the EC Commission. Whether the 
Commission had the right to pronounce on such matters, whether it facilitated the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, are recurrent debates in the literature.490 Everyone seems to be concerned with 
stressing how flawed the role of international society was. 491 While this might be true, I 
suggest that these views tend to obscure the fact that the very establishment of a conference 
indicates international society’s willingness to delineate, again, the boundaries of self-
determination, and the ensuing international expectations. As it became accepted, perhaps 
reluctantly, that self-determination was to be, again, the principle at the base of a new wave of 
state formation, the standard of legitimate statehood and membership in international society 
had to be redefined.  
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Possibly because of the very nature of the task, discussions on self-determination’s normative 
components were, in the early 1990s, better articulated than they had been in the past. In 
giving its opinions, the EC Commission in fact explicitly addressed the three questions that 
had historically animated debates over self-determination’s meaning: whose claims of self-
determination should be recognised? What rights did self-determination entail? What would 
the implications be, once statehood would be recognised (and thus what should be the 
responsibilities correlative to such rights)? It soon became clear that, to a certain extent, 
answers to the first two questions had already been defined by the claimants. More centrality 
was in turn attributed (for much of the next two decades) to the third dimension, namely to 
the correlative responsibilities defining what good, or perhaps tolerable, domestic order was 
to be, for a state to be deemed a legitimate member of international society.  
 
However, as I shall argue in this and the next chapter, these delineations were undertaken on 
very contradictory grounds, that would determine the nature of later international involvement 
in the area. The reasons for that were twofold. First, a sharp divide separated domestic 
practices of self-determination from international ideas about it. Second, and importantly, 
another tension characterised the relationship between the international normative 
environment in which these ideas were embedded, and international practices of self-
determination. Whereas the former stressed non-interference, human rights and an ethnically 
blind conception of the polity (coinciding with Europe’s ideological commitment to 
democracy and human rights) the latter were characterised by the recognition of ethnic groups 
and thus, in turn, of some of their claims.  
 
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to establish an understanding of the two tensions 
that underlined international society’s delineation of self-determination as the newly found 
standard of legitimate statehood and membership in Europe. The implications of these 
contradictions will be the object of the following chapter. To do so, I begin by providing an 
historical context within which to understand the emergence of national claims of self-
determination. Unlike in the case of the two previous waves of expansion, this time it was 
domestic claims that prompted an international reaction and for this very reason, these claims 
need to be first explicated. I will then go on to describe international society’s confused 
attempt to set the standard of self-determination and grant new meaning to its historical 
components.  
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The Historical Presence of Self-Determination and Ethnicity in Yugoslavia 
 
The life of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, formed after World War I, came to an end officially 
in 1943. That same year, Ante Pavelic, leader of the fascist Ustasa movement, proclaimed 
the formation of the Croatian Independent state (NDH), encompassing the territories of 
modern Croatia and Herzegovina. Officially formed as an Italian protectorate, the NDH 
played the role of a “puppet state” for Nazi Germany. The purpose of the Ustasa regime in 
power was to establish an ethnically self-determined Croatian state through a large-scale 
campaign to methodically eliminate Jews, Muslims from Bosnia, Serbs and Roma people. In 
parallel, within Serbia the royalists loosely reorganised around the Cetnik movement headed 
by Draza Mihajlovic. Fighting against the Axis powers, Cetniks had a policy of selective 
collaboration to the extent, Mihajlovic claimed, that it could help the emergence of a Greater 
Serbian state.492 Following the Serbian Orthodox adage, gdje je slava tu je Srbin (“Where 
there is a Slav there is a Serb”),493 Cetniks sought to occupy all those neighbouring 
territories inhabited by Serbs, encompassing parts of modern Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Conversely, the project of the “Serbian nation” implied the 
elimination of all those internationally unrecognised minorities and recognised ethnic groups 
that did not share the same religion and beliefs, in particular Croats, Muslims and Roma 
people. Interestingly, a similar rhetoric would be adopted, fifty years later, by both Croats 
and Serbs.494 
 
As a reaction to these events, as early as 1941 the Yugoslav Communist Party led by Josip 
Broz Tito organised its own resistance, as a fight for national liberation from those different 
forms of oppression. The two main objectives of the Yugoslav Partisans were the liberation of 
the Yugoslav territory and the establishment of a workers’ multi-ethnic state based on 
equality of all. 495  Tito expressly encouraged the collaboration of all nationalities and 
communities. The victory of the partisans contributed to the triumph in 1946 of the Party’s 
motto, Bratstvo i Jedinstvo (“Brotherhood and Unity”). Although the mosaic of peoples, units 
and territories making up socialist Yugoslavia was confused, this mattered little, at least until 
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1990, when competing claims to self-determination emerged again. Although internationally 
claims of ethnicity were after the war delegitimised, Yugoslavia represented an exception in 
the eyes of the Allies. First, the Partisans had fought against the Axis Powers. Second, this 
fight was undertaken in the name of a Yugoslav unity, in an alleged continuity with the 
previous Kingdom. 
 
Self-determination, ethnicity, and socialism 
 
At the elections held in November 1945, the Communist Party won extensively and Tito’s 
party became virtually the sole political organisation in Yugoslavia. The formula for its 
victory lied in the rhetoric of national reconciliation: all the nationalities and peoples of 
Yugoslavia had equally fought against fascism during the war and therefore deserved to live 
together in a united and new Yugoslavia. The first Constitution was thus drafted in 1946. In a 
way not dissimilar to the “Yugomakers” in 1918, Tito proclaimed Yugoslavia as formed by 
the community of South Slavs peoples, equal in rights. Following article 1 of the 
Constitution:  
 
“(…) Yugoslavia is a federal people’s state republican in form. It is a community of peoples equal in 
rights who on the basis of the right of self-determination including the right of separation have 
expressed their will to live together in a federative state”496 
 
In practice, Yugoslavia was constituted as a federal state composed of six Republics - Bosnia, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia - and two autonomous entities within 
Serbia, which, later, were granted the status of “autonomous provinces” - Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. Only through the 1963 Constitution would the country become the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), shifting the locus of legitimate authority from the 
constituent peoples, to the Republics. In 1974, the Republics were renamed states.497 After 
World War II, with a few exceptions, the borders of the constituent republics were generally 
drawn following pre-World War I administrative imperial frontiers. Those changes were not 
regular and did not follow any specific national policy. While the boundaries of the 
constituent republics became suddenly crucial to delineating the borders of the post-Yugoslav 
states in the 1990s, the absence of consistency in the redrawing of the internal frontiers after 
World War II did not really matter. These were internal borders dividing federated entities, 
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and not nation-states. As Tito proclaimed in his famous Zagreb discourse shortly after the 
liberation:  
 
“ (…) The lines between the federated states in a federal Yugoslavia are not lines of separation, but of 
union. What is the meaning of federal units in today’s Yugoslavia? We do not consider them a group 
of small nations; rather they have a more administrative character, the freedom to govern oneself.”498 
 
At the core of the Communist ideology, self-determination was promptly mentioned in the 
1946 Constitution. The legal document referred to self-determination as the right exercised by 
the peoples of Yugoslavia to unite in a single state. Self-determination was reiterated in the 
1953 Constitution and again in the fourth and last Yugoslav Constitution of 1974.499 The 
Constitution also mentioned the right of secession for the peoples of Yugoslavia, but not for 
the Republics; the right to self-determination was instead proclaimed for the six republican 
subunits, excluding the two autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo.  
 
Blurring the picture even further, while six Republics existed, only five Yugoslav nations 
were recognised: Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes – Muslim 
Bosnians being excluded from such politics of recognition. “Muslims” (renamed in the 1990s 
“Bosniaks,” as until 1910) were recognised in the national census of 1961, yet they never 
became a constitutive Yugoslav nation. Interestingly, this led the Bosnian branch of the 
Communist party to declare at its 1964 Fourth Congress that Bosnian Muslims would 
eventually acquire the right to self-determination. In parallel, other minorities such as 
Hungarians and Albanians, named in Yugoslavia as “nationalities”, were simply denied equal 
rights of political representation and recognition. In addition to those pre-existing categories 
of ethnic identification inherited from past imperial politics of recognition, Tito added a new 
and more encompassing group: he created in the census the category of Yugoslav ethnicity. 
As Igor Stiks, “although it was possible to declare Yugoslav ethnicity, those who did so were 
not recognised as nations or nationalities and were thus not represented. (…) Yugoslavs 
simply did not have a republic!”500  
 
In spite of its egalitarian foundations, and perhaps even in line with them, it seems that with 
regard to membership recognition, Yugoslavia presented a hierarchical structure. This then 
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substantiates Alexander Cooley’s claims that while in their ideal form federations are not 
hierarchies, in practice this is often blurred.501 The hierarchy in Yugoslavia did not consist in 
the explicit predominance of one group – at least not until Slobodan Milosevic, following 
Tito’s death in 1980, claimed that the numerical superiority of ethnic Serbs implied that they 
should be politically and economically favoured. Instead, it was grounded in the distinct 
recognition and allocation of rights to individuals in relation to the different groups they 
identified with and areas they lived in. The constituent Yugoslav nations in their republics 
(“narodi Jugoslavije”) represented the most privileged group, entitled to both political 
recognition and their own state. The second group was composed of the Bosniak Muslims 
who, though not forming a constituent nation of Yugoslavia, represented the main ethnic 
group of Bosnia. Then followed “national minorities” or “nationalities” of Yugoslavia 
(“narodnosti”). These were individuals originating from Yugoslavia’s neighbouring countries 
that after World War I had been granted recognition through the Minority Treaties. Other 
ethnic groups that did not officially constitute an ethnic group, such as Roma people, were the 
most often socially, economically and politically marginalised.502  
 
By no means was it a deliberate or centralised attempt to prioritise certain groups over others, 
although some already argued that Belgrade and Serbian population took over the governing 
institutions of Yugoslavia and were granted greater entitlements.503 Unlike the Soviet Union, 
for example, ethnicity was not printed in passports and was only indicated in birth certificates 
and other administrative documents of domestic use. Those same documents, however, were 
used, after 1990, as tools of exclusion to assess one’s ethnicity. Beyond the officially 
recognised ethnic affiliation, individuals also possessed a double citizenship: Yugoslav 
citizenship (internationally recognised) and that of the constituent republics. The allocation of 
Yugoslav citizenship was grounded primarily in the principle of origin, for anyone belonging 
to one of the peoples of Yugoslavia.504 Citizenship of the constituent republics depended 
upon the condition of residence. Generally, citizens of Yugoslavia did not bother to change 
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citizenship of the republic when they moved within the Federation as, on a day-to-day basis, it 
was rather irrelevant, as long as one remained within the domestic borders of Yugoslavia.505 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, republican citizenship was used as the primary rationale 
to establish the new national political communities. Those who had not changed their 
republican citizenship when moving were therefore virtually excluded from the initial 
citizenry of those newly formed states.  
 
With the break-up of Yugoslavia, claims to self-determination in the name of an ethnic norm 
were received, internationally, with surprise. The exclusive formation of the post-Yugoslav 
states was operated, domestically, in continuity with past norms and practices, in what André 
Liebich terms “a legal fiction of uninterrupted statehood.”506 Newly elected political élites 
used the three membership dimensions underlined – citizenship, ethnicity and self-
determination - to justify discrimination, establish practices of hierarchical membership, and 
legitimise the formation of new, exclusive, states. Local nationalisms and ethnic claims to 
self-determination did not simply appear in Yugoslavia with the end of the Cold War. 
Although Tito had managed to maintain a subtle balance among all the communities in SFRY 
for thirty-five years – some say in harmony, others through repression – sporadic tensions had 
characterised the story of the Federation.507 The death of Tito in 1980 and the ensuing 
economic crisis into which Yugoslavia soon fell simply reinforced such claims and 
movements. Perhaps, then, British historian Allan Taylor made a point when he claimed that 
Tito was “the last of the Habsburgs.”508 
 
The road to dissolution  
 
The first sparks of violence started in Kosovo, in 1981. Kosovar Albanian students initiated 
several protests all over the province to demonstrate against their poor living conditions and 
seeking for Kosovo to become a Yugoslav republic. Demonstrations were violently repressed 
by the Yugoslav authorities, leading to a period of political discrimination towards Serbs 
living in Kosovo, by Kosovar Albanians. In 1984, Milosevic was elected as president of the 
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Serbian Bureau of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Three years later, on an official 
trip to Pristina, Milosevic declared his full support for Serbs in Kosovo, against Kosovar 
Albanian oppression and separatism. He then claimed that the only way to solve the Kosovo 
question was to reduce the autonomy of Kosovo. A claim that he put into practice by 
abolishing the status of autonomous provinces of both Kosovo and Vojvodina, as soon as he 
was elected president of the republic of Serbia, in early 1989.509 A few months later, in June 
1989, Milosevic went back to Kosovo. This time, he went to Kosovo Polje, the site of the 
famous 1389 Kosovo battle during which Serbs fought against the Ottoman army and were 
terribly defeated. During his commemoration speech praising Serbian national identity, he 
reiterated that Serbs had been oppressed throughout history and that this had to cease; that 
Kosovo was part of Serbia. As the banner behind him read, “Only unity saves the Serb.”510 
 
Over the years, numerous commentators on the Balkan conflicts have depicted Milosevic’s 
1989 speech as preannouncing the start of the war. While this is certainly true, ethnic 
exclusion was as much part of Croatian rhetoric as it was of Serbian. At the end of the 1980s 
Tudjman presented his “Croatian national programme” and openly spoke about a Croatian 
nation-state. Tudjman’s views about a Croatian nation-state encompassed the region of 
Bosnia mostly inhabited by the Croatian community: Herzegovina. Not only did this reflect 
that Tudjman did not take seriously the idea of a separate Bosnia, but also his view of it as an 
artificial creation of the Ottoman Empire, against the historical existence of an independent 
Croatian state.511 His irredentist views also clashed with Milosevic’s expansionist project of 
Greater Serbia, similarly including parts of Bosnia and Croatia. Both	  Croatian	  and	  Serbian	  officials	  had	  their	  respective	  views	  as	  to	  whether	  Muslims	  from	  Bosnia	  were	  (are)	  either	  Croats	   or	   Serbs. To be sure, this raised the concern of Muslim politicians in Bosnia, who 
sought recognition as a constituent people of Yugoslavia. That 12.1% of the population of 
Croatia identified with Serbian ethnicity was a further obstacle to Croatian independence 
aspirations. 512	  With the opening of Yugoslavia to party pluralism in 1988, and the creation, 
the following year, of Tudjman’s own right-wing conservative party, Belgrade started to look 
at his claims with increasing suspicion.  
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Yugoslav and Serbian officials though were not the only ones worried by Croatian nationalist 
and irredentist views. In Bosnia too, Muslim politicians started to fear Croatian as well as 
Serbian aspirations. In turn, as early as 1987 Slovenia had set up a “national programme.”513 
With less than 10% of the total population of Yugoslavia, Slovenia produced more than a fifth 
of the national GDP. In the context of economic crisis and high inflation, Yugoslav 
authorities feared that Slovenia might acquire greater autonomy. 514  Montenegro and 
Macedonia were instead the only two republics without a clear political project of self-
determination. Particularly in Montenegro, many of the officials were pro-Serbian. 515 
Meantime, Milosevic put forward his views on Serbian superiority, veiled by a discourse 
grounded on Yugoslav unity. In Belgrade, then capital of both Yugoslavia and of the socialist 
republic, he started to methodically blur the boundaries between SFRY’s and Serbia’s 
entitlements.516  
 
Within this context, the first multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections were 
organised in each constituent republic. In Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, right wing 
coalitions won. In Bosnia, Izetbegovic’s party emerged as the largest in the Republic. In 
addition to Serbia, it was only in Montenegro that the League of Communists won again, 
functioning in close collaboration with Milosevic’s party, the SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia, 
which had won in spite of denunciation of several irregularities in the ballot. Albanian 
Kosovars also decided to hold a referendum in July, asking the population to vote as to 
whether Kosovo should become a constituent republic part of the SFRY. The Serbian 
Parliament responded by suspending the provincial assembly and thereby annulling the 
referendum.517  
 
Tudjman and Kucan feared that this could also be Milosevic’s plan for, respectively, Croatia 
and Slovenia. For more than a year, Slovenian and Croatian national delegations to the 
Yugoslav League of Communists proposed to federal authorities the transformation of 
Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states. Milosevic was of course very reluctant 
towards the idea. In April 1991, both Croatian and Slovenian authorities decided to hold 
referenda on independence. In Croatia, 97.4% of the population declared itself in favour of 
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Croatian self-determination – even though the Serbian minority boycotted the referendum. In 
Slovenia, 86%	   of	   the	   population	   pronounced	   itself	   in	   favour	   of	   independence. 518	  
Unwilling to delay their respective declarations of independence, and aware of the increasing 
power that Milosevic was acquiring, Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence on 
25th June 1991. Croatia and Slovenia were the first two constituent republics of Yugoslavia to 
secede.  
 
Both Tudjman and Kucan proclaimed independence in the name of the will of their respective 
people, explicitly framed as the right of their people to self-determination exercised through 
what they described “democratic elections.”519 However, both declarations contained explicit 
references to a very exclusive understanding of the “nation” as defined in ethnic terms. The 
Slovenian declaration stressed from its first paragraph a clear analogy between natural law 
and the right of the “Slovene nation” to self-determination. The Croatian declaration 
repeatedly referred to the historical right of Croatia to self-determination.520 One year earlier 
though, the Constitutions of the socialist republics of Croatia and Slovenia had already 
defined each “nation” in ethnic terms.521  
 
A Confused International Reaction:  
Self-Determination and the Recognition of New States  
 
When Croatia and Slovenia started to show the first signs of their intent to proclaim 
independence in early 1990, international response was altogether negative. The EC, the 
CSCE (future OSCE), the UN, the USA, and other European states, in particular Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK, 522 promised that if unity were to be 
preserved and democratisation extended, Yugoslavia would receive financial assistance and 
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trading concessions.523 However, after Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from 
Yugoslavia on 25th June 1991, international discourse, so far unified, simply fragmented. 
Certain states such as Germany and Italy supported a faster recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia as sovereign states, perhaps also to avoid the development of further violence. 
Violent acts had in fact started just a few days after the two declarations of independence, 
between, respectively Slovenian and Croatian military separatist forces and the Yugoslav 
Army (JNA). Over the months preceding the declarations of independence, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Montenegro and Serbia had all diverted their funds for development to purchasing military 
armaments.524 Unlike Germany and Italy, the EC, the UN and individually France, the UK 
and USA upheld the need to reform Yugoslavia, by giving each republic a greater autonomy, 
circumventing the actual breakup of the Federation.525  
 
The EC then proposed to set up a special agreement. The purpose of the Brioni agreement, 
signed on 7th July 1991, was twofold. First, it offered time to all the parties involved to 
consider the course of the events and the consequences of their claims and aspirations. This 
was accomplished as Croatian, Slovenian and Yugoslav authorities agreed for a three-month 
moratorium on all armed and state-building activities. Slovenia and the JNA agreed 
specifically to terminate all armed activities. The Brioni agreement concurrently marked the 
end of the short war in Slovenia. Croatia acknowledged a freeze on all independence activities 
until 7th October 1991. Yet, while during these three months Tudjman’s government did not 
entrench Croatian independence through legal means, violence did increasingly burst out 
between Croats and ethnic Serbs living in Croatia, the latter with the support of Slobodan 
Milosevic. The moratorium also served another purpose. It gave more time to international 
society to decide on what the international response to the Yugoslav crisis should be. 
 
In August 1991 the Council of Ministers of the EC decided to create a special arbitration 
commission on the events, best known as the Badinter Committee. A month later, Lord 
Carrington inaugurated the European Conference on Yugoslavia, composed of EC mediators 
and all the representatives of the parties involved: the Yugoslav delegates and the 
representatives of each constituent republic. A year later the Conference would be renamed 
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the International Conference on Yugoslavia, combining the work of the EC, the UN, the 
OSCE and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.526 It seems interesting to note that in 
1991, only a small group of states, calling itself “international community,” was to undertake 
the task of dealing with the Balkan question.527 Almost ironically, this echoed the post-World 
War I settlement, when the Great Powers, deeming themselves more mature than other states, 
had defined the standards of legitimate statehood and membership for post-imperial states in 
the family of nations. 
 
Initially, much of the Conference activity was concerned with establishing a ceasefire in 
Croatia, where violence was constantly increasing. In November, following the end of the 
moratorium established three months earlier by the EC, Croatia and Slovenia continued their 
respective state-building activities, joined by Macedonia and, increasingly, Bosnia. Indeed, 
Macedonia held its referendum on independence on 8th September 1991, even though it was 
recognised by the EC only in 1993.528 Bosnia enacted a memorandum on sovereignty on 14th 
October 1991, while the independence referendum was held several months later, between 
29th February and 1st March 1992 – the same day on which the war officially started in 
Bosnia. Serbia contested these acts, describing them as unconstitutional.529 Yet, the new 
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia enacted by Milosevic in 1990 presupposed that the 
president of Serbia could unilaterally decide to proclaim the start or end of any war involving 
the whole or part of Yugoslavia.530 Worried by the potential consequences of these acts and 
decisions, the European Conference invited the Arbitration Committee to intervene more 
directly on these matters, from late autumn 1991. Such intervention would take the form of 
legal opinions. No formal procedure was established as to how these should be sought and 
answered. The only thing that was clear though was that the Conference would use them as 
grounds to settle the Yugoslav question.531  
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The content of the opinions 
 
Between the end of 1991 and the middle of 1993, Lord Carrington asked the Arbitration 
Committee, in the form of specific questions, to give its opinion on what were described as 
ten major legal matters on the SFRY.532 The opinions all dealt with the application of the 
right of self-determination to the region and, I shall argue, with the understanding of its 
normative components: people, rights and responsibilities. Lord Carrington presented the first 
three questions to the Commission on 20th November 1991. Lord Carrington personally 
addressed the first question, whereas for the following opinions, he was used as an 
intermediary, between the interested parties and the EC Commission.533  
 
He first asked whether Yugoslavia still continued to exist, whether it was in a process of 
disintegration, or break-up. Ten days later, the Committee responded that Yugoslavia was, 
following Slovenia and Croatia’s acts of secession, in a process of dissolution. Even though 
Lord Carrington addressed the second and third questions that same day, the Committee 
responded to both only later, at the start of January 1992 when violence and exclusion had by 
then spread throughout the whole of the Balkans. These had been addressed by the Republic 
of Serbia. The second question concerned ethnic Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia. Were 
they entitled to self-determination? The Committee responded that they were, yet strictly in 
the sense of autonomy and recognition as minorities within sovereign countries and that both 
Croatia and Bosnia had to “afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups all the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms recognised in international law, including, where 
appropriate, the right to choose their nationality.”534 As we will see in the next chapter, 
Croatian authorities would deform the opinion, on the right to choose nationality, to justify 
the denial of citizenship status and rights to the Serbian minority.  
 
With its second opinion, the Commission ruled out, implicitly, a possible right of secession 
for smaller groups, including for instance Kosovo Albanians. Self-determination was to be 
understood only for the main constitutive groups of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the third question 
demanded whether the internal boundaries between Serbia and Croatia, and Serbia and Bosnia 
were to be considered frontiers protected by international law. The Committee established 
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that it recognised, following the principle of uti possidetis juris, the borders between Croatia, 
Bosnia and Serbia. In this sense, the Commission formally acknowledged that independent 
statehood was possible only for the former constituent Yugoslav Republics.535 
 
Opinions 4 to 7 were addressed in December by the EC via Lord Carrington. Each asked, 
respectively, whether Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia were ready 
for international recognition.536The Committee answered in January, recommending that only 
Slovenia should be recognised (opinion 7). Bosnia had not yet held a referendum on 
independence and for this reason could not be internationally recognised. Only later was it 
recognised, following a referendum on 7th April 1992.537 At the start of 1992 the Committee 
assumed that only states in which the choice of self-determination was based on popular 
consent could be independent - even though, several countries had recognised the 
international borders of Bosnia two months earlier. Procedurally, however, free elections 
defined the means to assess the will of the people. This had in fact been explicitly established 
in the Paris Charter: “democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed 
regularly through free and fair elections.”538   
 
Croatia was the object of opinion 5. The Committee recommended waiting before recognising 
the country, as measures for protection of minorities required by the EC had not been 
integrated yet within domestic legislation.539 Only a year earlier the Paris Charter had in fact 
asserted the need to protect and respect the equality of “ethnic, cultural, linguistic and 
religious national minorities.”540 While, this standard had been set in Paris with reference to 
the Soviet Union, its relevance for Yugoslavia became soon evident. As a response to this 
opinion, Tudjman immediately wrote to Robert Badinter, at the head of the Commission, 
guaranteeing that such prerequisites would be included. This, however, did not happen. 
Whereas in its preamble the Constitution recognised certain minorities, these were largely 
denied political rights and thus access to the body politic.541 After all, Germany had already 
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recognised both Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states three weeks before the Committee 
issued opinions 5 and 7 (on Slovenia). How then could the opinion of the Commission be a 
compelling enough reason for change? Despite the strong opposition of both France and the 
UK, the EC recognised Croatia as a sovereign state on 15th January 1992.542  
 
Opinion 6, dealt with Macedonia. Even though the will of the Macedonian people had been 
determined via referendum, because of the strong Greek opposition, the Committee 
recommended waiting for international recognition. Opinions 8 and 9 further entrenched all 
these decisions, recognising the process of dissolution of the SFRY and advising that 
problems of state succession should be solved through mutual agreements between the 
successor states. Finally, opinion 10 stated that Serbia and Montenegro, together constituted 
as FRY from December 1991, could not be recognised as the legal continuum of SFRY, as 
Milosevic claimed. For this reason, the EC Committee argued, the FRY had to apply for both 
international recognition and membership within international organisations, as the other 
successor states had done. Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia became indeed members of the UN 
on 22nd May 1992. The FRY instead did not apply. In this way, Milosevic could persist in 
claiming that the new state was in continuity with Tito’s Yugoslavia, while further 
entrenching his policy of “serbianisation” in the Balkans.543  
 
Untangling international contradictions at the start of the 1990s 
 
The international approach in the former Yugoslavia is often described as a departure from 
the past. Certainly, that an international conference should be set up just a few months after 
the declarations of independence of Croatia and Slovenia, while these were still allegedly 
“domestic” matters, came in 1991 with surprise. This though, I suggest, was more the result 
of a contrast with what had been, from 1945 and then more strongly from 1960, a “pluralist” 
approach to international order, than a radical departure from the past. After all, both after 
1919 and throughout the 1950s until 1960, self-determination had been used to regulate post-
imperial statehood and membership in international society. Each time, in a different way, 
international society had explicitly delineated this standard, along with its correlative 
expectations as to what legitimate domestic order ought to be. Similarly to previous 20th 
century waves of expansion of the sovereign order, in 1991 international society sought to 
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delineate the contours of self-determination. However, international society’s newly 
rediscovered will to regulate from the outside the units of political communities was 
characterised by several inconsistencies. These became apparent as long as the work of the 
Conference for Yugoslavia continued.  
 
Most visibly, a sharp divide separated on the one side domestic claims of self-determination 
in the name of ethnicity, and on the other, international society’s liberal understanding of it. 
That ethnic claims of self-determination had re-emerged, at the heart of Europe, while 
European international society endorsed liberalism, democracy and human rights, was hardly 
tolerable. In 1960, the norm of self-determination had been embedded in the human rights 
framework. How, only three decades later, could these two very different understandings 
coexist? The tension was best embedded in president Tudjman’s words when, in 1991, he 
claimed: 
 
“(…) In their endorsement of human rights, democratic countries, including the entire United Nations 
are not sufficiently prepared for the present historical wave of creating national states. They have not 
found a satisfactory answer to the question of how to ensure the realisation of every nation’s natural 
right to self-determination”544  
 
The state of affairs, when the Conference started, was that both Slovenia and Croatia had 
already declared independence, although the borders of the new states had not yet been 
defined. In 1960, when granting independence to colonial territories along former imperial 
borders, self-determination was established internationally as a territorial, and not a cultural 
right – as had been the case after World War I. To seek to regulate territorial matters rather 
than cultural claims, was, in 1991, tempting. Approaching the question through the lens of 
territory rather than that of culture, it was thought at the conference, might in fact maintain 
international society’s post-war commitment to self-determination as an ethnically blind 
principle. The question was dealt with in EC Committee opinions 1 and 2. The units were 
promptly regulated through the application of the principle of uti possidetis. Similarly to the 
colonial context, it was thought, this might keep the process more orderly.545 Opinion 3 was 
the first to confirm the relevance of the principle beyond decolonisation. 
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In applying the colonial principle of uti possidetis to the Balkans, the Peace Conference on 
Yugoslavia recognised domestic borders internal to the Federation as the new international 
frontiers. The major problem with the principle, as it was applied to Yugoslavia, was that it 
confirmed, although inadvertently, the influence of local ethno-national discourses within the 
new states. More recently, Cornelia Navari has brought it to light that Robert Badinter himself 
felt uncertain in applying the principle, prompting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to 
immediately give a constitutional justification for the decision. 546 The justification stated that 
the international decision was anyway in continuity with SFRY’s law (art.5 of the 1974 
Constitution.)547 Perhaps because of the pressure under which international society found 
itself, the Conference acknowledged the possible coincidence between the boundaries of the 
new states and those of the “nations.”  
 
International society insisted on stressing - especially a posteriori - that the allocation of self-
determination was limited to the dissolution of Yugoslavia; that by no means would the 
Badinter principle of self-determination constitute a precedent. This has led to the 
development of the argument, throughout the 1990s, that self-determination was in fact only a 
“remedial right,” used if no other solution could be found.548 The reason for that, it has been 
argued, lay in the use of the Badinter opinions as “legal justification for its recognition policy 
in Yugoslavia.”549 In practice however, the matter was less clear. Already in 1991, it was 
“upon the advice of the Arbitration Commission” that the EC grounded its conditions for the 
recognition of the successor states to the Soviet Union.550 In the case of the Soviet Union 
though, the application of uti possidetis proved to be less problematic, with the exception of 
the Baltic Republics, and at least until the recent resurgence of self-determination claims in 
Ukraine and Crimea, as the process was uncontested by the central authorities.551 
 
Debates emerged again in 1992, as five jurists called upon the National Assembly of Québec, 
“to consider the territorial status of the province in the event of its separation from 
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Canada,” 552  following the Badinter opinions. 553  After lengthy discussions and the 
organisation of a referendum in 1995, the demand was ultimately dismissed, as international 
lawyer James Crawford concluded in his 1997 Opinion to the Canadian government that uti 
possidetis was a decolonisation principle and did not apply to Québec.554 In so doing, he 
confirmed that the application of the principle was exceptional to the case of the Yugoslav 
dissolution. The matter, perhaps, was finally solved. Two years later however, debates started 
again, following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1244, establishing the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). From 1999 until 2008, when 
Kosovo declared unilaterally independence, neither scholars nor practitioners could agree as 
to whether a Yugoslav entity (rather than republic) could secede. In its 2010 advisory opinion, 
the ICJ concluded that this act did not violate international law, or the 1999 international 
supervisory framework.555 While many argued about the illegality of such act, others believed 
that the Badinter Opinions served as a precedent.556 As underlined by James Summers, in its 
advisory opinion to the Declaration of Independence, the ICJ, however, did not clarify the 
matter.557 The	   recent	   resurgence	   of	   claims	   to	   self-­‐determination	   in	   the	   Crimea	   has	  fostered	  discussion	  again,	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  Badinter	  opinions	  constitute,	  or	  not,	  a	  legal	  precedent.558	  	  
 
Going back to 1991 however, except from Bosnia, where no constituent people existed 
administratively, in the cases of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro 
(together as FRY), the application of the principle was straightforward. Uti possidetis 
confirmed the advantage of an ethnically exclusive understanding of the domestic political 
community, over ideas of blind equality and inclusion. From the start of the 1990s, newly 
proclaimed leaders found in this international recognition the justification to constitute 
exclusive political communities. They could inaugurate hierarchical membership, in 
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continuity with Yugoslav rules and norms and in the name of an internationally recognised 
principle of self-determination. 
 
In 1991, the international argument used to justify the allocation of uti possidetis was, as said, 
that for a state to be recognised, in conformity with the Paris Peace Charter, the will of its 
people should be first expressed through a plebiscite or elections. The Charter stated indeed 
that a “democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through 
free and fair elections.”559 Accordingly, the EC Committee established that only those 
republics where referenda for independence had taken place could be recognised as 
sovereign.560 As such, Yugoslav constituent republics seeking for independent statehood had 
the responsibility, set by international society, to conform to this standard. Differently from 
1919 and 1960, holding referenda was a responsibility that international society explicitly 
imposed for the realisation of self-determination. While in 1960 plebiscitary choice was also a 
means of assessing “the genuine will of people,” the decision to recognise a right to self-
determination was made largely upon UN investigation.561 In 1991, the expression of the 
“will of people” through the exercise of political rights was explicitly set as the precondition 
for international recognition.562  
 
How referenda would be undertaken domestically, namely, who could vote and who could 
not, was not a matter of concern for the EC Committee. Bosnia, for example, had to wait 
several months before the Committee declared that it was ready for statehood. Even though 
the Committee had acknowledged its international borders by recognising those of Croatia 
and Serbia, independent statehood was only confirmed following the March 1992 plebiscite. 
That Bosnian Serbs would boycott en masse the referendum was well known to international 
society, following the numerous warnings given by local authorities. 563 Both the EC and US 
claimed that the organisation of a democratic referendum (followed by international 
recognition), might avoid the spread of violence. What was at the start of 1992 international 
society’s “exit strategy” 564 from a direct involvement in Bosnia’s domestic order, it is well 
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known, failed.565 It was evident that international society’s approach to state recognition was 
flawed. In each republic, not only in Bosnia, several minority groups had boycotted the 
referenda on independence. Moreover, in 1991, hierarchical membership was already in 
several former republics a common practice. Beyond attempts to physically stop citizens from 
exercising their right to vote, whole sections of citizenries of former republics were suddenly 
excluded from their body politic through the enactment, in the name of self-determination, of 
ethnically exclusive citizenship laws.  
 
In addition to that, as I have shown through the analysis of the opinions, not all the republics 
were simultaneously recognised, even though they had held elections and referenda. While 
the Badinter Committee claimed in December 1991 that Slovenia should be recognised (EC 
and UN official recognition followed a year later in January and May 1992), Macedonia‘s 
recognition was postponed until 1993. The reason for Macedonia’s deferment lay in Greece’s 
refusal to recognise, for historical reasons, the boundaries of the new state. Nevertheless, this 
further blurred international practice of self-determination. As constituent republics enjoyed 
different treatments, some claims were granted more visibility – and perhaps more legitimacy 
– than others.  
 
It did not take long for the EC Conference to realise its contradictions. As said, Robert 
Badinter himself was preoccupied by the application of the opinions that he had contributed 
to drafting. However, it became soon clear that the first two normative components attached 
to self-determination, people and rights, had already been largely defined, in exclusive terms, 
by local claimants. Paradoxically, through its opinions, the EC Committee further entrenched 
them. Perhaps as a result of the realisation of such inconsistencies, more insistence was in 
turn attached to the third dimension, namely to the correlative responsibilities that states 
should uphold, to be deemed legitimate members of post-1990 international society, once 
self-determination was to be realised.  
 
State responsibilities and legitimate behaviour  
 
Sovereign responsibilities, which historically had been attached to the realisation of self-
determination, became again, as in 1919, explicitly tied to its recognition. The Conference 
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thus initiated a leitmotiv that would shape international society’s involvement in the Balkans 
for the following decade. These responsibilities represented in fact a clear externally dictated 
condition for membership in international society. As in 1919, sovereign equality of new 
states was made conditional upon the acceptance (more than actual compliance) with criteria 
internationally imposed. These, I shall argue, touched unequivocally on the delineation of 
what good domestic order ought to be within the new states, in conformity with international 
society’s ideological commitment to democracy and human rights. In 1960, resolution 1514 
declared that “by virtue of” the right of self-determination, people can “freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Yet, 
neither that resolution nor article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did 
explicitly “distinguish among such political systems as liberal democracy, democratic 
socialism, corporatism or communism.”1 In 1990, democracy was established as the system of 
legitimate political authority for the new states. 
 
In December 1991, a group of EC foreign ministers presented before the Peace Conference a 
set of conditions that needed to be met if post-Yugoslav Republics sought international 
recognition.566 In addition to being constituted on a democratic basis, the guidelines presented 
a list of other prerequisites. Newly elected political élites should give the guarantee that they 
would comply with the provisions of the UN Charter, of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, that 
they would respect the inviolability of international borders and, in particular, that they would 
comply with the 1990 Paris Charter.567  
 
Agreeing upon the propositions enacted in the Paris Peace Charter signified, at least in 
principle, the acceptance by new states of “democracy as the only system of government of 
our nations.” It also implied that the guarantee that human rights and the equality and rights of 
minorities would be respected. The Charter also mentioned the respect of the rule of law and 
the promotion of a market economy. The document thus was an open “attempt to make the 
quality of a state a precondition for its participation in European international society.”568 In 
this way, international society would directly monitor the rightful membership of individual 
states,569 and decide whether it conformed or not with international expectations attached to 
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the realisation of self-determination. The Paris Charter made clear in fact that “domestic 
political arrangements” were explicitly linked to states’ international legitimacy.570 Whereas 
the Charter expressed the endorsement of liberal norms and rules in the explicit language of 
each state’s responsibility,571 by stating that the CSCE “[would] ensure that everyone [would] 
enjoy recourse to effective remedies, national or international, against any violation of his 
rights,” it implied that beyond states’ own responsibilities, an enforcing mechanism of 
supervision would be set in place. In 1990, though, how this would happen was not clear. 
 
The Paris Charter of 1990 did not constitute a legally binding document. However, if the post-
Yugoslav states wished to be recognised, and further be deemed as equal members of 
international society (by the CSCE, EC, UN) they had to give the guarantee that they would 
enforce these responsibilities. In its resolution 713, the Security Council reiterated in explicit 
terms the idea that responsibilities were attached to sovereignty. Resolution 713 enacted on 
25th September 1991 was the first to deal with the breakup of Yugoslavia, invoking chapter 
VII of the Charter and thereby transforming the Yugoslav crisis into an international matter at 
the UN. The resolution set an arms embargo for SFRY/FRY, pushed towards the respect of a 
ceasefire and to a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav dissolution. Importantly for my 
argument, it indicated that, “(…) the Secretary-General observes that (…) the concept of state 
sovereignty has taken on a new meaning, not only rights but also responsibilities.” Whether 
the meaning was new, I believe that I have shown through the previous chapters, was not 
really the case. Responsibilities were attached to the realisation of self-determination in 1919, 
and before that to the 19th century standards of civilised membership in the family of 
nations.572At the start of the 1990s, though, these responsibilities were explicitly articulated 
and further entrenched in the language of “sovereignty as responsibility.”573  
 
Hence, to be deemed legitimate members of international society, newly “self-determined” 
states would have to accept a certain number of responsibilities. As implied in the Paris 
Charter, new states would further be deemed accountable for them, both domestically and 
internationally. At the start of the 1990s, post-Yugoslav states thus had to give the guarantee 
that they would comply with a set of international norms such as democracy, human rights, 
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the rule of law, liberal economy, and with the specific criteria delineated by the EC 
Committee. Post-Yugoslav states formally included, in their national jurisdictions, references 
to “human rights,” or “equality.” In practice however, they did not conform to internationally 
defined expectations. For Tudjman or Milosevic this did not really matter at the start of the 
1990s. Only later would international society remind them that the moral and political 
categorising of post-Yugoslav states as less democratic / liberal depended on the fact that 
international expectations attached to the realisation of self-determination had not been met. 
 
Indeed, the standards that were set between 1990, with the endorsement of the Paris Charter, 
and the latest opinion of the EC Commission in 1993, were later to be often referred to in 
international society’s involvement in the area. As we are about to see in the next chapter, 
throughout the 1990s, they would be recurrently invoked (along with other increasingly ad 
hoc criteria) as benchmarks to which post-Yugoslav states had to conform, if hoping to be 
deemed legitimate members (or, as in the case of Kosovo, simply members) of international 
society. In a way not dissimilar to 1919, as we will see in the next chapter, these standards 
would function as political and legal markers upon which judgements on the stage of 
advancement of the new states would be articulated.  
 
Conclusion  
 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the start of the 1990s, claims of self-determination in 
the name of an ethnic norm emerged again internationally. That this should be happening 
right after the endorsement of the Paris Charter, and at the heart of Europe, came 
internationally as a great surprise. In the Balkans, as I have shown in this chapter, these 
claims were largely in continuity with Yugoslav norms and rules. Ethnicity and self-
determination had in fact been two central dimensions of the Yugoslav membership regime. 
At the start of the 1990s, these were thus available tools for newly elected political elites to 
claim an ethnically connoted right of self-determination. Such claims were, however, in 
obvious contrast with what had become, after World War II, an ethnically-blind norm of self-
determination, as well as with Europe’s commitment to democracy and human rights.  
 
As a reaction to these events, international society established a peace conference and a 
special arbitration committee to deal specifically with the matter of self-determination in the 
Balkans. This, I have argued in this chapter, indicated international society’s newly 
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rediscovered willingness to delineate, as in 1919 and 1960, the boundaries of self-
determination and ensuing international expectations. As it became accepted that self-
determination was to be, again, the principle at the base of a new wave of state formation, the 
standard of legitimate statehood and membership in international society was redefined. The 
work of the EC Committee therefore attests to the international attempt to grant meaning, not 
without contradictions, to self-determination’s normative components, in accordance with 
international and European standards of legitimacy. However, in some sense, local claimants 
had already defined the first two dimensions: people and rights. In turn, international society 
stressed that if new states sought international recognition, they had to guarantee that they 
would conform to internationally delineated responsibilities. However, I have shown, they did 
so on contradictory grounds. In 1990-1992 this mattered less than did keeping the process of 
dissolution as orderly, or perhaps as little confused, as possible. After all, through its response 
international society had delineated, once more, its expectations attached to the realisation of 
self-determination.  
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As I have shown in the previous chapter, with the start of the dissolution of the Yugoslav 
Federation, international society came to delineate, again, the contours of self-determination 
and the international expectations that attached to its realisation. As in 1919 and 1960, self-
determination was used as the standard for, if not post-imperial, at least post-federal, 
membership in international society. The EC Committee thus redefined the meaning of self-
determination’s components - people, rights and responsibilities. However, international 
society’s newly rediscovered will to regulate from the outside the units of political 
communities contained several shortcomings. Importantly for us, through its opinions the EC 
Committee recognised certain ethnic claims over others, while concurrently arguing that 
democracy, equality and human rights were to be the basis of self-determination for the new 
states. While this contradiction was clear, it was less of a matter of immediate concern. After 
all, the Committee had made international recognition of the post-Yugoslav states conditional 
upon their guarantee that a clearly defined set of responsibilities, correlative to the right of 
self-determination, would be respected. For states to be deemed legitimate, they now had to 
uphold those guarantees.   
 
As the war progressed and as international public opinion kept referring to the mistakes of the 
Badinter Committee, contradictions became increasingly evident.574 In several post-Yugoslav 
states, practices of hierarchical membership were established to redefine national political 
communities, and used as rationales for exclusion and mass killings. In an alleged continuity 
with Yugoslav politics of recognition, these were also justified in the name of international 
principles of state-making. Practices of hierarchical membership were in contrast with 
international conceptions of equality and human rights that, despite obvious flaws, were 
embedded in the idea of self-determination.  
 
As national authorities pursued, each in its own way, their respective state-building activities, 
international involvement in the area became increasingly ad hoc. For each specific context, 
international expectations as defined in 1990-1992 came to be coupled with more detailed 
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UN, OSCE, EC/EU and other international standards and monitoring tools. These, I argue, 
largely took the form of enhanced conditions to which new states had to conform, in the name 
of a state responsibility (domestic and international) previously outlined in the opinions and 
the EC guidelines for state recognition.  
 
To systematise my claim, I propose to look at the cases of Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. From 
the start, hierarchical membership was a legal feature of Croatia’s membership regime. 
Largely unquestioned for a whole decade, it was only later that Croatia’s initial practices of 
self-determination were internationally disputed. As it sought to become a member of the EU, 
Croatia was required to adapt its domestic practices to European expectations about 
appropriate behaviour and identity. In Bosnia, in turn, although hierarchical membership was 
a feature of war politics, ending violence was the first international priority. In 1995, the 
Dayton Agreement seemed to foster discriminatory practices at the very moment when the 
UN set up an international supervisory regime to monitor and judge Bosnia’s compliance with 
international norms. Kosovo, in fine, represents somehow a different case. Whereas it was not 
part of the 1991 EC arrangements, from 1999 a similar disciplining regime to the one 
established in Bosnia was set up. The settlement of Kosovo’s status (and sovereignty) was 
made conditional upon the enforcement of international norms. Concurrently, however, 
Kosovo’s international supervisory regime seems to have fostered a hierarchical recognition 
of membership and rights. Following the 2008 Declaration of independence, domestic 
hierarchies have been called into question by, for example, the OSCE, to claim that Kosovo is 
still not yet a “democratic” polity. 
 
 
The Case of Croatia: Self-Determination, a Domestic Matter?  
 
In May 1991, the population of Croatia was asked to express itself in a referendum as to 
whether they wanted the "Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state that 
guarantees the Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia cultural autonomy and all 
rights of a citizen (…).” Although the wording of the referendum question suggested that 
Serbs and other ethnic minorities would be equally treated, the Croatian Constitution enacted 
a year earlier defined Croatia as primarily the state of ethnic Croats. While ethnic Serbs living 
in Croatia and representing, according to the 1991 census, 12.2 % of the total population 
boycotted the referendum, 94.7% of the participants voted in favour of independence. The 
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outcome of the referendum was no surprise. From 1990, following the victory of Franjo 
Tudjman’s conservative Hrvatska Demokratska Stranka (“Croatian Democratic Party” - 
HDZ) at the “first free elections,”575 Tudjman’s newly founded opposition party had in fact 
started a pro-independence campaign marked by a nationalist tone.576  
 
The HDZ mobilised local media to promote ideas about a mythicised unity and common 
decent. From the start of his campaign in 1990 and throughout his years in power until his 
death (1999), Tudjman conveyed discourses about an uninterrupted history of Croatian 
statehood started in the 10th century. These discourses were institutionalised in the 1990 
Constitution, which, it should be said, was not amended until 2010.577 Nationalist narratives 
were supported by the endorsement of “Croatian” symbols, the same ones used by Pavelic in 
1943 when he set up the NDH. For instance, he named the new national currency “kuna,” the 
same unit of exchange used in fascist Croatia. He also adopted, slightly changing it, the red 
and white chequered flag, the traditional Ustasa emblem.578  
 
While these events were taking place within what were still the borders of Yugoslavia, 
Croatia’s along with Slovenia’s claims to self-determination were increasingly the object of 
international attention. Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on 25th June 1991. 
This declaration was soon after followed, as we have seen in the previous chapter, by an 
international three-month moratorium asking Croatia (and Slovenia) to freeze state-building 
activities. A day after the moratorium expired, Croatia enacted its national citizenship law, on 
8th October 1991. The process of national self-determination initiated with the plebiscite for 
independence was confirmed, as Croatia’s body politic was redefined in exclusive terms. A 
few months later, the Badinter Committee recognised in its third opinion Croatia’s republican 
borders as international frontiers. In so doing international society inadvertently 
acknowledged the ethnic component of Croatian claims to self-determination. Both ethnicity 
and independence though had already been mentioned in the 1990 new Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Croatia. This, I believe, substantiates the point made in the previous 
chapter. When the Badinter Committee gave its opinions, local claimants had already defined 
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to an important extent the first two components of self-determination (people and rights) that 
the Badinter Committee then confirmed. Following the Preamble of the 1990 Croatian 
Constitution:  
 
Considering the presented historical facts [reference made to the historical continuity of Croatia since 
the 10th century] and universally accepted principles of the modern world, as well as the inalienable 
and indivisible, non-transferable and non-exhaustible right of the Croatian nation to self-determination 
and state sovereignty, including its fully maintained right to secession and association, as basic 
provisions for peace and stability of the international order, the Republic of Croatia is established as 
the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of autochthonous national 
minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and 
Ruthenians and the others who are citizens, and who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian 
nationality and the realization of national rights (…) 
Respecting the will of the Croatian nation and all citizens, resolutely expressed in the free elections, 
the Republic of Croatia is hereby founded and shall develop as a sovereign and democratic state in 
which equality, freedoms and human rights are guaranteed and ensured, and their economic and 
cultural progress and social welfare promoted.579 
 
Hayden has qualified the 1990 Croatian constitution as the clearest example of “constitutional 
nationalism.” 580  He claims that the legal definition of Croatia and its right to self-
determination in exclusive terms allowed for the administrative “omission” of other citizens 
from the national political community.581 In the first article of the 1974 Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic, Croatia was indeed defined “as a national state of the Croatian people, 
state of the Serbian people in Croatia and state of nationalities living on its territory.” The first 
article of the 1990 Constitution instead instituted “the Republic of Croatia as the national state 
of the Croatian people and the state of members of other nations and minorities who are its 
citizens.” While the preamble of the Constitution defined as national minorities Serbs, 
Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and Ruthenians, 
according to the first minority law enacted in 1992 only those minorities representing more 
than 8% of the total population had the right to vote.  
 
Without the right to vote, individuals that according to the 1991 census did not fall into a 
large minority were a priori excluded from the Croatian body politic. In the 1991 census, 
however, only ethnic Serbs represented more than 8% of the total population.582 This law was 
later abolished in 1995 but until 1999, namely until Tudjman’s death, no law on the matter 
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existed. In practice, minorities were excluded from full participation in the national political 
community for almost a decade in accordance with the 1991 Yugoslav census.  
 
The matter for those who did not identify with Croatian ethnicity was further complicated by 
citizenship requirements. Whereas the first criterion in seeking citizenship was the possession 
of the previous socialist Croatian citizenship, the second was (and actually still is) Croatian 
ethnicity.583 Concerning ius sanguinis criteria, the number of generations has never been 
legally specified; therefore in the 1991 context of consolidation of an exclusive corporate 
state identity, anyone able to “demonstrate” Croatian ethnicity could be granted citizenship. 
No specific criteria existed as to the means of such demonstration. Often, even parents’ or 
grandparents’ baptism certificates were sufficient. While this clause related to individuals of 
ethnic origin living abroad, co-ethnics within the territory of Croatia automatically became 
citizens of the new state when independence was proclaimed.584  
 
Those who did not identify with Croatian ethnicity, however, and who until 1991 had been 
citizens of socialist Croatia, without even moving, were from one day to the next turned into 
aliens. They were asked by Croatian authorities to apply for the new citizenship from the 
start, needing to prove that they had lived in Croatia at least for the previous five years. For 
some, this was an easy matter. For those who had migrated to Croatia during the Yugoslav 
regime however, things were further complicated. When individuals migrated from one 
republic to the other, as said, often the required changes in citizenship status were not 
undertaken, precisely because migrations were internal to the Yugoslav state.585 What seemed 
to be a simple oversight in the SFRY had therefore direct consequences in the definition of 
the new national constituency.586  
 
Practices of hierarchical membership in Croatia 
 
As international attention was increasingly directed to the widespread violence in Bosnia, 
Tudjman kept invoking non-interference, and Croatia’s natural right to self-determination to 
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justify his project of state-building. It was in this context, I suggest, that national officials 
inaugurated practices of hierarchical membership in a legal fiction of continuity with the 
previous Yugoslav politics of recognition. Invoking the past membership regime was 
instrumental to legitimising national claims and the setting up of hierarchies among 
population groups. While the literature largely presents Croatia’s state-building project as one 
of homogenisation, clear hierarchies in the allocation of status (who can be self-determined?) 
and rights (how is self-determination exercised?) existed. It appears then that in the 1990s 
Croatian state, various categories can be identified, in relation to the rights granted or denied 
to them. In looking at the practices through which Croatia drew the boundaries of its political 
community, I have identified three categories of included/excluded individuals.  
 
The first category was – and still is - constituted of ethnic Croats totally included. Two cases 
specifically entered into this category: ethnic Croats living on the territory of the newly 
proclaimed independent state, and the diaspora. The definition of Croatia’s self-determination 
in ethnic terms directly translated into the inclusion in the body politic of those ethnic 
“Croats” living abroad. Individuals belonging to the broadly defined diaspora were given the 
possibility to acquire a double, Croatian, citizenship and the right to vote at Croatian 
elections, even while remaining in their country of residence or origin. Official numbers on 
naturalisations of co-ethnics abroad are, however, not publicly available, the Croatian 
Ministry of Interior considering it a confidential matter. To be granted citizenship, for the 
diaspora, what mattered at the start of the 1990s was being able to loosely demonstrate one’s 
ethnicity (art.11 of the citizenship law). Conversely, individuals associated to other ethnic 
groups living in Croatia had endorsed Croatian culture and customs.  
 
With regard to the diaspora, two separate typologies were, and actually still are, considered in 
the citizenship law: first, the diaspora living in the far abroad; second, and more ambiguously, 
the diaspora living in the near abroad, namely in other SSFY. This second group has 
specifically benefitted from facilitated naturalisation procedures and is mainly embodied by 
Croats from Herzegovina.587 When the citizenship law was enacted in 1991, both Tudjman 
and Milosevic had projects of territorial expansion. Tudjman’s project of “Great Croatia” 
specifically, included the whole of the territory of Herzegovina.588 As Bosnian statehood was 
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internationally recognised, Croats from Bosnia principally living in Herzegovina were 
granted, as an alternative to territorial annexation, Croatian citizenship.589 After all, following 
Yugoslav politics of recognition they were “as” ethnically Croats as ethnic Croats in Croatia.  
 
Minorities recognised during Socialist Yugoslavia, as well as other “nationalities” of 
Yugoslavia – exclusive of Serbs - constituted the second category, that is, the non-ethnic 
partially included. These were, following the 1990 Constitution: Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, 
Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and Ruthenians. Interestingly, while in 
1919 only four minorities had been recognised internationally, the then available census of 
1910 recognised exactly these same nine groups.590  Whereas individuals associated to 
minorities had a legal citizenship status, as said, for a whole decade, they were simply denied 
political rights.  
 
The third category, the internal excluded, was constituted by ethnic Serbs. Reference to Serbs 
of Croatia almost inevitably brings to mind the events of the 1995 military operation Storm, 
led by the Croatian Army. The primary objective of this operation had been the re-
appropriation of the Serbian “occupied” region of Krajina. During this operation between 200 
000 and 250 000 Serbs, former citizens of the Croatian Socialist Republic, were either killed 
or forced to leave Croatia to find refuge in one of the neighbouring states - principally Bosnia 
and Serbia.591 Since 1995 national media, history books and state officials have come to 
describe operation Storm as the homeland’s war of liberation from Serbs.592 However, these 
views obscure the fact that these were the very same individuals who were citizens of the 
Croatian Republic, until the dissolution. In 1991, they were simply denied the status of 
Croatian citizenship and were asked to formally reapply to become members of the new 
independent state of Croatia. 
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Individuals associated during the years of Socialist Yugoslavia to nations without a 
“homeland” embodied the fourth group of discriminated people, falling into the category of 
internal excluded. This was the case of Roma people and Vlachs who, differently from other 
recognised minorities in Croatia, did not have a kin-state to which they could refer. During 
the 1990s they were less visibly discriminated than Serbs. Yet, this was so for the simple 
reason that, in continuity with Yugoslav politics of recognition, these groups were not visible 
in any public debate. Domestically, they were excluded from the national project of Croat 
self-determination. Internationally, the concern with regard to Croatia was directed towards 
the treatment of ethnic Serbs. It was only at the end of the 1990s that discrimination against 
Roma people became an issue of international debate. Namely, when the OSCE and the EU 
politicised the matter and made of minority protection one of the explicit criteria for EU 
membership.  
 
Croatia’s Politics of Self-Determination and EU Conditional Membership 
 
Practices of hierarchical membership were initiated in Croatia before the EC Committee’s 
disciplining role, though in some sense, Tudjman found in the opinions of the Committee a 
legitimising ground. The uneven allocation of rights to population groups was in fact justified 
in the name of Croatia’s right to self-determination. Be it because of the violence in Bosnia, 
or perhaps a sense of continuity with international society’s commitment to liberal pluralism 
in the early 1990s, for a whole decade, Croatia’s discriminatory practices were internationally 
tolerated.  
 
With Tudjman’s death in 1999, Croatia started to show its will to join the European Union. It 
soon became clear that if Croatia wanted to become a member of the EU, it was required to 
adapt domestically to regional integration. The EU asked Croatia to take several legal and 
normative provisions and to conform to EU liberal standards on rule of law, human rights, 
democracy and the liberal market.593 These standards related primarily to the endorsement, by 
Croatia, of the EU acquis requirements. As set in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union 
“any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1)” (Art. 49), that is, 
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“the principles of liberty, democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law” (Art. 6/1) may apply to become a member of the EU.594   
 
Croatia was also asked to respect “specific conditions related to stability - namely, respect for 
existing peace treaties and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia - and to regional cooperation.”595 Croatia was the object of an “enhanced 
conditionality,”596 as the EU made clear that it would “maintain a stricter observation of the 
progress made in satisfying the conditions [posed].”597 EU Politics literature largely presents 
“EU conditionality” as the most efficient tool of “democratisation” and “domestic change,” as 
it requires legal adaptation to EU standards.598 Other scholars have put in evidence instead the 
significant analogies between EU conditionality and the 19th century standard of 
civilisation.599 For instance, Yannis Stivachtis has made the point very clearly in his piece 
(and title) “Civilisation and International Society: the Case of European Union Expansion.”600 
Stivachtis makes the analogy between 19th century and EU accession practices, stressing the 
“civilisation dimension embedded in membership conditionality.”601 Hartmut Behr has made 
a similar point. In the 19th century “standards of civilisation decided which non-European 
nations were eligible to interact with European nations, and if a nations was perceived as 
eligible (or civilised), the method of interaction;” similarly, he claims these dimensions are 
embedded in EU accession policies.602  
 
In light of these interpretations, we can also locate the “enhanced conditionality” measures for 
Croatia in the EU civilisational project. In other words, the EU might have set stronger 
conditions and expectations for what it assumes are less liberal, or perhaps less civilised, 
practices. Following the endorsement of the Pact of Stability with South-Eastern Europe in 
1999, the EU did after all directly call into question the Croatian politics of self-determination 
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as undertaken in 1990. It repeatedly asked Croatian authorities to change its citizenship law 
and comply with other EU guidelines on human rights and minority rights. 603 In other words, 
for nine years (the longest process of accession in the history of the EU), the EU asked 
Croatia to redefine its domestic order and political community as defined in the early 1990s, 
in order to reach European standards and gain EU membership.  
 
Viewed in these terms, the post-Cold War European context becomes a specific normative 
environment, promoting liberal ideas about membership and rights. An interpretivist approach 
suggests that this normative environment is generative in two ways. First, it creates the 
possibility for an international (or European) judgment in relation to the organisation of 
domestic orders and to the treatment of internal societies. This has translated, for instance, 
into the EU’s expressed demand for Croatia to adapt its minorities and citizenship provisions. 
Second, as the EU has become a liberal zone of practice and identities, it also fosters 
standards of rightful state conduct and membership within it.  
 
Concerning specifically the definition of the boundaries of national citizenship (both as a 
status and as a set of rights), a clearly identifiable European model does not exist. The EU 
claims to be promoting a sort of archetypal conception of liberal citizenship defined in terms 
of equality of membership, and inclusiveness of right. However, how the assessment is made, 
as to when an aspirational candidate conforms to such expectations, is not fully clear. To be 
sure, the respect of human and citizenship rights, democracy and minority rights have 
constituted the “conditionality package” to which Croatia had to conform, if hoping to 
become a member of the European society of states.  
 
Croatia joined the EU in 2013, though while it has integrated in its legislation provisions on 
minority rights and non-discrimination, it has not changed its exclusive citizenship law. 
Certainly, reasons for that can be attributed to the fact that, after all, the establishment of a 
citizenship law falls under the competence of national governments and that, in this sense, the 
EU cannot deal with the matter. Nevertheless, the same day that Croatia celebrated its 
accession, EU representatives made it clear that although Croatia had become a member of 
European international society, Brussels was still concerned about its domestic practices and 
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guarantees of equality.604 It might be too early to tell but it is not implausible to interpret this 
and ensuing EU reminders as a somewhat ambiguous rhetoric of differentiation. A rhetoric 
that underlines that even after accession, the status of Croatia is perhaps not as equal, after all, 
as other members of the European family of nations.  
 
The Case of Bosnia: War, Ethnicity, and the Responsible State 
 
Like Croatia, Bosnia was recognised internationally following a referendum on independence. 
Already at the end of 1991, in its third opinion, the Badinter Committee had acknowledged as 
international the borders between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. However, as said earlier, the 
recognition of Bosnia as a sovereign state had been delayed following opinion 4, until the 
organisation of a referendum. The referendum was held between 29th February and 1st March 
1992. Shortly after, on 6th April 1992, the EC and US together recognised Bosnia as sovereign 
and independent. On 22nd May, Bosnia was admitted to the UN. Yet, the events that 
surrounded the referendum, declaration and recognition of independence led Bosnia 
simultaneously to the start of a much more violent war than in the other successor states. As 
put by Martii Kosnenniemi, the war in Bosnia has brought in fact to international attention 
that nationalism in Yugoslavia, has been an “onion problem.” Who represents the minority 
and who the majority is in fact simply a matter of location and perspective.605  
 
War and the crystallisation of difference 
 
In 1991, several recognised ethnic groups co-existed in Bosnia, in wider a variation of 
proportion, when compared to the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia. According 
to the 1991 census, the four principal groups were Muslims (Bosniaks) who constituted 
43.47% of the total population, Serbs 31.21%, Croats 17.38%, and Yugoslavs (namely, those 
who from 1971 endorsed their ethno-national origin as Yugoslav) 5.54%.606 As we have seen, 
however, differing from the other ethnic majorities in the rest of the Yugoslav republics, 
Muslims were never recognised as a constituent people, with Bosnia as their kin republic. 
Instead, ethnic Croats and Serbs in Bosnia found themselves in 1991 with each, respectively, 
a kin state. In addition, both Milosevic and Tudjman included important parts of the Bosnian 
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territory in their respective expansionist project. Hence, in March 1991, Milosevic and 
Tudjman met in Tito’s old hunting lodge of Karadjordjevo, to talk about a potential partition 
of Bosnia between the two. 607 No agreement was found. Less than a year later, the 
inviolability of the borders of Bosnia was acknowledged through the Badinter opinions. Alija 
Izetbegovic, who had won at the last federal elections, became the internationally recognised 
leader of the new country, along with his SDA party (“Party of Democratic Action”), 
membership of which was based on identifying as a Muslim. 
 
The issue of the independence of Bosnia was therefore different than for the other constituent 
republics of Yugoslavia. In the other successor states the coincidence between the nation and 
the state was “easily” solved by the newly proclaimed national élites: each republic entitled to 
self-determination had a respective constituent people defined in ethnic terms. In Bosnia, 
though, three groups claimed the same territory. In this context the first citizenship law of 
Bosnia was enacted, in 1992. As the war progressed, however, questions of citizenship 
allocation and rights became irrelevant.  
 
According to the 1991 census, undertaken before the start of the war and the changes in the 
ethnic composition of the population, Croat populations were concentrated in Herzegovina, 
Muslims principally inhabited the areas surrounding Bihac, Sarajevo and the East of the 
country. Serbs instead were spread throughout the remainder of the territory. With the 
organisation of collective displacements and killings following ethnic lines during the war, 
the demographic structure of the country changed radically. For example, the proportion of 
Muslims that inhabited Hercegovina decreased and so did those of Croats and Muslims living 
in Republika Srpska. However, the exact shifts in demographics are not yet known. After 
years of discussions a census was finally organised in 2013. The results, however, have not 
yet been released. Additionally complicating the picture, though they were never recognised, 
during the war two self-proclaimed republics coexisted, in the Serb and Croat inhabited areas 
respectively: Republika Srpska (RS) and the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. 
 
Republika Srpska was created in a movement of opposition to the claims of self-
determination taking place in Bosnia. In October 1991, Serbian deputies principally belonging 
to Milosevic’s Serb Democratic Party opposed the “sovereignty memorandum” for 
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independence, presented at the Bosnian parliament. A few months later, they persuaded the 
Serbian population of Bosnia to boycott the referendum on independence. At the end of 
October 1991, Serb parliamentarians formed the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia-
Hercegovina, ending the tripartite association at the parliament that had been set up a year 
earlier by the political representatives of each ethnic group. This tripartite understanding had 
been established following the release of the 1991 population census, so as to proportionally 
represent within national institutions each ethnic group. In January 1992, the constitution of 
the Republic of the Serb people of Bosnia was released. In April, namely a day after the 
international recognition of Bosnia, Republika Srpska declared its independence and its union 
with Yugoslavia, in support of Milosevic.  
 
In the name of Republika Srpska’s somehow (mis)interpreted self-determination, a month 
later Radovan Karadzic announced, before the newly formed Bosnian Serb Assembly, the 
political programme of the republic, in six strategic points. All the points touched upon the 
drawing of the territorial borders of the newly proclaimed republic. The first point specifically 
concerned the need to quickly establish the borders that would divide Serbs from the two 
other main ethnic communities.608 Karadzic also proclaimed the formation of a republic army, 
with, as its Chief of Staff, General Ratko Mladic. Karadzic suggested that Republika Srpska’s 
territory would also include the areas in which Serbs had been allegedly, during World War 
II, a majority and had become a minority during the partisans’ “persecutions.” The 
accomplishment of RS’ self-determination was understood in terms of the constitution of an 
ethnically pure entity. To change the ethnic balance of the area, every means was used: from 
massive displacements and village fires to rapes and killings. According to a written 
document submitted in 2004 to the ECOSOC, following the war 135 386 individuals of 
Croatian ethnicity and 434 144 Muslims were missing from the territory of RS.609 In parallel, 
the Serb population was increased via the introduction during the war of ethnic Serbs from 
other areas of Bosnia as well as, from August 1995, from Croatian Krajina.  
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While, during the war, most of the international and media attention was directed to the RS, 
both because of the violence of the ethnic Serb expansionist project and the general 
stigmatisation of Milosevic, a parallel state to Croatia was set up. This was the Croatian 
Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Proclaimed in April 1992, it was deemed illegal internationally a 
few months later, though it continued to exist informally until 1995 and was recognised by 
Croatia.610 Similarly to political leaders of the RS, those of the self-proclaimed republic 
undertook persecutions and deportations of Muslims and non-Croat populations. The purpose 
was the creation of an ethnically pure, Croatian, area within Bosnia. 611 In addition to gross 
violations of human rights, a whole regime of hierarchical allocation of rights and privileges 
also existed for ethnic Croats, coinciding, as discussed in the previous section on Croatia, 
with Tudjman’s project of Croatian self-determination.  
 
To make sense of Tudjman’s expansionist visions in Bosnia, Francesco Ragazzi has spoken 
about a “de facto annexation of Herceg-Bosna” during the war years. Hence, through the 
Croatian citizenship law enacted at the end of 1991, between 500,000 and 800,000 citizens of 
Bosnia, ethnically Croats, were naturalised, becoming also citizens of Croatia and thereby 
acquiring the right to vote.612 These individuals voted in mass for Tudjman’s party, the HDZ, 
which promised them several privileges. During the war, the HDZ-BIH was principally a 
channel of communication and exchange between Zagreb and the local politicians. Following 
Ragazzi, during the war this happened importantly through the informal financing of the 
separatist Croat army, the Croatian Defence Council. In addition, during and after the war, 
and perhaps even until the death of Tudjman, the HDZ continued to fund banks, schools and 
social institutions exclusively for ethnic Croats in the Hercegovina area.613 
 
Throughout the war, both UN and EC representatives proposed several peace plans, to settle 
the territorial aspirations of the three principal ethnic groups. Already in February 1992, at 
what had then become the International Conference for Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington and José 
Cutileiro proposed a system of ethnic power-sharing, paralleled by a territorial 
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decentralisation following ethnic lines. The plan was immediately rejected by the Bosnian 
Muslims, who sought for a larger share of territory, proportional to the size of its population. 
During the war three other peace plans were proposed. In January 1993 the Vance-Owen plan 
for a centralised state was presented, though Bosnian Serbs rejected it, as their territorial 
expansion had already, importantly, progressed. In August 1993 another plan in which 
Bosnian Serbs would get 52% of the territory was presented. Bosniaks, to whom only 30% of 
the territory would be granted, rejected it. The last attempt before Dayton came from the 
Contact Group, an informal association of powerful countries including the UK, the US, 
France, Italy, Germany and Russia, formed specifically to find a solution to the Bosnian war. 
Between February and October 1994 the Group presented several proposals. However, they 
were all rejected by Bosnian Serbs. Meantime, despite the deployment of both UNPROFOR 
and IFOR (NATO) forces, violence was not decreasing, in particular on the Serbian side. In 
July 1995, the media made public the images of the massacre in the UN protected area of 
Srebrenica, for which Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic were internationally indicted.614 
The NATO military campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, was thus organised, to end 
violence in Republika Srpska and to lead the actors locally involved to peace talks.  
 
The Dayton peace talks officially started on 1st November 1995 and lasted until 21st 
November. In his memoirs, the architect of Dayton and US assistant secretary of state for 
European and Eurasian affairs, Richard Holbrooke, wrote that the conditio sine qua non for 
the success of the talks was that only Milosevic (in contact with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko 
Mladic, both indicted by the ICTY), Tudjman and Izetbegovic, accompanied by their 
delegations were permitted to attend the conference. They were asked to remain in Dayton 
until an arrangement was found, without talking to the press and without the need of an 
agreement from home parliaments.615 The two major goals were to transform the 60 days pre-
talks ceasefire into a stable peace plan, and to settle the multi-ethnic question. In twenty days, 
under a great deal of pressure and disagreement among the delegations, as well as among the 
international peacemakers, an accord was finally found.616  
 
                                            
614 As of today (December 2014), both Karadzic and Mladic are still on trial at the ICTY. Karadzic: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis_karadzic_en.pdf ; Mladic: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf  
615 Holbrooke, To End a War, 200. 
616 Ibid., Part III (Dayton) In his mémoirs, Holbrooke recalls his experience in Dayton as an American diplomat 
day per day, highlighting the difficulties and tensions on each side. 
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After Dayton 
 
The Dayton Agreement partitioned Bosnia into two parts, Republika Srprska with 49% of the 
territory and the federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina with 51%, combining both Muslim 
and Croat populations. Because of its contested nature, it left aside the district of Brcko, a 
neutral self-governing district in the North of Bosnia. Problematically, the Dayton Agreement 
maintained for the Serbian populated areas the name Republika Srpska. First, this implied the 
existence of a “special” entity within Bosnia, carrying the name of Republic within a 
sovereign state - the other entity being called the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. It 
has since inevitably continued to evoke the Bosnian Serb attempt to homogenise a whole part 
of Bosnia. Dayton also established the new Constitution of Bosnia (annex IV) still in force 
today, as well as the citizenship law in effect until 1999 (Citizenship Act, in annex IV). 
 
The Agreement contains many inconsistencies with regard to membership and citizenship 
rights. Most importantly for us, Bosnia’s political community was inaugurated on very 
contradictory grounds. Following the Dayton Constitution for Bosnia, the allegedly new 
domestic liberal regime would conceive human rights of individuals as inalienable and 
described them as never secondary to those of national groups. In the citizenship act however, 
made up of a set of power-sharing agreements, ethnic groups had political supremacy over 
individuals.617 This remained the case later, when in 1999, the National Citizenship Law 
replaced Dayton’s Citizenship Act. Interestingly, it was the Office of High Representative 
(OHR) in Bosnia that, with local representatives, elaborated the content of this law. The 
drafting of a citizenship law constituted, in line with other internationally defined conditions, 
an explicit requirement “to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and 
viable democracy on course for integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions.”618 
 
Moreover, the Constitution of Bosnia as established in Dayton makes a clear distinction 
between the constituent peoples and other citizens of Bosnia. Those who do not belong to one 
of the three groups, or who do not want to show a preference for an ethnic group “are 
disenfranchised from electing their group representatives in the country’s political 
                                            
617 Sarajlić, “The Bosnian Triangle: Ethnicity, Politics and Citizenship,” 1. 
618 Official statement of the OHR, introduction. 2007 (updated in 2012): http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-
info/default.asp?content_id=38519  
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institutions.”619 In other words, in a country where since 1995 membership has been primarily 
defined in ethnic terms, constitutionally, only the three major ethnic groups in the country 
share power in state institutions.620 The voting system itself therefore “prevents individuals 
from transcending ethnic boundaries and electing members of other ethnic groups as their 
representatives.”621 Consequently, groups not acknowledged in the constitution have been 
denied full access to the Bosnian political community. The document does also refer to 
“equality” and non-discrimination – though not in relation to the allocation of rights.  
 
From 1995, the idea that individuals’ interests could only be upheld or represented by 
someone of the same ethnicity has crystallised, in some sense, some of the war discriminatory 
categories. The point has been made already that post-Dayton Bosnia displays, in fact, in 
particular at the level of each entity, a hierarchical rights regime grounded in older categories 
of politics of recognition.622 These practices have been facilitated both nationally and at the 
local level, as, in compliance with the Dayton Agreement, group-differentiated rights have 
been married to territorial ones.  
 
Following the territorial partition within the country, the Dayton Agreement established the 
existence of two citizenships in Bosnia: national, and entity. Each entity has thus its own 
citizenship law and is in charge of the birth, residence and naturalisation records. Entity 
citizenship laws provide that all citizens of Bosnia who resided on the territory of one of the 
two entities from 6th April 1992, namely from the start of the war, are to be considered 
citizens of that entity. The right to vote was – and still is - allocated according to the entity of 
residence.623 Legally, it is possible to change entity citizenship. In practice however, the 
matter has proven far more complicated. In line with the Dayton Agreement, each entity 
constitution has special provisions, which define them since 1995 as exclusive dominions of 
their ethnic majorities. 
 
                                            
619 Sarajlić, “Conceptualising Citizenship Regime(s) in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 24.  
620 Pupavac, “Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in SFR Yugoslavia and Bosnia,” 12. In her article Pupavac 
describes in detail the limits of what she clams is liberal multiculturalism in Bosnia. 
621 Sarajlić, “Conceptualising Citizenship Regime(s) in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 24. 
622 Pupavac, “Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in SFR Yugoslavia and Bosnia,” 7; Sarajlić, “Conceptualising 
Citizenship Regime(s) in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina”; Sarajlić, “The Bosnian Triangle: Ethnicity, 
Politics and Citizenship.” 
623 Sarajlić, “The Bosnian Triangle: Ethnicity, Politics and Citizenship,” 15. 
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Indeed, in post-Dayton Bosnia, several overlapping (and hierarchical) membership regimes 
existed: first, the national one that differentiated both the three constituent groups and other 
minorities; second, the entity regimes, each with their own hierarchies locally developed. 
Third, within the FBIH itself, a further differentiation has existed between Muslims and 
Croats, visible for example in Mostar, a town divided between these two constituent ethnic 
groups.624 The Dayton agreement has legalised what were pre-existing membership categories 
in Yugoslavia, but in so doing, it has also recognised, hierarchically, certain claims over 
others. Not only has Dayton made of ethnic groups the primary locus of identity. Difference 
has also been institutionalised, allowing for the development of local hierarchies in rights 
allocation according to the group of origin. To be sure, the Dayton Framework Agreement for 
Peace was meant to be a temporary solution negotiated in just twenty days, to be modified 
during Bosnia’s politics of state formation. However, as of today, the Bosnian Constitution as 
set up in its Annex 4 has never been modified. Equality of rights, political equality and human 
rights are claimed, whereas rights and membership follow obvious hierarchical lines.  
 
The realisation of self-determination and sovereignty as responsibility 
 
In order to enforce the Framework Agreement, the Dayton conference set up the Office of 
High Representative (OHR). As set in the Agreement, since 1995, the OHR has been in 
charge of “monitoring the implementation of the peace settlement,” to “maintain close contact 
with the parties to the Agreement and promote their full compliance,” “coordinate the 
activities of the civilian organisations” (…), “giving general guidance,” “facilitate, as the high 
representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with 
civilian implementation.” 625 Accordingly the OHR has been in charge of monitoring the 
enforcement of what is, as we have seen, a complex and contradictory framework for 
membership in Bosnia. Despite its hierarchical component, the OHR has, at the same time, 
fostered a political discourse about political equality, equality of rights, non-discrimination 
and human rights. That this egalitarian narrative sits uncomfortably with an externally defined 
hierarchical regime, seems to not really matter. This contradiction (and others) is best 
crystallised in the 1998 Madrid Declaration of the OHR’s Peace Implementation Council: 
 
                                            
624 See on the matter Vetters, “The Power of Administrative Categories.” 
625 Article II, Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement. 
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 “BiH must become a modern democratic country, where all citizens are equal before the law, 
destined to be an integral member of the European family. It must also be a country in which 
historical, cultural and linguistic and religious traditions are valued and respected where 
diversity is a source of strength not division.”626 
 
References to Bosnia’s “genuine” enforcement of liberal democracy, and to “true” security in 
the name of non-discrimination have been recurrent, both by the OHR and the OSCE Mission 
in Bosnia. As both international missions have repeatedly stated, Bosnia “must” (using the 
same language as the OHR) show that it is able to become accountable towards its own 
citizens. This, it is claimed, can only happen through the enforcement of liberal standards of 
conduct. International parties, in turn, are there to “help” in delineating standards of conduct 
and to monitor their enforcement. For example, the OSCE Mission Programme on Equality 
and Non-Discrimination both “advocates for the elimination of discriminatory laws, policies 
and practices and technically supports the capacities of governmental institutions to meet their 
obligations to deliver and enforce such rights.”627 How this is supposed to happen, however, 
given the very framework of Dayton, is not fully clear.  
 
In spite of these contradictions, international society constantly monitors, through 
increasingly specific and articulated mechanisms, Bosnia’s “state of advancement” towards 
the enforcement of liberal standards. As such, since 1995 both the OSCE’s and the OHR’s 
official statements have repeatedly made the point that Bosnia is not yet “able to take full 
responsibility for its own affairs.” 628In 1998, the OHR’s Peace Implementation Council 
stated that, “democracy is taking root in BiH, but it needs to be reinforced at every level.” 
What “taking root” meant and when the OHR would deem that it is fully realised, however, 
remained unclear. In fact, almost fifteen years later, the OHR seems to consider in its reports 
that despite “progress,” the Bosnian government is not yet democratic enough.629  
 
                                            
626 http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5190  
627 Statement of presentation of this specific programme of the Osce Mission in Bosnia: 
hhttp://www.oscebih.org/Default.aspx?id=51&lang=EN 
628 Official statement of the OHR, introduction. 2007 (updated in 2012): http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-
info/default.asp?content_id=38519 
629 The various 2014 reports in fact all make the same point: “the downward trajectory the country has been on 
during the last eight years continued, with governing institutions and political leaders failing to advance on a 
broad range of reforms, including the conditions set for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to move towards Euro-
Atlantic integration.” Available online: http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/archive.asp?sa=on 
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While the OHR claims “to give citizens real control over their own lives,” 630 Bosnia’s 
complete realisation of self-determination - externally delineated by international norms and 
ad hoc measures - is yet to come. As put by Nehal Bhuta, “instituting [the] vision of the good 
constitutional order is also claimed [by international actors] to be a means of realising another 
fundamental principle of the contemporary international order: self-determination.” 631 This is 
ironic, as Bosnia has been an independent state, and member of the United Nations, since 
1992. 
 
The establishment of the international supervisory regime in Bosnia has led numerous 
scholars to make the analogy with colonial and trusteeship practices.632 William Bain in 
particular has argued that the OHR, along with international missions in Kosovo and East 
Timor, “has seen a return to trusteeship practices,” overtaken in the Cold War years by the 
right of self-determination.633 He claims that “trusteeship practices” are, however, historically 
inherent to international society.634 In 1995 then, the OHR took on the task of governing the 
country. The OHR is “empowered to promulgate law and to remove elected officials, even 
those of the highest rank, who are judged to be in violation of the Peace Agreement or the 
terms of its implementation.”635 In no way, though, is the OHR accountable for the decisions 
it takes on local institutions and citizens.636 I have shown through my previous chapters that 
Bain’s understanding of self-determination is more a reflection of a certain historical context 
(the Cold War and decolonisation) than of the substance of the idea itself. Historically, self-
determination has always been associated with internationally defined expectations and 
responsibilities, bearing direct implications on the nature of statehood. Bosnia, I hope to have 
shown, is thus no exception to this trend and this, I believe, should not be seen as in 
contradiction with Bain’s argument.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
630 Point 12.4 of the Madrid Declaration 
631 Bhuta, “New Modes and Orders,” 804. 
632 See respectively Chandler, Bosnia Faking Democracy after Dayton; Bain, Between Anarchy and Society, 
2003. 
633 Bain, Between Anarchy and Society, 2003, 129. 
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The Case of Kosovo: Self-Determination and Conditional Sovereignty 
 
Let us now though go back in time and contextualise the story of Kosovo. In what was in the 
early 1990s Yugoslavia, a context marked by increasingly visible independence claims, 
Kosovo Albanians thought that they too could take advantage of this moment. Throughout the 
1980s, relationships between Serbia and Kosovo, as we have seen in the previous chapter, had 
become increasingly tense. In September 1991, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 
formed in 1989 to counter Milosevic’s oppressive policies and banned by Yugoslav/Serbian 
authorities, organised a referendum on independence. 87% of the voters chose independence. 
The plebiscite, massively boycotted by Serbs following Milosevic’s instructions, was 
declared illegal by Belgrade. In October 1991, “Republika Kosova” declared its 
independence, and was immediately recognised by Albania. No one else, however, took 
Kosovo’s claims seriously, as the Badinter Committee concluded that only former Socialist 
Republics would be recognised as having a right of self-determination. In fact, “Kosovo was 
the only entity that asked for an opinion to the Badinter commission but did not receive 
any.” 637  As indicated later by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 
international society feared that giving way to Kosovo’s claim would lead to a “never-ending 
process of political fragmentation.”638  
 
In turn, while Albanian leaders claimed that Kosovo Albanians were a people with a territory 
and for this reason were also entitled to self-determination, Belgrade claimed that Kosovo 
Albanians were only a minority in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Because 
Yugoslav membership politics were grounded on equality, Belgrade argued, they were not 
supposed to have any special recognition or right. The argument that Serbian authorities held 
was that, in continuity with previous Yugoslav practices, “however one chose to read the 
1974 constitution, neither the jurisdiction of Kosovo nor the Kosovo Albanians had a right of 
self‐determination: Kosovo was not a republic of Yugoslavia but a province of one of its 
republics, and the Kosovo Albanians were not a constituent nation but a nationality.”639  
 
As Kosovo’s independence claims were discounted throughout the 1990s, violence and 
discrimination increased. In May 1992, Ibrahim Rugova, at the head of the Democratic 
                                            
637 Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society, 36. 
638 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 58. 
639 Fabry, Recognizing States, 191–192. 
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League of Kosovo (LDK), won the clandestine elections and became president of the 
unrecognised Republika Kosova. From then on the LDK sought to create, by peaceful means, 
parallel rules and institutions to Serbian ones. Rugova favoured what Nicholas Wheeler has 
called a “Gandhian style politics of non violence,” 640 against the will, and with the violent 
reaction, of Belgrade. Throughout the whole of the 1990s Rugova did not react to Milosevic’s 
instigations of violence, losing, in turn, the support of many Kosovars. In this context, 
discrimination was initiated on the Serbian side that quickly led to what Heather Rae has 
termed “pathological homogenisation,” namely “forced assimilation, expulsion, genocide.”641 
Discrimination was not perceptible within the FRY’s legal documents. Indeed, the 1990 
Constitution and 1992 citizenship law did not bear any trace of “ethnification,” establishing 
instead a fiction of Yugoslav citizenship for all the previous residents of the Socialist 
Republics of Montenegro and Serbia.642 In practice though, equality was certainly not part of 
Belgrade’s political agenda.643  
 
First and foremost, hierarchical membership for Kosovar Albanians was embodied in the 
1989 revocation by Belgrade of the status of autonomous province gained by Kosovo and 
Vojvodina in 1974. With the loss of its special statute, which, for ten years, guaranteed, inter 
alia, special cultural rights for Albanians, Kosovo was simply turned into a Serbian region. 
According to Milosevic, it was a region “at the heart of Serbia,” inhabited, nonetheless, by the 
Albanian minority. Uttered in the name of a pretended equality, politics of “reserbianisation” 
implied the cancellation of special political and cultural rights for minorities. Most visibly, 
schools, newspapers and radios were closed, as Serbia integrated a new school programme. 
Also, and related to Belgrade’s “language policies”, minorities’ political parties were deemed 
illegal.  
 
As a reaction to the augmenting discriminations towards the Albanian minority and the 
absence of any firm reaction on the side of Rugova, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) was 
founded in 1996. An ethnic Albanian paramilitary organisation, the UCK started its first 
military campaigns against Serbian militias and civilian populations right after its creation, 
leading to a refugee crisis on both sides. In 1998 there were already between 200,000 and 
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300,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees.644 Kosovar Albanians who fled 
abroad automatically lost their citizenship. In turn, for those Serbian refugees from other 
states who had fled to their kin-state, the option was given of immediate Serbian citizenship, 
if settling in Kosovo (or Vojvodina, inhabited by a Hungarian majority). This double 
procedure was facilitated by the fact that even though Serbia was formally in a federation 
with Montenegro, republican citizenship depended upon the Serbian Ministry of Interior, 
accountable only to Milosevic.  
 
In 1998, the UCK launched an important offensive against Serbs in the Drenica Valley, 
followed by a violent counter reaction by Belgrade. The first step to internationalise the 
matter was taken in March 1998 by the Security Council through its Resolution 1160, which 
made of the Kosovo crisis an issue of international peace and security, entrenching it in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, Serbian repressions and UCK campaigns 
continued. Two additional resolutions were adopted: resolution 1199 in September 1998 and 
1203 a month later. Both recalled the Security Council’s preoccupations as to human rights 
violations, Serbia’s territorial integrity and, increasingly, the need for a “substantially greater 
degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration” for Kosovo.645 In January 1999 
however, the Kosovo Verification Mission received a report stating that civilians of Albanian 
origin were being killed on a massive scale in Racak, under the direct orders of Milosevic’s 
office.646  
 
A month later, the Contact Group and NATO organised a conference, in Rambouillet, seeking 
to find a solution through Richard Holbrooke’s mediation. After a long negotiation, in March 
the British, American and Albanian delegations signed the “Rambouillet Accords.” 
Milosevic, however, refused to sign as, he argued, too much autonomy was granted to 
Kosovo through the recognition of special social and political rights for Albanians, under the 
authority of locally established institutions.647 Violence continued and, on 24th March, 1999, 
NATO launched Operation Allied Force.648 
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227
 Kosovo 1999-2008 
 
Operation Allied Force was followed by the immediate adoption of Security Council 
resolution 1244, establishing that the United Nations would be in charge of the International 
Transitional Authority (ITA) through the presence of a specific Mission, the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General was thereby granted special powers, similarly to the Bosnian case, though 
pending a final status solution for Kosovo. In June 1999, following the military operation, it 
was obvious that Kosovo would not go back to its status as province under Belgrade’s 
authority. However, no international consensus existed as to its future status. While the 1999 
Kosovo Report “concluded that the best available option for the future of Kosovo [was] 
conditional independence,”649 Serbia explicitly refused any discussion on the matter.  
 
The UNMIK therefore chose, not unlike Bosnia, a “step-by-step approach,” recommended by 
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo,650 in its participation in building 
“accountable” - a word repeatedly used by international actors on the ground - foundations 
and institutions for Kosovo. The December 2000 UNMIK Report referred explicitly to the 
endorsement of democracy as being conditional for “Kosovo’s path to self-governance,” as 
“increased responsibility in the arena of self-governance is linked to mature political and 
civic behaviour” (my emphasis).651 Such “maturity” was described explicitly in following 
reports, suggesting that Kosovo’s self-governing institutions ought to be “responsible” for 
“good governance, human rights, and equal opportunities.”652  
 
In 2001, the UNMIK enacted a “Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government 
in Kosovo.” Besides formally establishing local self-governing institutions, the framework 
did not address directly the issue of Kosovo’s future status. It mentioned in its foreword that: 
“This is a truly historic document: It will guide the people of Kosovo toward the 
establishment of democratic structures, and its successful implementation will greatly assist 
                                            
649 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 9. 
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228
the process of determining Kosovo’s final status.”653 The inauguration of “democratic” 
institutions, it was argued, would have helped in the matter. Meanwhile, however, waiting 
was the safest option. In 2003, a set of UN established benchmarks for the “good governance” 
and “democratisation” of Kosovo, giving birth to what became later the “Standards Before 
Status” policy were, in turn, enacted.654 The possibility of a discussion on the realisation of 
Kosovo’s (democratic, to be sure) self-determination was thus explicitly made conditional 
upon the endorsement of those same liberal democratic standards and values underlined in 
Bosnia.655  
 
The 2001 UNMIK Constitutional Framework also explicitly reiterated ideas of both 
responsibility and accountability of Kosovar self-governed institutions with regard to equality 
and human rights.656 These thus were later summed up in the 2005 Security Council Report 
“Standards Before Status” for a “A Kosovo where all – regardless of ethnic background, race 
or religion – are free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger and where there 
is tolerance, justice and peace for everyone.”657 In parallel, similar to Bosnia, after 1999, the 
OSCE mission in Kosovo also stressed Kosovo had the “responsibility” to uphold equality 
and respect for human rights. In particular, Kosovo had the responsibility to organise equal 
elections. Again, the responsibilities stressed by the OSCE evoke those attached to the 
realisation of self-determination in 1991 and, even more so, the responsibilities that the 
Bosnian government was required to fulfil. The difference was that for Kosovo, adapting to 
international norms and rules was the condition that needed to be fulfilled, to even initiate 
considerations on its future status.  
 
In 2005, the Security Council stated that it was at last possible to start thinking about a “final” 
status for Kosovo. This statement was the result of the UN-commissioned report elaborated 
by Kai Eide, under the auspices of the Secretary General, recommending that the status 
process should begin.658 The decision to launch it stemmed from the observation that local 
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actors were, after all, responsible enough, even though the implementation of the standards 
had been uneven.659  
 
The Kosovo Status Process was launched in 2005 and UN special envoy Martii Ahtisaari was 
appointed to start consultations with the involved parties, negotiate and establish a road map 
for Kosovo. Interestingly, from 1992 to 1994 Ahtisaari had been the president of the Bosnia 
Working Group of the International Conference of Yugoslavia. 660  He advanced a 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement in 2007, supported by the US, the 
EU and by Kosovo authorities. While independence was not explicitly mentioned as such, the 
draft settlement was widely interpreted as suggesting independent statehood for the former 
autonomous province. Inter alia, the Ahtisaari plan proposed international membership within 
international organisations for Kosovo and the adoption of “national symbols.”661 Of course, 
Serbia rejected the plan and later, in November 2008, when Kosovo had already unilaterally 
declared independence, the EU accepted the demand of Serbia, not to implement the plan 
through its EULEX mission, as should have otherwise happened.  
 
However, while articles 2 and 3 of the plan clearly linked “self-governing” institutions’ 
responsibility to respecting equality of all communities and their rights, in line with previous 
statements and provisions, a hierarchical recognition of rights and groups was concurrently 
fostered. Similar to Bosnia, while the plan endorsed equality and human rights as grounding 
for the Kosovo polity, “ethnicity and groups rights were the paramount values in [the report’s] 
ethnicised discourse.”662 As in Bosnia, group rights, ethnicity and territoriality thus shaped 
the allocation of certain rights, in particular political ones. As in Bosnia, this inadequacy 
facilitated the setting up of a hierarchical allocation of rights, along, inevitably, older 
categories of recognition. The difference was that from 1999, the UNMIK was in charge of 
the citizenship registers.663 
 
To complicate the matter, since 2008, “despite the constitutionally and legally enshrined 
promise of equality, differentiated citizenship together with a political context defined by an 
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ethnic divide and past structural inequalities contributed to the emergence of hierarchical 
citizenship where some groups are more equal than others.”664 While the creation of new 
hierarchies might recall Koskenniemi’s “onion problem” earlier mentioned for Bosnia, it also 
seems to indicate that hierarchies continue to emerge, when even apparently egalitarian or 
liberationist principles (from Serbian “oppressors”) like self-determination become the 
organising principles of domestic orders. It seems, in turn, that since Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration, the OSCE Mission in loco has found in these new group rights hierarchies a 
reason to further “advise [Kosovo’s] institutions,” this time, for example, as to “how to 
improve and implement anti-discrimination legislation and policies.” Hence, after 2008, 
through its special section bearing the by now, for us, evocative name “Toleration and Non-
Discrimination,” the OSCE still “helps promoting tolerance and acceptance of diversity in 
Kosovo,” it “teaches young people about different cultural heritage,” but it also gives “strong 
recommendations.”665  
 
In what still seems to be – borrowing the expression from Bain – a “ new paternalism,” the 
overall OSCE mandate in Kosovo is in fact, as of today, “to take the lead role in all matters 
relating to institution and democracy-building.” In other words, its wording has not changed 
since it was first established, in 1999, as a “pillar” of the UNMIK. 666 The OSCE is still 
“regularly assessing the process of ‘democracy-building’,” as, it seems to be implied, Kosovo 
has not yet reached the standards “required,” to be recognised if not as a civilised, at least as a 
tolerable state internationally. OSCE reports (but also reports from other organisations) thus 
regularly indicate that despite constitutional equality, discrimination is still prevalent in 
Kosovo. This (once more) is ironic, as the Ahtisaari Plan itself, while proposing an uneven 
allocation and recognition of rights (Section II), suggested in 2007 that Kosovo could apply 
for membership in the society of states.  
 
Dominik Zaum has argued that “by establishing international administrations and denying 
self-governance to the affected populations [in Kosovo and Bosnia]” international society 
“compromises one of the fundamental aspects of sovereignty, the norm of self-
determination.”667 In IR and legal scholarship, Zaum is certainly not alone in making this 
                                            
664 Krasniqi, “Equal Citizens, Uneven ‘Communities’: Differentiated and Hierarchical Citizenship in Kosovo,” 1. 
665 From the mission statement of the section on Toleration and Non Discrimination: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/105094 - as of 1st December 2014 
666 http://www.osce.org/pc/28795 - the statement bears the date 1999 
667 Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox, 2007, 128. 
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claim. However, I have shown through this section and the previous, that the idea of self-
determination is in fact central to the history of Kosovo, or even Bosnia. In the case of 
Kosovo, after 1999 and until 2008, international actors seem to have carefully avoided the 
explicit term “self-determination,” referring instead to Kosovo’s “self-government.” 
However, as I have shown, it appears that they have constantly negotiated its three 
constitutive components: peoples, rights and responsibilities. It then seems to me that rather 
than compromising the idea of self-determination, the recent history of Kosovo has simply 
confirmed, Robert Lansing’s 1921 prophecy, that “the phrase is simply loaded with 
dynamite.”668  
 
Conclusion 
 
When, in 1991-1992, the EC Commission delineated the contours of self-determination for 
Yugoslavia, it also redefined international expectations attached with the idea. These 
international expectations were in line with Europe’s ideological commitment to liberalism 
and human rights, and clearly outlined what good domestic order ought to be within the new 
states if self-determination was to be realised. In the early 1990s, these expectations came to 
constitute a “pre-consensus,” later reinforced, I have shown, by increasingly ad hoc standards 
and measures, on which a more, or less, vigorous judgement on the legitimacy of new states 
could be made. However, I have shown, expectations were revised on contradictory grounds. 
While both the 1991-1992 settlement (for Croatia and Bosnia) and two international 
supervisory regimes (for Bosnia and Kosovo) have upheld an enhanced version of political 
equality and equality of rights within the polity, they have also promoted the hierarchical 
recognition of national and ethnic groups.  
 
This, however, does not seem to have mattered for international society’s categorising of 
states along lines of democratic/liberal zones of practice and identity. It seems then that over 
the 1990s and 2000s, while criteria of appropriate domestic behaviour have been constantly 
reviewed and refined, legitimate statehood and membership for the post-Yugoslav, “self-
determined” states has become increasingly aspirational. This might well evoke the 1920s 
international order. As the League of Nations repeatedly reminded the newly formed 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia that its status as sovereign equal was dependent upon meeting 
                                            
668 Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, 79. 
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expectations defined in the Minority Treaties, these very same treaties were constituted on 
contradictory grounds. In a way, the history of self-determination in the Balkans, both before 
World War I and from the end of the Cold War confirms Gerry Simpson’s point expressed 
only one year after end of the war in Bosnia: 
 
 “Throughout history, the elasticity of self-determination has ensured its longevity but diminished its 
legitimacy. It has managed to survive inconsistent application, to absorb anomalies and, ultimately, to 
satisfy powerful strategic and political interests and realities without compromising its revolutionary 
appeal”.669 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
669 Simpson, “The diffusion of sovereignty,” 1996, 260. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has offered an account of the twentieth century expansion of international society 
in which an ambiguous and contested idea of self-determination is central. I have sought to 
unearth a neglected side of the politics of self-determination, in which a combination of 
international disciplining and local practices produces stratifications both among and within 
states. The main critical point that I have made is that a linear tale of progressive equality 
attached to the expansion of the nation-state is at odds with logics of hierarchy that 
accompany the history of self-determination. Invoked to dismantle imperial orders and 
universalise the model of the nation-state, I have shown that self-determination has also 
involved exclusions and hierarchies, both domestically and internationally. This has been true 
throughout the twentieth century, though it has taken different forms for each wave of 
expansion of international society: the conclusion of World War I, the wave of post-World 
War II decolonisation, and following the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
 
The Argument Restated 
 
I have argued that despite their variations, twentieth century understandings and usages of the 
idea of self-determination point to a recurrent tension. This is a tension between the 
egalitarian aspirations of self-determination, on the one hand, and the practices of hierarchy 
associated with self-determination, on the other. For each of the 20th century waves of 
expansion of international society, this tension has been evident at three different levels of 
world politics. First, it has been embodied in the disciplinary role of international society, 
when self-determination was redefined, during each wave of state formation, as the standard 
of legitimate membership and statehood. Second, the tension has manifested at the domestic 
level of the newly “self-determined” states as boundaries of national political communities 
were delineated. Third, and as an implication of all this, the tension is found in the ordering of 
states within international society. Let me survey again each of these dimensions. 
 
First, the tension has been manifest in international redefinitions of self-determination. In 
becoming the accepted standard for post-imperial statehood and membership in international 
society, I have argued that self-determination has entailed correlative disciplining 
expectations. These, I have suggested, have been international expectations as to what “good” 
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domestic order ought to be within post-imperial states, expectations that have shaped at given 
times and in different ways, conceptions about legitimate statehood and membership. They 
have regularly revealed that the political equality of individuals and equality of rights is 
constitutive of the nation-state. However, they have also been at times more, at other times 
less, explicit and coherent, periodically fostering the recognition of certain claims over others. 
These expectations, I have suggested, thus compromise the dominant narrative about equality 
within and among states. To fully comprehend these expectations, I disaggregated the idea of 
self-determination into what I have identified are its three historical components: “peoples,” 
“rights” and “responsibilities.” 
  
Second, I have argued that the tension has taken form at the domestic level of the new, “self-
determined” states, as political élites came to draw the boundaries of national political 
communities. I have shown that the egalitarian ethos attached to the concept of self-
determination obscures the problem that how the “people” are defined matters for how rights 
are to be allocated. Specifically, throughout the past century, uneven distributions of political 
rights persisted within many post-imperial states. “Hierarchical membership,” that is old 
social distinctions or hierarchies inherited from past imperial modes of recognition, have 
structured post-imperial societies.  
 
International expectations about equality within new states have thus only rarely been met. I 
have argued in fact that domestic politics of self-determination were largely perceived 
internationally as a distortion, or misapplication of the principle within “self-determined” 
states. This contrast, I have suggested, has resulted in the re-establishment of hierarchies 
between “old” and post-imperial states in international society; between more civilised or less 
civilised states; between states that allegedly are defined by equality and inclusion and those 
that witness hierarchical membership in politics of self-determination. Hence, whereas 
international norms have become delineated increasingly in liberal terms, the practice of 
creating hierarchies of status has not disappeared.  
 
Historical Cases 
 
The bulk of the thesis then sought to demonstrate the historical basis for my claims. I have 
chosen to study each twentieth century wave of expansion of international society. First, for 
each period examined, I have looked at international redefinitions of self-determination, at the 
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1919 Paris Peace Conference, at the UN over the two decades following World War II, and 
through the Opinions of the EC Committee in 1991-1992. Then, I have looked at the role of 
self-determination domestically, in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after 1919, in post-colonial 
Africa after 1960 with a specific focus on Nigeria, and in the Balkans after 1990, drawing 
international implications for each case.  
 
 Post-1919 Order 
 
The historical investigation started with the end of World War I and the Paris Peace 
Conference, when self-determination became a principle of international order. In Paris, self-
determination became the shared standard of post-imperial membership within international 
society. The Paris Peacemakers directed the principle to the territories formerly under the 
authority of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, whereas territories formerly under 
the rule of defeated powers were put under the tutelage of the League of Nations, through the 
Mandate System. The allocation of self-determination and recognition of statehood was made 
conditional upon the signing of the Minority Treaties, outlining the contours of appropriate 
state conduct. More specifically, I have suggested, they delineated the defining components of 
self-determination: peoples, rights and responsibilities. “Peoples” were defined in ethnic 
terms, as the principle was directed to Central and South-Eastern Europe to those groups that 
had mobilised national sentiment in the 19th century. They were granted the “right” to 
independent statehood and recognition, but they also had to conform to a series of conditions, 
such as the respect of equality domestically and – though unequal - recognition of certain 
minority groups and their rights.   
 
The way domestic societies came to be delineated and treated within many newly formed 
states, though, did not follow the Great Powers’ expectations, as established in the treaties. To 
illustrate my claim I examined the case of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as, 
only some months after international recognition of independent statehood, national 
authorities there inaugurated practices of hierarchical membership. These were established 
along old social categories inherited from imperial politics of recognition. Although, as I have 
stressed, these were justified in the name of international principles, hierarchical membership 
showed that international expectations attached to self-determination had not been met. 
Throughout the 1920s, I have shown, the League of Nations would constantly remind 
Yugoslavia and other post-imperial states that their status as sovereign equals was dependent 
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upon meeting international expectations about appropriate state behaviour. With their 
contradictions, the Minority Treaties functioned as standards of appropriate statehood and 
membership. That more “mature” states could interfere (though they very rarely did so) in the 
domestic jurisdiction of states viewed as less experienced indicates, I have contended, that 
hierarchies of status between new and old states were a leitmotiv at the League. Interestingly, 
these hierarchies, I have argued, in many respects followed the lines of old assumptions about 
international social order.  
 
 Post-1945 Order and Decolonisation 
 
Following the end of World War II, with its inclusion in the Charter, the right of self-
determination was formalised in international law and took on an ethnically blind 
connotation. However, I have argued, it was conceived more as aspirational than as an 
immediately and universally applicable right. In fact, I have argued that in the early years of 
the UN, together with the promotion of egalitarian principles such as sovereign equality and 
human rights, international practice was characterised by hierarchical worldviews. I then 
endorsed the view supported by the existing literature that throughout the 1950s, post-colonial 
delegates at the UN and, to a lesser extent, local colonial élites, seized the western-defined 
language of human rights, which they used to justify their claims to self-determination.670 
Thereby, I suggested, post-colonial delegates granted new meaning to self-determination’s 
components. Against the will of colonial powers, self-determination was grounded on 
universal moral foundations, though its practical application was limited by the principle of 
uti possidetis juris to those under colonial rule. In turn, both rights and responsibilities 
attached to self-determination came to be embedded in the language of human rights. As a 
result, I have suggested, a nexus between human rights and political rights within bounded 
polities (necessary for the exercise of self-determination) was also formalised. 
 
Struggles at the UN culminated in the passing in 1960 of resolution 1514 by the General 
Assembly. The resolution demanded the termination of colonialism and thereby the end of the 
whole constellation of ideas, norms and rules governing colonial empires. The Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial People prompted, in the name of self-determination 
                                            
670 Reus-Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty,” 2001; Burke, Decolonization and 
the Evolution of International Human Rights, 2010; Reus-Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the 
International System, 2013. 
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of the equality of peoples and human rights, the immediate constitution of new states in areas 
still under colonial rule. However, I have argued that when post-colonial states in Africa 
delineated the boundaries of their political communities, hierarchy largely prevailed over 
equality. I examined membership practices in several post-colonial states formerly under 
French and British rule, and argued that new states largely inherited, following the formal 
devolution of power, hierarchies from past imperial modes of recognition. By looking at the 
case of Nigeria, I showed how national élites found in ethnicity and other kinship criteria 
empowering justifications for the establishment of new distinctions grounded in old ideas, as 
claims to self-determination re-emerged domestically. With decolonisation, international 
supervisory regimes retreated, due to norms of sovereign equality and non-interference. 
However, though in a more tentative form, hierarchical worldviews were reconstituted in the 
arguments of numerous scholars. 
 
 Post-Cold War Order 
 
With the break-up of Yugoslavia at the start of the 1990s, claims of self-determination in the 
name of ethnicity reappeared internationally. I argued that the organisation of the European 
Conference on Yugoslavia and the establishment of a special EC Committee attests to the 
international readiness to redefine the contours of self-determination and its normative 
components. Compared with the two other historical periods, this was undertaken through the 
EC Committee’s legal opinions. As it became obvious that the substance of both “peoples” 
and “rights” had already been defined by the claimants, more attention was granted to the 
correlative responsibilities if statehood was to be recognised. However, I argued that these 
delineations bore contradictions. Coinciding with Europe’s commitment to democracy and 
human rights through the 1990 Paris Charter, liberal norms were upheld, but international 
practice was characterised by the recognition of ethnic groups and thus, in turn, of some of 
their claims. 
  
I have shown that in several post-Yugoslav states, practices of hierarchical membership had 
already been inaugurated to redefine national political communities, following old social 
categories of recognition inherited from Yugoslavia. These categories were used as rationales 
for exclusion and mass killings and were occasionally justified in the name of international 
recognition. As violence was spreading throughout the Balkans, international involvement in 
the region became increasingly ad hoc. International expectations as defined in 1990-1992 
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came to be coupled for each context with more detailed international standards and 
monitoring tools. These, I have demonstrated, took the form of enhanced conditions to which 
new states had to conform if they sought recognition as equal sovereigns (or simply 
sovereigns) in international society. To illustrate my claims, I examined three cases where 
international responses differed: Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. 
 
Contributions of the Thesis 
 
This thesis offers two sets of contributions to the discipline of International Relations: one 
theoretical, on the study of hierarchy and civilisation, and the other methodological, on the 
study of history in IR.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
First, the thesis speaks directly to the literature on the constitution of hierarchy in world 
politics. Over recent years, the discipline has witnessed a growing interest in this area, as 
authors have started to call into question the traditional assumption that anarchy is the 
fundamental condition of the international system. Interpretivist literature had already 
disputed this framework in the early 1990s, suggesting that anarchy was by no means the 
inevitable condition of international relations,671 that instead these might well be combined in 
a specific way to produce a certain order,672 and that this order might have well been 
hierarchical.673 Over the past decade, a range of alternative perspectives has developed on the 
matter, spanning from rationalism to constructivism, investigating both the persistence of 
imperial dynamics674 and the reconstitution of hierarchical logics in world politics.675 This 
thesis contributes to this body of literature, underlining that both logics of hierarchy and 
residues of empire matter as much as logics of equality in the contemporary world order.  
 
                                            
671 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.” 
672 Onuf, World of Our Making. 
673 Clark, The Hierarchy of States. 
674 Motyl, Imperial Ends, 2001; Sharman, “International Hierarchies and Contemporary Imperial Governance.” 
675 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, 2009; Cooley and Spruyt, Contracting States Sovereign Transfers 
in International Relations; Donnelly, “Rethinking Political Structures”; Hobson and Sharman, “The Enduring 
Place of Hierarchy in World Politics”; Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society Grotius, Colonialism and Order in 
World Politics, 2002. 
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In this sense, this thesis resonates with arguments advanced by Edward Keene and Gerry 
Simpson on the “bifurcated” nature of twentieth century world order.676 Both authors argue 
that the contemporary order is characterised by a twofold pattern. On the one hand, they see 
“toleration” (in the words of Keene), or “liberal pluralism” (following Simpson), as 
underscoring sovereign equality and non-interference despite cultural and political 
differences. On the other hand, they view “civilisation” (in the words of Keene), or “liberal 
anti-pluralism” (in those of Simpson), as the tendency to categorise states on the basis of their 
internal moral and political characteristics, following international liberal norms.677 Both 
Keene and Simpson blur the boundaries between the domestic and international sphere. This 
thesis, by engaging in a historical study of both the domestic and international practice of 
self-determination, has advanced this intellectual agenda. As Andrew Hurrell has argued, self-
determination is after all the principle that “more than any other, ties the inside and the 
outside, what the units are to be, who their members are, and how their boundaries are to be 
determined.”678  
 
Second, the thesis speaks to the flourishing literature, to which Keene’s work is also related, 
on the twentieth century “civilising project.” As indicated by John Hobson, given their 
complementary themes, literatures on hierarchy and civilisation have in fact sometimes 
converged.679 Authors, in particular those from the English School, have increasingly argued 
that whereas decolonisation and human rights codification inflicted a coup de grace to 
explicitly hierarchical ideas about civilisation and peoples, this has not meant that their 
underlying structures have been entirely discarded. 680 New practices and criteria have instead 
been attached to the post-World War II liberal “civilising project.”681 These, it has been 
argued, are largely associated with the liberal international enterprise: from the endorsement 
of democratic government and the respect of human rights, to the status of women and the 
                                            
676 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, 2002, 6, 121, 124; 
Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 2004, 312. 
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realisation of economic and financial standards.682 This thesis has shown that the idea of self-
determination can also be related to a civilising project, though throughout the twentieth 
century as a whole. Whereas self-determination is largely imagined as an egalitarian and 
liberationist principle, I have shown that as the standard of membership in international 
society, it has also operated as an elusive token of civilised behaviour and identity. 
 
Historical Implications: Recovering Meaning in History 
 
In addition to these theoretical contributions, the thesis makes a second, methodological 
contribution to the study of International Relations. By understanding self-determination in 
terms of its three components—peoples, rights, and responsibilities—it can contribute to the 
further development of a constructivist approach to study history. In 2008 Christian Reus-
Smit considered what it means to do “constructivist history.” He suggested that the way 
constructivists engage in history is distinct in IR, flowing from its foundational idea that 
ideational structures are “constitutive forces in history.”683 Constructivists, he argues, view 
ideas as giving “meaning to historical processes, forces that warrant, justify, and license 
certain forms of action.”684 Because of their interest in social, political and moral change, 
constructivists have favoured the comparative study of several historical moments that, they 
consider, represent turning points in relation to the ideas they study. For this reason they often 
use macro-historical methodologies.685 Favouring a focus on how political actors, rather than 
big thinkers, act and formulate claims, constructivists look at how their ideas reflect or defy 
contingent understandings of what are legitimate identities and behaviours, at given times.686  
 
Differing from much intellectual history, constructivist history does not bound its 
understanding of ideas to the use of one word or phrase. Intellectual historians are interested 
in the impact of ideas held by thinkers within a specific historical setting and, conversely, in 
how these contexts contribute to the emergence of specific thoughts. Related to the purpose of 
                                            
682 See respectively: Stivachtis, “Democracy, the Highest State of ‘Civilised’ Statehood”; Donnelly, “Human 
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their discipline, intellectual historians’ analyses are thus largely focused on key theoretical or 
philosophical texts. In turn, because of their concern with intersubjective ideas held by 
thinkers as well as, importantly, by other social agents, constructivists understand context 
beyond text. Therefore, they search for ideas and seek to understand them through complexes 
of meanings that encompass both behavioural and discursive practices, rather than only 
through “tell-tale” words.687However, as Michael Barnett has remarked, in spite of their 
interest in historical processes, constructivists “have been less attentive to historiographical 
issues than they probably should be.”688  
 
My approach to self-determination, based on the three historical components that I have 
identified by looking at broader international debates for each wave of state formation, fits 
this emerging constructivist project. In this space I want to take a step further and make the 
case for a concept, or tool, that might, as a consequence of my research, contribute to 
recovering meaning in the historical study of international relations. As a way forward, I 
propose thinking in terms of “immanent meanings.” I understand immanent meanings as an 
analytical category, helpful for macro-historical research inasmuch as it allows the 
identification of discourses and practices reflecting key ideas of political, social and moral life 
in world order, at given times. Put simply, I take an immanent meaning to be one that is 
expressed through complex forms of arguments and conjunctions of propositions, not 
necessarily in single terms or phrases.  
 
Much has been written on discourse, practices and possibly context as meaningful analytical 
categories in social, historical and philosophical studies. When compared to these, I suggest, 
the concept of “immanent meanings” is more inclusive. Inherent to it is a constant conceptual 
swing between on the one hand agency, via a focus on practices, and on the other hand, 
structures – in the case of interpretivism, ideational ones. “Immanent meanings” implies 
operating with an understanding of one idea, inclusive enough to identify certain behavioural 
and discursive practices within a meaningful span of time or area, reflective, in turn, of that 
given idea. This is precisely what I have sought to do in this thesis, through the identification 
of self-determination’s normative components.  
                                            
687 As cases in point of this approach see: Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples, 2002; Reus-
Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System, 2013; Glanville, Sovereignty and the 
Responsibility to Protect, 2014. 
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 Articulating the concept of “immanent meanings” is helpful to the extent that, if systematised, 
it can represent a valuable tool for historical enquiry, for at least two reasons. First, it sheds 
light on the impact of past ideas on the politics of their time. It does so by allowing us to 
uncover the historical presence of notions, the content of which has shifted over time, 
stressing change. Simultaneously though, it points to the persistence/existence of specific 
patterns of action and broadly defined ideas, throughout history. Second, this concept, used in 
constructivist history, does something that intellectual history is mostly not concerned with. It 
sheds light on how ideas are understood within debates and practices in contemporary world 
politics. Michael Mahon suggests that genealogy becomes a “diagnostic history for the 
present.”689 I too, advance the argument that “immanent meanings” can help us to critically 
conceive contemporary world politics, and think about how meaning comes to be constructed, 
in specific ways, over time.  
 
In the study of IR, “immanent meanings” have a purpose for historical enquiries, such as this 
one, which seek to study an idea having some relevance either in modern or contemporary 
politics. Historians, and in particular intellectual historians, might a priori argue against my 
proposition, contending instead that ideas have their own integrity, related to the context in 
which they emerge and develop. The concept that I advance, though, does not seek to deny 
that. It represents, instead, a helpful tool with which to call into question the tendency to grant 
absolute meanings to specific ideas, be they upheld by thinkers or agents of public political 
life. If one idea is recurrent over time this does not equate with its content being unchanging. 
The fixing of one meaning upon a given idea is precisely what constructivist history seeks to 
dispute, as does this thesis. Nonetheless it is a compelling phenomenon of international life 
that certain ideas navigate over time, changing in their content. This is clear for concepts 
unambiguously at the heart of the functioning of the international system. “Immanent 
meanings” though can help to reveal less distinct ones through the identification of clusters of 
trends and their variation throughout history. They allow us to scrutinise how similar 
arguments can be made in different situations. They also allow us to investigate how different 
types of arguments can have a similar “perlocutionary power,”690 though bearing different 
contents according to the context in which they are developed.  
                                            
689 Mahon, Foucault’s Nietzschean Genealogy Truth, Power, and the Subject, 101. 
690 See Skinner, Visions of Politics. Volume 1, Regarding Method, 99. Skinner suggests that in his view, the work 
of intellectual historians should be concerned less with what certain authors may have intended by writing in a 
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 Before concluding this thesis, I would like to address the two risks that I identify in my 
attempt to define the practice of searching for “immanent meanings.” I see these as critiques 
that historians could address to this intellectual proposition. The first is what I term the 
“teleology risk.” Namely, it is the danger of starting to believe that if certain arguments were 
made throughout history it was because they were meant to develop in a certain way in 
modern or contemporary politics. My answer to this is that while the search for “immanent 
meanings” stems from the need to think critically about modern politics, the arguments agents 
made or ideas people upheld are both historically and culturally bounded. In other words, 
thinking in terms of “immanent meanings” does not mean presupposing that the conception 
that was held in a different historical moment was modern or contemporary. Nor does it mean 
that a conception held in a non-western context is/was defined by western ideals. Thinking in 
terms of “immanent meanings” does not equate with the search for timeless or universal 
truths. Instead, because of its “relativism” it can help develop not only analytical clarity, by 
developing a certain subtleness in looking at ideas and practices over time, but also 
conceptual inclusiveness as, though changing over time, ideas and practices bear 
commonalities that could otherwise not be identified.  
 
The second risk is one of anachronism, namely, granting meanings and interpretations to 
given arguments in the belief that they could refer to an idea proper to more recent times, or 
to the past. The truth is that this second risk is harder to avoid for an IR theorist. It seems 
sensible, however, to look for “immanent meanings” within an overarching historical span of 
time, made coherent by the presence of pre-existing normative structures - be they loosely or 
firmly rooted – that allow for the development of cognate ideas and practices. “Immanent 
meanings” thus explicitly refer to ideas that bear some minimal degree of intersubjectivity; 
otherwise they simply could not be identified within the normative context that gives them 
substance.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
certain way (perluctionary act) than with what authors were doing in writing certain texts (illocutionary act); 
Skinner grounds his distinction upon Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 99-102. It is my contention, 
however, that IR scholars who are engaged with history do have something to tell in regard to the 
“perlocutionary power” of certain acts, and that this relates to the reception and understanding in the broader 
sphere of social and political relations. In other words, I refer here to the “causal” role that ideas have in shaping 
history. 
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